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# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

## TEEMING ASIA AND THE WEST

THE breakdown of Western civilization, so often forecast, may remain an unsubstantiated terror. However, as far as the prediction is limited to the end of the white man's era—that is, to the world order (or disorder) established by him and the present distribution of the earth and its resources—the the vision is, indeed, assuming grim contours of reality.

The imminent danger which has overshadowed our public life has been that from aggressive totalitarian communism. For good reasons, our anxious attention is still turned to the Kremlin as the central source of international peril. But it is the Kremlin's junction with the countless masses of Asia—an Asia provided with modern and continuously growing armies—which makes it clear that our technological superiority already has ceased to offer full protection to us and to our abundance of life, while our numerical inferiority is steadily growing.

In the Second World War the Hitler attack on the very foundations of Western civilization was linked through the Axis system with the Asian challenge of Western supremacy. The threat we now are facing presents the same combination of European totalitarianism and Asiatic nationalism, but on an enlarged scale: the Axis nations comprised 200 million, the Communist nations represent 750 million. These figures reflect another basic difference. The master-race theory was essentially not an article of export; Hitler created Quislings but not followers; and his Asian partner preached "Asia for Asians" but had all the people of Asia against him. The Communist gospel is luring millions in the West and in the East; in Asia it has become a banner under which her teeming masses are being united in their



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striving for land and bread, and in their hatred against the Western lords of the world.

I

In the dark picture of the West's relations with Russia following World War II there was one encouraging aspect: the absence of deeper economic and demographic motives underlying the new Russian imperialism. This is even more true today. Russia needs to conquer no markets, no sources of raw material (with the possible exception of North-Iranian oil, considered as a prolongation of the Baku oil fields) and no territory for an overflowing population. A relative exhaustion of farmland reserves is compensated by industrialization based on the resources of the soil and subsoil. Also, industrialization and urbanization have curbed the birth rate which is falling in spite of all efforts of the Soviets to encourage the production of cannon fodder. The birth rate in Russia before 1905 was above 50 per thousand. Since then, it has slowly declined to less than 40 per thousand by 1930, and to around 35 in the late 1930's. After the Second World War the trend continued, reducing the birth rate to between 25 and 30 per thousand. Thus, the Russian standard of living could gradually be raised if the economic activity were not made to serve military purposes.

Quite different is the situation we face in Asia. The Russian people are destitute because they are Communist-ruled; the Asian people are accepting Communist rule because they are destitute. Eastern and Southern Asia, in particular, are victims of overpopulation. Up to the seventeenth century unlimited production of children was offset by a slaughterhouse mortality. The permanent state of warfare effectively checked population growth. What should be emphasized is that military activities, as such, were not so murderous as the ensuing economic ruin. When marching through a land, an armed horde may or may not have trampled down the crops and demolished irrigation works; they certainly made provision for themselves, foraged, collected "taxes" and imposed "contributions"; and what they left was often taken over by their adversaries or by neutral bandits. Many peasants were reduced to the status of beggars and vagabonds, homes were deserted, lands stood untilled. The hungry,

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enfeebled wanderers became victims as well as carriers of epidemics which completed the work of sharply reducing the population.

However, the former equilibrium between high fertility and high mortality was upset when the destruction of surplus population in the course of wars was stopped by the Manchu dynasty in China, the British governors in India, and the Dutch rulers in Indonesia. In China the situation radically changed toward the end of the seventeenth century, when the Manchu obtained control over the whole Chinese territory. For a hundred and twenty years there followed unbroken internal peace, while during the succeding hundred years peace and relative security were the normal conditions, although interrupted by years of rebellion and war. Restored order, dikes and dams repaired or rebuilt, rudimentary relief in cases of flood, drought and famine, and expanded farming which made use of every piece of land brought about an increase of China's population from 100 million at the end of the seventeenth century to 300 million around 1800, and to 400 million in the twentieth century.

Still more spectacular, because more rapid, was the growth of population in India and Indonesia. When Warren Hastings became the first governor-general of British India (1774) the population of the subcontinent was slightly over 100 million. As British control gradually extended over the territory the population grew faster and faster, exceeding 400 million when the new states of Pakistan and India were born (1950). The population of Java rose from 5 million in 1815 to some 50 million when it was taken over by the new national government of Indonesia (1948). The total population of Indonesia is now about 75 million.

To peace and security, colonial administrations added efficient famine relief and control of epidemic diseases. The latter is probably the field where success was most conspicuous. Smallpox ceased to cut off millions of lives; in Indonesia it almost disappeared. The antiplague vaccine, developed by Haffkine in the British-Indian service, became a powerful weapon. Malaria was checked by quinine, which in India became available in every post office. Medical help was extended outside the colonial area to China, at first by European missionaries and then on a much larger scale by American organizations which also tried to

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provide famine relief. In all of Eastern and Southern Asia mortality was curbed, whereas an unchanged social structure kept the high birth rate intact (except for the beginning of a decrease of natality in industrially progressive Japan). As a result, 1,100,000,000 people have come during our times to live jammed in Eastern and Southern Asia.

The close of the era of relative peace and stability came toward the beginning of the twentieth century, and was symbolized by the early revolts against British rule in India and the Chinese revolution of 1911. Paradoxically enough, the condition of overpopulation which peace had created had laid a groundwork for further unrest. As a cure for this unrest in overcrowded Asia we made sincere efforts to improve the standard of living of her hundreds of millions, especially in the way of the Point Four program; and we even offered the highest blessing of Western civilization—democracy. But we were met with the unscrupulous competition of the Communist totalitarians to whom, incidentally, we yielded the strongest weapon of propaganda—the luring promise of land.

## II

The words Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor addressed to Christ may symbolize the defeat of democracy in her struggle with communism for the soul of Asia. "Thou didst promise them the bread of Heaven, but . . . if for the sake of the bread of Heaven thousands shall follow Thee, what is to become of the millions . . . of creatures who will not have the strength to forego the earthly bread for the sake of the heavenly?" Thousands—intellectuals and politicians—stretched out their hands for the heavenly bread of democracy, but millions of common people (who in Asia are mostly peasants) asked for the plain earthly bread and the bread-yielding land. And it is the Asian Communist rulers, whom Moscow has indoctrinated and provided with arms to seize the land, who are giving it to the peasant.

Of course, no land distribution will change the ratio of land to men, which in China is approximately two thirds of an acre of cultivated land per person (as compared with three acres in the United States), and it will hardly ameliorate the economic conditions of masses. Also, to keep the governmental machinery going

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and to mend it, the Communist régime must squeeze an agrarian surplus from the peasant just as relentlessly as the landlords ever did. Apart from foreign help, agriculture is in Asia almost the only source out of which military and industrial progress can be paid for; hence it can be foreseen that when the new order is firmly established the peasant will be fleeced still more and oppressed to the point where he finally becomes a serf in the collective farm. But then it will be too late to shake off his new yoke, heavier than any previous one.

With or without collectivization, land distribution is no lasting solution of the Asian economic problem which is too little land for too many people. Yet neither have we a solution. This is no primitive area where a touch of Western technology would produce miracles. Scientific farming could bring about a certain increase of crops even in China, though Western agricultural scientists who have worked there insist that they have learned as much as they have taught. The main profit of improved agricultural methods would be to set free manpower occupied in farming; but for what purpose since the labor supply is already abundant?

The Western panaceas against the misfortunes of Asia are birth control and industrialization: the latter would provide for more rational utilization of the available manpower; the former would prevent agglomeration of new surpluses. Birth control and industrialization, indeed, played prominent rôles in preventing Western Europe from being plunged into overpopulation and misery. However, the success of these innovations was due to conditions quite different from those of today's Asia. In the West the transition from a traditional to a rational approach to childbearing was not the cause but rather the result of a changed pattern of economic and social life. It was mainly a by-product of industrialization and urbanization, and it took a long time before fertility began to fall more rapidly than mortality. In the meantime the economic sphere of Europe's growing population could be enlarged by a complex of interrelated factors—the rise of industry, improved farming, the colonization of new land areas, and the opening of new markets— which characterized the predominantly peaceful era of Western progress.

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The problem which Asia now faces may be similar to the one the West had to solve; namely, to keep economic and social progress winning the race over the growth of population, until higher living levels would restrain reproduction. However, the possibilities of solution are different. Unlimited spaces stood open before the West to absorb the most "superfluous"; the East finds access to any less overcrowded areas bolted and barred. The West bought "colonial goods"—food and raw materials—at a low price and sold manufactured goods at a relatively high price, and the difference—the income of the industrial population—enlarged the internal market; the East has to pay dearly for its imports and to sell cheaply its exports. For Asian industry is a late-comer, and its cheap labor is its main asset in free competition, as far as it has access to a free competitive market. But it has almost no access; and that is the crucial point, because the internal market, too, is severely restricted so that even the product of the cheap labor cannot be purchased by the peasantry.

An example of an Asian country which "solved" its demographic problem through industrialization is provided by Japan. The growth of the population (from 30 million in 1850 to 75 million in 1940) and its shift to the cities and to industry proceeded in intimate connection with political and economic expansion. Emigration certainly operated as a safety valve; but the annexed or occupied areas were mainly utilized as a source of food and raw material and as a monopolistic market for manufactured goods. The process entered its final phase in the 1930's, after Japan's enlarging sale in the world market was shattered by world depression and international trade restrictions. Japan's response was a new outward surge, economic progress becoming a mere by-product of conquest followed by preparation for further conquest. And, as long as this program did not collapse on the battlefield, Japan had no trouble in keeping her increasing manpower busy.

That is how the solution of an Asian overpopulation problem through industrialization looks in the sad reality, not in the sweet dreams of humanitarians who would like to see people happy the world over, provided they do not compete with us either in the commodities market or in the labor market. The

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post-war outlook of Japan shows the limitations upon the opportunities which remain open to an industrialized Asian country, when it has been forced to become peaceful. As "a Japanese industrialist" quoted by Hessel Tiltman, the Tokyo correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, said:

> We have got to house, feed, clothe and care for 85 million people. We cannot alleviate the problem by migration. Birth control would not help for the next 20 crucial years; the workers of tomorrow are already born and growing up. If, as soon as we begin selling tuna or chinaware to the United States or textiles or machinery to the sterling countries, there are cries of "cheap labor" and a "flood" of Japanese goods, then we may have to reconsider our national policies. No nation starves quietly.

## III

From time immemorial Asia was the birthplace of all great movements of people. The fate of nations thousands of miles away depended on the direction of the expansion of China, the world's greatest agglomeration of sedentary population. It has been suggested with good reason that China's vigorous defense against the nomads, based on the Great Wall at her northern confines, started the population avalanche that crushed the Roman Empire. The next great thrust against Europe began in Southwest Asia; the Arab conquest in the seventh and eighth centuries deprived Byzantium of most of her possessions, encircled the Mediterranean over North Africa, and was stopped only in France. In the meantime, China had progressed as far as Central Asia where her clash with the right wing of Arab expansion hurled new waves of nomads against Europe; one of these peoples—the Hungarians—when firmly established on the middle Danube became a new plague for Western Europe. Blocked and harassed from all sides, its people destroyed themselves in endless wars and feuds. Only in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when the Chinese expansion turned to the South, did the diversion of Asian nomadic streams toward Northern China as well as to the Middle East give Europe breathing time, and in the Crusades Europe even took the offensive. Although the conquests of the Crusaders were short-lived, feudal anarchy could be slowly checked while these distant exploits

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were engaging the adventurous elements; the population grew steadily, the cultivated area was enlarged, and craft and commerce promoted the advance of urban life.

In the thirteenth century the greatest Mongol eruption—under Genghis Khan and his successors—which had acquired exceptional strength by absorbing elements of Chinese civilization, overflowed the world up to Central Europe. Although the flood soon receded somewhat, Russia was for centuries lost to Western civilization; and one of the tribes pushed by the Mongols—the Ottoman Turks—embarked upon the conquest of the remnant of the Byzantine Empire. In this way, the first period of Western progress came to an end, political and economic conditions deteriorated, being still more aggravated by the Black Death which in the middle of the fourteenth century reduced Europe's population by one third. The Turkish conquest culminated in the capture of Constantinople (1453) and was only stopped before Vienna (1683). Like a nightmare, the Turk pressed down upon Europe, but it was this awesome pressure which gave start to a new life. The Ottoman conquest barred the old ways of commerce with India and forced Europeans to seek new routes across the ocean.

It still took centuries before the rôles of the West and East were interchanged. As late as 1700 A.D. hardly any European potentate could rival in wealth and power an Emperor of China, the Great Mogul of India or the Sultan of Turkey. Only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did the technology of Western civilization enable nations of European stock to seize all "open spaces" and to exclude from them the peoples of Asia. Europeans would have liked to "colonize" the Asian continent, too. The Russians succeeded in doing this in the northern part of Asia. Their persevering penetration of the course of three centuries from the Urals to the Pacific barred Chinese expansion toward the North. The fertile steppes of Central Asia and Southern Siberia, sparsely populated by primitive agriculturalists and nomads, became, particularly after the construction of railways, a settlement area for tens of millions of Russians. Western Europeans who invaded Asia from the sea met nations with the oldest civilizations in the world. Because their population

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was numerous and dense, their lands could not be colonized. But since they were technologically backward, they could be politically or economically subdued.

In the late nineteenth century the full conquest of Asia seemed to be around the corner. Only European rivalry frustrated its accomplishment. And because of this same rivalry a reverse of the trends was initiated at the dawn of the next century. Having acquired the European know-how, Japan inflicted a heavy defeat upon Russia. Japan's victory was considered as a success for Britain's policy, because of its tendency toward weakening Russian influence in the Far East, and it was generally viewed in Western Europe and America from this angle. Only a few, imbued with a deep knowledge of Asia and the Asians, grasped the meaning of the event.

"The history of Asia had arrived at a turning point", wrote Meredith Townsend in the preface to the 3rd edition (1905) of his *Asia and Europe*.[1] He foresaw that "the great effort to conquer Asia, which has now been going on for two centuries, must now terminate." René Grousset, the French authority on Asia, was far from being an Anglophobe; for him "to challenge the British Empire was to attempt Europe." Yet, concerning the unsoundness of British policy in the Russo-Japanese war, he wrote (in 1924): "There may come a day when the action of Anglo-Indians [*sic!*], pushing the Japanese armies against the Russians, will appear similar to that of the first Byzantine emperors who threw the Goths upon Europe."

By the end of the nineteenth century, then, Europe held the Asian continent firmly gripped within two gigantic arms, the one stretching across Siberia and the other pressing around the coast. When Japan succeeded in pushing back the Russian expansion, the English-speaking world had given its blessing to this first revolt of Asia. Three decades later Japan invaded the continent, and then, incited by Germany, in 1941 stormed to the South against her former friends, the United States and Great Britain. Still the tide was stemmed. The attempt of the in-

[1] *Asia and Europe: Studies presenting the conclusions formed by the author in a long life devoted to the subject of the relations between Asia and Europe* (New York and London, 1905).

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sular nation to change the course of world history was only a prologue. For now the mainland of Asia personified by China has entered the arena, trying to advance to the East and to the South and to push out the peoples of the Western nations. Chinese military forces are being Russianized—as in the past in Japan the army was Germanized and the navy Anglicized. As a matter of fact, what we observe today is still not so much an alleviation of foreign pressure upon East and South Asia (considered as an entity), as rather a change of the character and source of the pressure. As old-fashioned colonialism fades, Soviet imperialism is extending its more sophisticated domination. Or, speaking in terms of geography and dynamics of history, the retreat of Western Europe to and from the shores of Asia corresponds to the Russian advance from the North.

In the future the Chinese advance to the East and South may merely continue in the same directions; it could provide the basis for further expansion to the East and North, ultimately turning toward Russia herself. Although the Communist rulers of Russia may still pursue the goal of Communist world domination by furnishing China with guns and ideology, in the aspect of history the phenomenon we witness can be formulated as follows: after a respite of a few centuries, the bearer of the most ancient civilization and the largest conglomeration of human masses is about to resume its former—one might even say, its traditional—rôle as a primary source of peoples' movements, peaceful and warlike, which seem to underlie the courses of political history.[2]

The old Chinese way of life with its familiar symbols of mandarins, pigtails, deformed women's feet, and rikhshas has vanished and with them also have gone the white man's prestige and the allegedly inbred Chinese pacifism and disdain for the military profession. The Chinese soldier has again crossed the border and has demonstrated his will to fight. It is for the military experts to judge how much time the industrial preparation required for military exploits under modern conditions will take. The laymen can only state the facts as they are. The above-quoted Townsend wrote: "If 200 years hence [the future] shows Europe ruling, taxing and enlightening the great mass of Asiatics, then

[2] See my article "Migration" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. XV, 1952.

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have I . . . read history in vain." The prediction has been almost fulfilled in less than fifty years.

Sufficient to crush the Boxer uprising in 1900 were 20,000 foreign soldiers who went from the coast as if on parade and seized and looted the Chinese capital. Today American crack troops have been needed to stop the Chinese and Koreans at the cost of heavy losses. Asia's old cultural tradition facilitates the adoption of other nations' achievements; and technology, jazz and communism are the most easily assimilated elements of Western "civilization". When its climax has been attained—the assembly-line fabrication of instruments of mass extermination—and once the peoples of Asia have become aware that their perpetual misery is not Heaven-ordained, they will hardly accept the partitioning of the world as it was performed in the course of the short period of white domination.

What appears inevitable is that a redistribution of the world and its resources will take place. We have in mind not a political but an economic and demographic expansion of the peoples of Asia, and history teaches that such expansion can be the result as well of victory as of defeat. Furthermore, it need not be inevitable that this development should come about only after large-scale armed conflict between East and West. However, Communist activity in Asia has placed severe restrictions on the degree to which the problem of Asia's relations to the rest of the world may be settled in a peaceful way. Thus, while the Asian problem—basically conditioned by overpopulation—cannot be said to be Communist-produced, the solution of this problem through compromise is now Communist-inhibited, with much graver implications for the future of the Western World.

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# HUMAN NATURE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT*

## Retreat from Reason in the Age of Science

THE century from 1860 to the present has marked a steady retreat from reason. This retreat has recently become headlong, so that at present we are living in a new age of faith. But at the beginning of the century, in 1860 let us say, reason was still enthroned in the United States. In the 1860's the traditional Christian approach was still dominant, and continued to be, for that matter, in the succeeding decades. Orthodox doctrine taught the reality of original sin, but it also taught men to believe in their ability to struggle against sin and in the possibility of redemption. In an expanding Christian circle the idea of the malleability of human nature, of its potentialities for good, was finding fresh emphasis; and in this circle the idea was coming to be held that sin is social rather than individual in character, and that the Christian effort must concentrate on reforming society. Christian ideas about human nature also squared with age-old proverbs: people accepted the maxim, "You can't change human nature", but they also quoted the conflicting proverb, "As the twig is bent, so the tree inclines."

On a more sophisticated level men still largely subscribed to the faculty psychology which Professor Thomas Upham of Bowdoin College had done so much to popularize. This assumed a duality of body and mind. The body was the seat of those base impulses which to the orthodox meant original sin. But the mind was made up of capacities classified under the faculties of understanding, feeling and will. Through the will man could rule his baser impulses and translate his innate moral ideas into action. Properly disciplined by early formal training, reason and will could enable individuals to eliminate traditional shortcomings in themselves and in society. Thus the academic scheme of human nature represented a synthesis of Christianity and the Enlightenment.

* An article on the same general topic, and dealing specifically with "The Age of Reason and Morality, 1750–1860", appeared in the September issue of the QUARTERLY. These inaugurated the Gino Speranza Lectures at Columbia University.



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Such optimistic views of human nature were firmly entrenched in American thought of 1860 despite some dissident notes. These ideas had so long been dominant in the thinking of leading Americans that by that time they were commonplace even among the masses. They were reflected in dime novels, in the popular women's magazines, and in Fourth of July orations.

It is not strange that so dominant a philosophy of human nature was very little affected by a tremendous event in 1859, the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. This did provoke a lively response as the years passed, particularly in intellectual circles. But it did not at first cause even intellectuals to doubt *their* ability to get at *the* truth. Not for perhaps fifty years did this doubt even begin to be a serious one in their thinking—not indeed until William James and John Dewey spoke so plainly that they had to listen. No wonder that the retreat from reason was a very slow one.

Just as the traditional formulations about human nature continued after 1859 to enjoy wide credence, so did the social "sciences" associated with these formulations. Economics, political science, sociology and history continued to appeal to the older ideas about human nature for validity. Even as late as the turn of the twentieth century the academic social studies were for the most part formal, rational and highly schematic. Each one, as synthesized by eminent writers, postulated universal and unchanging laws—laws comparable to those governing the mind in faculty psychology or the physical universe in Newton's system. These laws, discovered by the use of reason, were all highly reasonable and abstract. And they were well cloaked with moral virtue.

It is possible to comment only briefly on these formal and rationalistic social disciplines. The classical and neoclassical economics assumed that the individual acts rationally, and that reason leads him to avoid pain and seek pleasure. It also assumed that the economy is governed by abstract and unchangeable laws of supply and demand. It further assumed that any complete economic equality as between individuals is out of the question—it does not for one thing square with the inequality of endowment of individuals. Neither, so the neoclassical econ-

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omy held, does it square with universal economic laws. But on the other hand, if these laws are obeyed, then a reasonable equilibrium between desires and satisfactions can be counted on. The way is open to economic progress if not to economic utopia.[1]

In the field of political thought we again find the assumption of a system governed by certain laws of nature. According to these laws, formulated in the seventeenth century and analogous to Newton's laws of gravitation, every individual possesses inalienable rights to life, liberty and property. Government exists to protect the individual in these rights. It cannot properly interfere with their natural operation by favoring the weak and improvident at the expense of the strong and capable. To do so would deny to the latter their natural rights to liberty and property. The national sovereign state can, however, use its police powers in war to protect the natural rights of its citizens when these are menaced by aggressors beyond the national boundaries. Such was the prevailing synthesis of political science familiar to our grandfathers in the 1870's and 1880's and, in a sense, to our fathers on the threshold of our own century.[2]

In the sphere of social relations, the sociology of three quarters of a century ago was coming to terms with the nineteenth-century doctrine of evolution in a greater degree than had the sister disciplines of economics and political science. But sociology was also formal and rationalistic—theoretical and schematic in its conception of absolute laws. These permitted the able and ambitious to climb the social ladder; but if one failed to take advantage of the ladder, or slipped in the effort, he must be content with his status. The social laws also included the acceptance by women of their limited rôle. So too the inferior races must accept their inferiority. But in each case there was room for improvement—within the proscriptions set by nature.[3]

[1] See Rexford Guy Tugwell, "Human Nature in Economic Theory", *Journal of Political Economy*, XXX (June 1922), 317–345; A. J. Snow, "Psychology in Economic Theory", *Journal of Political Economy*, XXXII (August 1924), 487–496; and C. E. Ayres, "Fifty Years' Development in Ideas of Human Nature and Motivation", *American Economic Review*, 26th supplement (March 1936), 224–236, 250–254.

[2] Max Lerner, "The Political Theory of Charles A. Beard", *American Quarterly*, II (Winter 1950), 303–321.

[3] Albion Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States 1865–1915", *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI (May 1916), 721–864.

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At the very time that the formal, moralistic and rational synthesis of the social studies was achieved, new and revolutionary developments had begun to challenge the dualistic faculty psychology with its emphasis on an innate rationality and morality in human nature. In America it was not a scientist but a poet who first proclaimed an entirely naturalistic and monistic view of man. Walt Whitman rejected all antitheses between body and soul and identified morality with obedience to nature's law of the organic unity of man.[4] Such evil as the Good Grey Poet saw in "flippant people with hearts of rag and souls of chalk" he laid at the door of man's refusal to accept the unity of body and soul. But few took Whitman's startling and shocking message very seriously.

If at first a similar hostility greeted kindred ideas blown to our shores by the new scientific currents, in the long run these proved telling. In 1867 Edward Livingston Youmans called attention to the progress that had been made, chiefly abroad, in the scientific study of human nature. He pointed to the implications of the physiological discoveries of Sir Charles Bell and Dr. Marshall Hall; of the far-reaching theory of Sir Charles Darwin; and of the application by Helmholtz and others of the techniques of physics to the study of sensations.[5] Other Americans discovered the pioneer work of Wundt in the laboratory study of mental activity. In later decades careful observations and controlled experiments, especially in relation to the behavior of animals and young children, showed the continuity of animal and human behavior. All this was, of course, in line with the theory of organic evolution.[6]

One highly significant result of the development of biology in the later half of the nineteenth century was the more specific content given to the hitherto loosely used term instinct.[7] A

[4] For an interesting discussion see R. D. O'Leary, "Swift and Whitman as Exponents of Human Nature", *International Journal of Ethics*, XXIV (January 1914), 183–201.

[5] Edward Livingston Youmans, "On the Scientific Study of Human Nature" in *The Culture Demanded by Modern Life* (New York, 1867), pp. 373–411.

[6] See Gardner Murphy, *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (New York, 1949), especially chapters 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14; and A. A. Roback, *History of American Psychology* (New York, 1952), Part II.

[7] Edward Chace Tolman, "The Nature of Instinct", *Psychological Bulletin*, XX (March 1923), 200–218.

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German Darwinian, Preyer, elaborated a list of specific instincts which he applied to an analysis of child and adult behavior. In America William James listed some fifty instincts which his pupils Thorndike and Woodworth still further extended. The discoveries of the geneticists, Mendel, Weismann, Morgan and others, led to a sharpened and more precise analysis of instincts in purely biological terms. In time it became evident that many of the so-called instincts were in truth not inherited mechanisms but rather acquired patterns of behavior. But before this became fully evident many psychologists, including James and, especially, G. Stanley Hall, taught that inherited patterns of behavior provided the natural if not the inevitable foundation for the subordinate rôle of women and of the backward races, for war, and for competitive capitalism.[8]

The darker view of human nature which in the earlier Age of Reason and Morality had found only such exceptional literary exponents as Hawthorne and Melville was now buttressed both by the new Darwinian emphases and by incoming literary currents from abroad. Half-whimsically, half-seriously, Mark Twain held man up to scorn for pretending to a morality denied the higher animals. The satirist went so far in *The Mysterious Stranger* as to dub man "such an unreasoning creature that he is not able to perceive that the Moral Sense degrades him to the bottom layer of animated beings and is a shameful possession."[9] Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote his "medicated novels" in which he made a sweeping use of the mechanistic and unconscious factors in human behavior. His proto-Freudian essay, "Mechanism in Thought and Morals", discussed these on the scientific level.[10]

[8] Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (New York, 1935), chapter 12.

[9] Samuel L. Clemens, *The Mysterious Stranger and Other Stories* (New York, 1922), p. 50. See also the *Autobiography*, edited by Albert B. Paine (New York, 1924), II, 248.

[10] "Mechanism in Thought and Morals" was given as a Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard in 1870 and is to be found in *The Works of Oliver Wendell Holmes* (Boston and New York, 1892), VIII, 260–314. For a modern psychiatrist's comments on Holmes's fiction see Clarence P. Oberndorf, *The Psychiatric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes* (New York, 1943).

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Conservatives who opposed the program of feminists, pacifists and socialists declared, "You can't argue with an instinct." When Henry George asked Edward Livingston Youmans what could be done about the political corruption and the selfishness of the rich in promoting it, the disciple of Darwin and Spencer replied: "Nothing! It's all a matter of evolution. Perhaps in four or five thousand years evolution may have carried men beyond this state of things."[11] The same conviction that selfishness, competition and struggle, based on an instinctive nature, governed social relations was reflected in the Middletown of the 1930's—"the strongest and best survive—that's the law of nature after all—always has been and always will be."[12]

But you would be left with a very false impression if you supposed that the newer biological study of human nature did nothing more than to buttress faith in the inevitability of war, racial and sex inferiority, economic competition and the *status quo* generally. In undermining the older view of human nature as innately rational and moral, the new psychology did not close the doors entirely to the traditionally American faith in meliorism. In the functionalist phase which the new psychology in the United States assumed under the leadership of James, Mead and Dewey, mind was thought of as the capacity of the organism to adapt itself to situations, to solve problems. The traditional concept of motivation and learning was rejected for the more realistic one of the adaptation of the organism to changing situations through problem-solving.

In John Dewey especially the new views about human nature reënforced the optimistic faith in man's capacity to shape his future in ways that seemed desirable and good.[13] It is worth noting that Dewey developed his views in the first two decades of the twentieth century when the movement for social, political and economic reform was at high tide. At the very turn of the century he argued that all concepts of human nature are, as it

[11] Henry George, *A Perplexed Philosopher* (New York, 1892), p. 136 n.

[12] Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts* (New York, 1937), p. 407.

[13] For a discussion of Dewey's psychology in relation to the American environment see Merle Curti, *op. cit.*, chapter 15, and *The Growth of American Thought* (New York, 1951), pp. 557 *et seq.*

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were, politically determined. The theory that human nature does not and cannot change was, he insisted, a view functional to and prevalent in aristocracies. The democratic scheme of human nature emphasized thinking as problem-solving and living as a coöperative social enterprise in which experience was reconstructed on ever more satisfying levels, individual and social. In other words, far from conceding that the new psychology struck a blow at the old faith in man's capacity for progress and democracy, Dewey held that it actually opened new avenues to those objectives. His view of human nature was at its core essentially American in its emphasis on mind-in-use and on man's ability to make adjustments in a changing environment which he himself could direct. "True psychology", he declared, "is itself a conception of democracy."

In rejecting dualism, in questioning the sweeping scope so many psychologists gave to instincts and to imitation in learning, above all in repudiating the idea of mind as fixed structure, Dewey advanced a democratic and one may say an American conception of human nature. Some now think he was too optimistic, but one must nevertheless note that much empirical investigation in school, clinic, industry, and mass communication supports his thesis. And in the current programs for the study and improvement of human relations we have an impressive tribute to his theory of human nature.[14]

Dewey represented not only a retreat from the earlier rationalistic conception of the autonomous individual. He also in a sense represented a qualification of the emphasis of the early scientific studies of human nature in terms of biology and physics. In supplementing this emphasis with a consideration of man in his social context Dewey supported the cultural anthropologists. Many of these shared his optimistic views about the potentialities of human nature. For cultural anthropologists questioned the assumption that all the traits common to Western civilization represented absolute laws governing all human behavior everywhere. On the contrary, careful scientific investigations of many primitive peoples seemed to indicate that competition

[14] Gordon W. Allport, "Psychology and the Fourth R", *New Republic*, CXXI (October 17, 1949), 23–26.

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and aggression, presumably universal traits, scarcely exist in certain cultures. Moreover, far from regarding women as mentally inferior, some peoples assumed that women are more highly endowed in intelligence and other desirable traits than men. And it was something of a shock to learn that just as we looked down on primitive peoples as innately inferior to us, so they regarded us as innately inferior to them. If we spurned the long-haired Kaffirs as little more than baboons, they regarded our almost bald pates and our inability to get along in their forests as proofs of innate inferiority.[15]

The implications of all this gave a much larger sphere to culture than to biology in explaining complex characteristics of collective behavior; undermined the assumption that universal economic, political and social laws govern all peoples; and postulated a relativism in discussions of human nature. Also if culture is more important than biology in many hitherto unsuspected spheres, the way is open to an enlarged and reënforced faith in the possibility of uprooting man's exploitation of man, war and other customs assumed to rest on inborn characteristics.[16]

These emerging ideas of human nature rested not only on the functional psychology and the pragmatic instrumentalist philosophy of James and Dewey and on cultural anthropology. They also drew support from and gave support to vigorous nonconformist and protest movements on the political, social and economic stage in the era of progressivism and the new freedom. Also related to the newer ideas about human nature and to protests against the *status quo* was a new approach to social, economic and political problems. The breakdown of the older, rationalistic, schematic conception of human nature inevitably weakened the various syntheses of the social studies that had drawn support from the traditional rationalistic conception of human nature.

[15] David Bidney, "Human Nature and the Cultural Process", *American Anthropologist*, n. s. XLIX (July–September 1947), 375–399; Ross L. Finney, "Culture and the Original Nature of Man", *Journal of Applied Sociology*, XL (March–April 1927), 339–343.

[16] William F. Ogburn, *Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature* (New York, 1922); Charles A. Ellwood, "The Modifiability of Human Nature and Human Institutions", *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VII (May–June 1923), 229–237; and Devere Allen, "Human Nature: Perennial Excuse for War", *World Unity Magazine*, VII (October 1930), 83–94.

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Equally important was the fact that in the later decades of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of our own, the pressure of industrial and urban problems became so great that social scientists began to study these problems empirically. Field surveys, case histories, and, above all, quantitative or statistical techniques revolutionized the older rational social studies by imbuing them with both empiricism and faith. Economists now concerned themselves no longer with studying abstract economic principles or laws which they applied to imaginary problems, such as Robinson Crusoe's classical economic behavior on a lonely island. They turned rather to specific, fact-finding studies of price behavior, of depressions, and of actual economic institutions, such as corporations, labor unions, and coöperatives; for these were now seen to influence economic activity in ways that failed to correspond to the older ideas about economic law.[17]

Skillful advertising technicians, appealing to sex, prestige and desire to conform, proved that demand could be vastly expanded. One advertisement pictured a hopeful, hard-working business man bent over his papers as he weighed a new investment versus a household demand. The caption read, "No use balancing your books if your wife can't balance a teacup." Experiments in paying higher wages for a bigger output upset older ideas about the iron law of wages. Friction between labor and management often yielded to insights gleaned from the new knowledge about human nature.[18] This emphasis on the application to specific problems of the new insights reënforced the faith both in man's power to shape his economic future and in the democratic belief that the poorest need not always be with us.

And there were similar changes in political studies. Empirical investigations of concrete problems proved that it was possible greatly to improve administration and efficiency in a democracy. Other studies suggested that lawmaking is the result of various pressures of interested groups rather than of any use of abstract reasoning. Laws came to be increasingly regarded, not as time-

[17] This is discussed by Louis Wirth in his essay on the social sciences in Merle Curti, ed., *American Scholarship in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1953).

[18] Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry* (Boston and New York, 1918) and *Human Nature and Management* (New York, 1929); Milton Nadworny, "Scientific Management and Labor, 1900–1940: An Historical Study", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1952.

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less, unchanging absolutes, but as instruments for adjusting in varied ways to changing human needs. All this strengthened the belief that, however great the difficulties, men are not governed by absolute political and economic laws, but that economic and political phenomena are far more complex and relative, and therefore more malleable, than had been assumed.

These implications are even more striking when we turn to the rising empirical studies of crime, delinquency, and other social problems. The new theories of human nature suggested that aberrant behavior may be more largely the result of conditioning, of the impact of specific and unfortunate experiences and situations, than of faulty will power or deficient reasoning. In proving the direct relation between unfortunate environment and crime and delinquency, and in demonstrating the useful potentialities of counseling, social workers still further strengthened the belief that man need not helplessly submit to a fate he cannot control.[19] New knowledge about the relation of inadequate nutrition or of deficient glandular activity or of harrowing childhood fears to mental illness revolutionized attitudes in this sphere. And the teachings of the cultural anthropologists and, in later years, of the social psychologists about the cultural as opposed to the biological bases for differences among men encouraged Negroes and their white champions in their fight against discrimination.[20] Psychologists proved that women possess as a group quite as high intelligence as men and have potentially quite as varied interests, and such findings reënforced the democratic movement to enlarge the opportunities of women in every sphere —educational, political, economic and social.[21] It came to be

[19] Pioneer studies include William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent* (Boston, 1915); American Academy of Medicine, *Physical Basis of Crime* (Easton, Pa., 1914); and Carl A. Murchison, *Criminal Intelligence* (Worcester, Mass., 1926). See also Arthur E. Fink, *Causes of Crime: Biological Theories in the United States 1800–1915* (Philadelphia, 1938).

[20] For example, Franz Boas, *The Genetic Basis for Democracy* (New York, 1939); T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (New York, 1931); and Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences* (New York, 1935).

[21] The pioneer study was Helen Bradford Thompson (Woolley), *The Mental Traits of Sex* (Chicago, 1903). Other significant investigations are reported in Beth L. Wellman, "Sex Differences" in *A Handbook of Child Psychology* (Worcester, 1933), pp. 626–649, and Quinn McNemar, *The Revision of the Stanford-Binet Scale* (Boston and New York, 1942), pp. 42–54.

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recognized that the Victorian authority Havelock Ellis quoted was wrong in regarding the suggestion that women possess sexual feelings as "a vile aspersion". The current Kinsey report speaks to this point!

The conception of human nature associated with the name of John Dewey has continued to be applied in many fields of human relations. But currents of thought in many ways quite opposite have gained increasing vogue. I have already called attention to the pessimistic overtones of the hereditarian emphasis on instincts—to the weight given to biology in the nature-nurture controversies. The early efforts to measure intelligence also seemed to run counter to the traditional view that all men possess rational faculties in a relatively high degree.[22] But before commenting on the sweepingly antirationalistic and antidemocratic interpretations given to the testing movement I must recall to mind the gloomy overtones implicit in the teachings of Freud.

Freud's message had already been heralded, at least in part, by the pioneer work of the Boston psychiatrist, Dr. Morton Prince. This too-often neglected American emphasized the large rôle of the unconscious, of repression, and of conflict in mental aberrations. He welcomed Freud who visited the United States in 1908.[23] Freud's teachings became increasingly familiar in the era after World War I. Without using the experimental techniques and the controlled observations of the objective psychologists, the Freudians developed a theory of human nature which, in emphasizing the importance of sex, contributed to a better understanding of motivation and behavior. This was particularly to the point in view of the traditional neglect of sex in the early faculty psychology and even in the great *Principles* of William James.

The newer views about the nonrational factors in behavior were abundantly illustrated in the First World War, an event which both in itself and in its aftermath did much to shake the

[22] For a discussion of this see Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, chapter 14, and David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York, 1949).

[23] Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality* (New York, 1905) and *The Unconscious* (New York, 1914). See also William S. Taylor, *Morton Prince and Abnormal Psychology* (New York, 1928).

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older confidence in the inevitability of progress. In this country intellectuals were shocked to see evidences of sadism and cruelty on the battlefield and in the prison camp. The widespread sense of catastrophe, futility and defeat was expressed in a cartoon which pictured a baboon contemplating an endless sea of soldiers' graves and saying, "If this goes on we will have to start all over again!" On another level thoughtful men and women were horrified to see how readily a highly charged emotional war propaganda was stimulated and how quickly a frightening mass hysteria resulted. What lay in store in the 1950's was anticipated at the trial in 1917 of fifteen professors at the University of Nebraska for alleged pro-Germanism on the most flimsy testimony, and the senseless persecution of countless citizens whose German-sounding names suggested guilt by association. Even more shocking than all this was the way in which the war forced almost everyone to take the recital of wholesale slaughter without turning a hair. All these things illustrated grimly enough the newer revelations about the irrationality of the human make-up.[24]

In the years that followed the First World War new evidences of irrationality weakened still further the older confidence in the ability of an essentially reasonable and moral human nature to shape a future of freedom, democracy and peace. Propaganda was organized on a huge scale and used not only by advertising men and pressure groups. Some political leaders who had formerly trusted "the people's will" now began to see that those in power could call on the skillful techniques of the public relations specialists and other experts to sway large masses of human beings. Grave doubts increased as to whether the people are rational and moral, whether the people are really always right. The psychological testing done during the war seemed to indicate so low a general intelligence that some jumped to the conclusion that the average person is simply too dumb to perform the functions of citizenship with any competence. Even when more critical psychologists demonstrated the inadequacy of the first tests and the errors in interpreting them, the idea of the average dumbness remained—and bolstered the doctrine of the elite as

[24] Merle Curti, *Peace or War: The American Struggle 1636–1936* (New York, 1937), chapter 8.

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preached on the one hand by the eugenicists and on the other by the new humanists of the Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More persuasion. Many climbed on the bandwagon of Henry Mencken and echoed his gibe that democracy is, in view of the low IQ of the masses, only boobocracy. These ideas did not die even when psychologists pointed out that the IQ was only an arbitrary measure, needing still more careful analysis, and not even fixed in any individual.[25]

The faltering record of the League of Nations did not do much to keep alive a confidence that man can uproot war. It did not add to the peace of mind of thinking people, either, when social scientists demonstrated the emptiness of mere verbal professions of peace, such as personal pledges never to fight—or even the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In the 1830's Professor Thomas C. Upham of Bowdoin College had argued that if only the peoples would insist that their rulers renounce war, peace would be at hand. Ironically, now in the 1930's they were insisting, but peace seemed farther away than ever.

In the 1930's the new revelations about the irrationality of men were even more shockingly illustrated. The inhuman atrocities committed by Fascists and Nazis against their fellow men weakened the belief that it is possible to control men's social behavior intelligently for truly social ends. Reports of purges in the Kremlin began to blast the earlier roseate predictions of well-known American authorities that in eliminating competition and insecurity the Soviet experiment was creating a happier version of human nature than Western man had known.[26] I need hardly add that the experiences of the post-war world have confirmed the growing doubts—the tension and fears, the uncertainties and anxieties associated with the atom bomb and the cold war are all too much with us. One example, which will be easily recalled, is symptomatic of the waning faith in man's ability to shape his

[25] See again Spitz, *op. cit.*, especially chapter 7.

[26] For example, E. C. Lindeman, "Is Human Nature Changing in Russia?", *New Republic*, LXXIV (March 8, 1933), 95–98; Frankwood E. Williams, "Can Russia Change Human Nature?", *Survey Graphic*, XXII (March 1933), 137–142; C. Dreher, "Collectivism and Human Nature", *Harper's Magazine*, CLXIX (September 1934), 489–491. *Cf.* Max Eastman, "Socialism Doesn't Jibe with Human Nature", *Readers Digest*, XXXVIII (June 1941), 41–49.

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social destiny into moral and rational channels. I refer to the articles in *Colliers Magazine* for October 7, 1952. The story, told by our distinguished playright and biographer, Robert E. Sherwood, and a galaxy of well-known writers, describes the third world war—*the war we did not want but could not prevent.* This shocking profession of inability to direct our future as we want it to be was indeed not quite all-inclusive and absolute. For even the *Colliers* writers envisaged the reconstruction of a defeated Soviet Union in accordance with dominant American ideas about freedom and comfort—including a style show in the Kremlin to give Soviet women the fashions they have been unhappily pining for these thirty odd years! But if some faith survives in our ability to shape our future at least in part, the picture is indeed very different from that associated with the doctrine of human nature widely held in the Age of Reason and Morality and in the first phase of the intellectual revolution of the early twentieth century.

For it is clear that we are in a period of reaction against the promises of the functional conception of human nature that resulted from the application of scientific methods to the study of behavior. That reaction is evident in the virtual disappearance of the more than century-old peace movement: to advocate peace today in any except the officially sanctioned way is to court the charge of subversiveness. The reaction is also seen in the insistence of psychoanalysts and of leaders of women's education that it was all quite wrong to suppose that women are the equals of men in their emotional and intellectual equipment. These spokesmen deny that women have as varied powers and interests as men. They ascribe mental conflicts to the efforts of women to assume responsibilities in the big world hitherto assumed only by men. Many indeed have bade farewell to feminism.[27]

The break with the early twentieth-century intellectual revolution can also be seen in the current reaction against progressive education and in the emphasis in many circles on discipline and formal training.

[27] For example, Helene Deutsch, *The Psychology of Woman: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* (New York, 1944), and Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (New York, 1947).

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In the field of race relations there have indeed been continued signs of improvement—of efforts to implement in practice the scientific testimony to the equal potentialities of all races. Despite these gains there is still a wide gap between our knowledge and our practice, as the dynamite bombings in many southern localities and evictions such as that in Cicero, Illinois, painfully remind us.

Unfortunately it is impossible to stop with these instances of the current reaction against the nineteenth-century confidence in reason and morality and against the seemingly better-grounded scientific view of human nature that in the early decades of the twentieth century helped create so promising a social science. For the reaction is also apparent in the readiness of legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts to curtail civil liberties and academic freedom. A free discussion of competing ideas, we are told, jeopardizes our security. The reaction is to be seen further in the reliance on verbal oaths of loyalty. These hardly square with the findings about motivation and behavior or with much we have presumably learned from social science.

Above all, the new temper is seen in what appears to be a characteristic attitude on the part of college students and other youth: a conscious and unconscious quest for security. Sometimes this takes the quite possibly harmless form of overreliance on expert counseling and guidance. This is the heyday of the psychiatrist. Yet one thoughtful psychiatrist recently remarked that sometime the psychiatry of today may well be regarded as no less childish than medieval alchemy now seems to us. More significantly, the search for security seems to be indicated in the emphasis on conformity—on not sticking your neck out. Underneath it all is, one gathers, a feeling of powerlessness to do much except to gaze on what well may be impending disaster and to take such comfort as one can in the small, the immediate, the concrete things, in just getting along and just holding on. No longer are people shocked or greatly excited about a world of violence and catastrophe.

The mood seems to be one in which freedom is regarded as too negative to be satisfying—despite our verbal professions—that indeed freedom imposes too great a burden of anxieties in a

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perilously uncertain world. In the nineteenth century the great value attached to individual freedom—a value functional to so much elbow room and to such wide and varied opportunities—was complemented by the habit of forming and joining voluntary associations. Thus men and women escaped in at least some degree the loneliness that individualism often meant. We still have our voluntary associations. But, though the crowds are bigger than they were in the Age of Reason and Morality—if they are not lonelier—one must now think at least twice before running the risk of possible guilt by association! Man himself may not be obsolete, even in a world of incalculable and perhaps uncontrollable instruments of destruction. But in some quarters the feeling prevails that freedom and the will to use it for social reconstruction are more or less obsolete.

Finally, the reaction against the intellectual revolution of the later nineteenth century and the early twentieth may perhaps also be seen in the distrust in many circles of the scientific method itself as an instrument for guiding men out of chaos and darkness into peace and light. Perhaps it is another irony of American history that the scientific methods and techniques to which we owe so much can also be used to incite hysterical emotion and to make man's destruction of humanity more efficient. Thus in the amazing atomic age the retreat from reason has led many to abandon faith in science. No substitute, no new faith, has as yet been found which seems completely to fill the gap left by the retreat from reason. Neither neo-Thomism nor neo-orthodoxy has swept the country. May, perhaps, the future historian conclude that the dominant faith of our time is the religion of nationalism—the American way? This of course is not a new faith. It goes back to our colonial experience. It was nourished by the Enlightenment and by its romantic aftermath. It was consolidated and sharpened as the nineteenth century ran its course. Yet nationalism now seems to have fewer competing loyalties than ever before.

All this suggests that the exponents of the newer theories of human nature and of the empirical approach in the social sciences expected too much, too soon. Many feel that science has been a god, and a false one no longer to be trusted to establish goals

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and to determine values by which man is to live, Hence the tendency of many to seek for security in authoritarian philosophies or orthodox religious faith. Hence the tendency of others to turn their faces against the unresolved conflicts of our time and to find solace in the arts. Hence the tendency of still others to despair of man's faith in his ability to bring about that which ought to be, to give way rather to the dark and hopeless cult of irrationality, or to brood on the rediscovery and implications of the problem of evil. Hence the renewed faith in American nationalism, and renewed opposition in many quarters to internationalism.

Time, of course, may prove that the current reaction against both the surviving heritage of the Age of Reason and Morality and the intellectual revolution of the last part of the nineteenth century and the early years of our own is only temporary. Certainly the historian may properly suggest that this may be the case. If so, the historian of the future will attach less importance to the reaction than do many thoughtful men and women today. It is of course natural for those who came to maturity in a world of depression, war, and prospects of war to expect little—to expect *too* little, to reconcile themselves too easily to an acceptance of what is and what seems likely to be. It is also understandable that many of my generation whose hopes have been dimmed by mankind's crucifixion in the past quarter of a century should share the view so common apparently among younger people in this country and in so many others. But I for one am convinced that this is not the part either of realism or of wisdom. Or of sound historical perspective. For, should the world crisis persist, should fear and suspicion and hatred and reliance on force continue to be man's chief outlet, then we may be sure that we shall have to face crises that will shake the world —and events that may quite possibly destroy civilization.

Each of us, whether he knows it or not, has some kind of a world view, vague and inarticulate, or clear and expressed. Each must take some stand in the current crisis. Not to take one is, in effect, to take one.

My own general approach to the problems of our time, based in some part on my study of changing concepts of human nature,

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may have some interest. I believe that we should make room in our outlook for tested knowledge about human nature and social behavior. But if we are wise we shall also provide for the revision of that knowledge—for what we now know, or think we know, is not the last word. And I am equally convinced that we should find out how to make more constructive use of the knowledge we have. For the gulf between traditional American values and professions and actual individual and social behavior seems to be ominously widening. We can of course say that the ideals so generously and eloquently expressed in the American experience assumed too much and must be pared down. But let us not pare down too much! For if we do, we confess our bankruptcy. We also confess that we do not choose to take our stand with those great and bold spirits, of other lands as well as our own, those great and bold spirits, known and unknown, recorded and unrecorded, who have helped develop the higher values of civilization and who have struggled for their realization. The American phase of that struggle has been especially full of promise, not only for Americans, but for millions of men and women the world over.

In other words, we can not separate ourselves from the past; and we may still choose what aspects of the past we cherish and in cherishing will try to advance. And in any long historical perspective we may still find exciting and exhilarating the great ethical values that man has developed and the rich esthetic gifts and potentialities he has evidenced. If we would be truly realistic, I think we must temper our recognition of man's biological limitations with an appreciation of his great achievements, in the field of social and political thought as well as in natural science and technology. And, of great importance in these times, I believe we must try to understand and in the best sense appreciate other cultures and systems—even those in conflict with our own. Moreover, I think we should make a truly experimental and sustained effort to think and to act in ways likely to encourage a similar understanding and tolerance of us on the part of others. Finally, I think it is possible to choose whether one wants to express what I have been saying in the symbols of the Christian vision of man's weakness and of his ability to progress

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toward redemption; or whether he wants to put it in the humanistic and naturalistic terms that American thought about human nature and social values also includes.

I know, of course, how hard it is, especially at this time, to formulate a clear outlook on the world, an outlook that seems to be both realistic and idealistic in terms of what we know about human nature and about the ideals and values America has received, succored, modified and created. But we are heirs of an American experience that has cherished new beginnings and sustained a faith in our capacity to direct our fate along rational and humane paths. In the words of a great historian, once a teacher in this University, we may conclude:

> Long the victim of material forces, man had, by taking thought, made himself the master of wind and wave and storm. May he not, by taking thought . . . make himself the master of his social destiny? Perhaps not; but as the human mind is greater than the waterfall which it compels or the lightning's flash which it confines, so the control of human destiny is a nobler object than the search for material power. Even though every door be slammed in our faces, still we must knock.[28]

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[28] Charles A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* (New York, 1947), p. 3.

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# "SOVEREIGNTY" IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AT THE PRESENT DAY

IT IS characteristic of the rather amorphous definitions in British constitutional law that there was never any exact statement of the boundaries of membership of that British Commonwealth that had grown out of, though not displaced, the old British Empire. It is clear that the British Commonwealth included only those portions of the British Empire that were self-governing and that had representative legislatures, especially the great composite states or Dominions that were formed in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century from the union of two or more British colonies—Canada, Australia, South Africa. The Statute of Westminster, 1931,[1] in its juridical form an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, was simply a translation into positive-law form of arrangements already arrived at in the Imperial Conference of 1926 and at a further Imperial Conference of 1930; and these Conferences, for their own part, only concretized already existing "conventions" (practice) governing the relations of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions *inter se*. In its Preamble, the Statute of Westminster in effect defined the scope of membership of the British Commonwealth as of 1931 by speaking of the participation in the two Imperial Conferences of delegates from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland.

By contrast, however, the Declaration of Commonwealth Prime Ministers of April 1949 speaks of the "Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, whose countries are united as members of the British Commonwealth." Thus by 1949 the Commonwealth lost one Republic (Ireland) from its ranks, and gained another Republic (India) as a new member, plus Pakistan and Ceylon; while Newfoundland was absorbed as a self-governing member-Province (state) within Canada, as a result of an Act

[1] 22 Geo. V, c. 4.



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of Union of 1949. It is worth observing, too, that, while the Declaration of April 1949 starts out by referring to the "British Commonwealth", by the end of the document the prefix "British" has been dropped, and there remains only an unprefixed "Commonwealth of Nations".

In their juridical origins, the constitutions of the member-countries of the Commonwealth stem from Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, even though historically these constitutions, in their actual drafts, were usually the substantial work of conventions in the various countries. At the respective dates at which the various member-countries were granted their own constitutions, those countries, as nation-states, were still subject to certain disabilities. For one thing, the decisions of their domestic courts were subject to appeal to and review by the Privy Council, the highest appellate tribunal for the old British colonial Empire. More important, however, was the effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,[2] an enactment originally rendered necessary by the curious perversity of a colonial judge, one Mr. Justice Boothby of South Australia, who persisted in holding statute after statute passed by the legislature of that colony invalid on the score of a supposed conflict with the English Common Law, but which was finally designed to establish general patterns for the relationship of the United Kingdom to her self-governing colonies. It is true that by the time of the First World War the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament, in terms of Section 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act,[3] to pass laws extending to the self-governing British colonies that had grown into the status of Dominions[4] had become largely of academic interest, in view of the rapidly developing practices (or "conventions" of the Constitution, as Professor Dicey called them)[5] gov-

[2] 28 and 29 Vict., c. 63.

[3] Colonial Laws Validity Act, S. 2. "Any colonial law which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament [i. e., the United Kingdom Parliament] extending to the colony to which such laws may relate . . . shall be read subject to such Act and shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain abolutely void and inoperative."

[4] Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa.

[5] See, generally, A. V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution* (1st Edition, London, 1885).

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erning the relations of the United Kingdom to those Dominions. But, in terms of formal juristic theory, since the constitutional instruments of all the self-governing Dominions originated in Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, the position and powers of the United Kingdom, in terms of Section 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, were clear and unqualified. Significant, too, was the "manner and form" limitation in Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act,[6] as to the powers of colonial legislatures to make laws concerning their own constitution, powers and procedure.

At the Imperial Conference of 1926, the substantial changes that had in fact taken place in the relations of the United Kingdom to the self-governing Dominions, even in the short period since the First World War, were expressly recognized in the Report issued by the Conference, which declared:

> They [the Dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . .
>
> Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever. . . . Equality of status, so far as Britain and the Dominions are concerned, is thus the root principle governing our inter-Imperial relations.[7]

As a direct result of the Imperial Conference of 1926 and of further inter-Dominion deliberations, the Statute of Westminster was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament in 1931.[8]

The significant features of the Statute of Westminster, from the viewpoint of the self-governing Dominions, were: first, its

[6] Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, S. 5. "Every representative legislature shall, in respect to the colony under its jurisdiction, have, and be deemed at all times to have had, full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers and procedure of such legislature, provided that such laws shall have been passed in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament [i. e., the United Kingdom Parliament] . . . or colonial law for the time being in force in the said colony."

[7] Imperial Conference, 1926, *Summary of Proceedings*, pp. 14–15. Status of Great Britain and the Dominions.

[8] Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. V, c. 4.

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repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, so far as the Dominions were concerned;[9] and, second, its specific provision that no law passed by the Parliament of a Dominion should be void on the ground of repugnancy to the law of England, and that the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion should include the power to repeal or amend any Act of the United Kingdom Parliament in so far as that Act was part of the law of the Dominion.[10]

Following upon the Statute of Westminster, the Parliament of the Union of South Africa in 1934 passed the Status of the Union Act which, after reciting the declaration made by the Imperial Conference of 1926 and also the passage by the United Kingdom Parliament of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, expressly declared: "The Parliament of the Union shall be the sovereign legislative power in and over the Union."[11] The Status of the Union Act then reënacted the Statute of Westminster in the form of an Act of the Union Parliament, to be construed accordingly.[12] What effect did the Status of the Union Act have upon the relationship of South Africa to the United Kingdom? From the orthodox legal viewpoint, if the Statute of Westminster created Dominion status, that is, if it was in itself "constitutive" of a change in legal relationship between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, then clearly the Status of the Union Act, in so far as it sought to go beyond the Statute of Westminster, would be invalid and ineffective. If, however, the Statute of Westminster were merely "declaratory" of fundamental changes that had already taken place in the relationship of the United Kingdom to the Dominions, especially since World War I[13]—that is to say, if it merely enacted into positive-law form already existing "conventions" of inter-Dominion constitutional law—then the

[9] *Ibid.*, S. 2 (1)—"The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion."

[10] *Ibid.*, S. 2 (2).

[11] Status of the Union Act, No. 69 of 1934, S. 2.

[12] *Ibid.*, S. 3.

[13] See H. ver Loren van Themaat, "The Equality of Status of the Dominions and the Sovereignty of the British Parliament", 15 *Journal of Comparative Legislation* 47, 53 (1933)—"If . . . we do accept the principle that there are legal limitations to the power of the British Parliament, there is nothing startling in the clause [S. 4. of the Statute of Westminster]. The British Parliament then merely made a declaratory Act concerning the legal limitations to its own power."

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Status of the Union Act would amount to the effective establishment of a local root for South African law and jurisdiction in place of the imperial root. A further consequence, by virtue of the provision of the Status of the Union Act, would be the equation of the Union Parliament with the sovereign, legally unlimited Parliament of the United Kingdom.[14]

The decision by the Privy Council in *Moore* v. *Attorney-General for the Irish Free State* (1935),[15] although it involved the important ruling that the Irish Free State legislature could now amend the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Constituent Act of the Irish Parliament (from which, in the view of the United Kingdom, the authority of the Constitution of the Irish Free State had stemmed), is itself a decision given (in effect) in full accordance with the "constitutive" view of the Statute of Westminster. In announcing the judgment of the Privy Council in that case, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey, noted first of all that the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Constituent Act of the Irish Parliament formed part of the statute law of the United Kingdom, in that each of them was part of an Imperial Act. Before the passing of the Statute of Westminster, the Lord Chancellor said, it was not competent for the Irish Free State Parliament to pass an act abrogating the Treaty, because the Colonial Laws Validity Act forbade a dominion legislature to pass a law repugnant to an Imperial Act. The effect of the Statute of Westminster, the Lord Chancellor continued, was to remove the fetter which lay upon the Irish Free State by reason of the Colonial Laws Validity Act: the Irish Free State legislature could therefore now pass acts repugnant to Imperial Acts.

On the other hand, the contrary "declaratory" view is necessarily implied in Sir Ivor Jennings' declaration that, after the passage of the Statute of Westminster, "The Oireachtas [i.e., the Irish Free State Legislature] and the Union Parliament (of South Africa) are sovereign legislatures. They can even repeal the Statute of Westminster." [16]

[14] See especially R. T. E. Latham, "The Law and the Commonwealth", published in W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* (London and New York, 1937), vol. I, p. 533.

[15] [1935] A. C. 494.

[16] Sir Ivor Jennings, "The Statute of Westminster and Appeals to the Privy Council", 52 *Law Quarterly Review* 173, 187 (1936).

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The unbridgeable gap between these two theories was clearly demonstrated in connection with the recent constitutional crisis in the Union of South Africa. In giving judgment in March 1952, in the case of *Harris* v. *Minister of the Interior*,[17] Chief Justice Centlivres of the Supreme Court of South Africa found it necessary *inter alia* to determine the effect of the Statute of Westminster upon the Constitution of South Africa. In interpreting the Statute of Westminster, Chief Justice Centlivres proceeded to treat the problem as an ordinary one of statutory construction appropriate for the application of the celebrated Rule in Heydon's Case. In this way, Chief Justice Centlivres was able to conclude (in terms of the declaration made by the Imperial Conference of 1926) that the "mischief" prior to the Statute of Westminster was that the Dominions were not, in the eyes of the law, autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. But he then, in effect, equated this "mischief" with the legal supremacy of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the inability of the Dominion Parliaments to make laws having extraterritorial operation, and went on to limit the "remedy" of the Statute of Westminster to the removal of these two particular disabilities, without any attempt to consider the powers and functions that might be appropriate to the Dominions in their new status. This, of course, is essentially the positivist approach. The United Kingdom, it is said, is juridically sovereign: the Dominions were created by the United Kingdom Parliament in the sense that their constitutional instruments had their source in, and derived their authority from, Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament; any changes in the status and powers of the Dominions, therefore, to be effective, must proceed in the same way. Proceeding in this positivist strain, Chief Justice Centlivres refused to see the explosive political changes in Ireland as amounting finally to anything more significant than the ultimate removal by the United Kingdom Parliament (in the Statute of Westminster) of external limitations (represented by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Constituent Act of the Irish Parliament) operating on the Constitution of the Irish Free State—the view

[17] [1952] 2 S.A.L.R. 428 (A. D.).

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taken by the Privy Council in *Moore* v. *Attorney-General for the Irish Free State*. Yet the opinion of the Irish jurists before 1931 was that Ireland became an independent Republic in 1919; that in 1921 its independence was recognized by the British government; that the validity of the Irish Free State Constitution rested upon the sovereignty of the Irish people; that the British Parliament enacted the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act, 1922, because it was necessary to bring the law of Great Britain into accord with the facts.[18] Though the Privy Council might disagree with these arguments,[19] it could be contended in reply that the Privy Council did not have any right to rule on these points, and that its decision was not binding on the Irish Courts.[20] In fact, when *Moore* v. *Attorney-General for the Irish Free State* came to the Privy Council, the Irish Free State government had declined to recognize the Privy Council's jurisdiction and had not seen fit to be represented by counsel at the argument before the Privy Council. From the contentions advanced by the Irish jurists, it would follow that probably by 1922, and certainly by 1926, the United Kingdom Parliament had ceased to be competent to legislate for the Irish Free State, with the result that the Statute of Westminster could not apply to the Irish Free State, and the result also that the full power of the Irish Free State legislature to amend the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Constituent Act of the Irish Parliament would not have to be related back to the Statute of Westminster.[21] In fact, according to the arguments of the Irish jurists, the Irish Parliament's powers

[18] Jennings, *loc. cit.*, p. 183.

[19] See, for example, the Privy Council decision in Performing Right Society v. Bray U.D.C. [1930] A.C. 377.

[20] Jennings, *loc. cit.*, p. 184.

[21] The Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) of 1922 had provided (Article 2): "All powers of government and all authority legislative, executive, and judicial in Ireland, are derived from the people of Ireland and the same shall be exercised in the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) through the organizations established by or under, and in accord with, this Constitution." Leo Kohn, *The Constitution of the Irish Free State* (London, 1932), p. 90, in discussing the legal origin of the Constitution of 1922, contends: "On the whole the legal evidence . . . would seem to favour an interpretation in conformity with the Irish contention that the Constitution derived its authority essentially from the enactment of the Irish Constituent Assembly. Its constituent power was formally asserted in the Preamble to the Constituent Act, and implicitly acknowledged by the British Parliament when it re-embodied the latter in its Act of Confirmation."

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in this regard would stem from the Irish Free State's attainment of sovereign status internationally,[22] and its necessary consequence that the Constitution of 1922 became the sole source of constitutional law in the Irish Free State. Likewise, the passing by the South African Parliament of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, would effectively amount to the "enactment of sovereign independence . . . an invitation to the South African courts to assert a local root for South African law and jurisdiction in place of the Imperial one."[23]

Of course, the basic problem in all this, which the conflict in the two views on the Statute of Westminster only serves to highlight, is that while the "sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament" may have been, when the constitutions of the member-countries of the Commonwealth were each established, a more or less satisfactory explanation of the historical origins and also of the "sanction" of those Constitutions, it is no longer possible, in the light of the political situation at the present day, to justify the binding force of those constitutions in terms of a continued supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to the member-countries of the Commonwealth. Circumstances have changed too much for that, even in the twenty odd years since the passage of the Statute of Westminster. The jurisdiction of the Privy Council in relation to appeals from the courts of the member-countries of the Commonwealth has generally been swept away by statutes passed by Parliaments of those countries;[24]

[22] The declaration that the people of Ireland are the source of all legislative authority in Ireland, contained in Article 2 of the Constitution of 1922, is preceded by the declaration in Article 1 of the Constitution: "The Irish Free State . . . is a co-equal member of the Community of Nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations."

Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 113, in commenting upon the effect of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution of 1922, concludes that Article 1 "formed the logical preliminary to the subsequent proclamation of popular sovereignty. It was because Ireland was free that her people was sovereign."

[23] Latham, *loc.* cit., p. 533. However Latham, though seeing a future reënactment by the Union Parliament of the South Africa Act as an Act of the Union Parliament, as the logical sequel to its enactment of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, would not agree that the Status of the Union Act had any legal efficacy so far as South Africa was concerned.

[24] See, e.g., in Canada, The Supreme Court Act, 1949 (13 Geo. VI, c. 37); in South Africa, The Privy Council Appeals Act, 1950 (No. 16 of 1950); in India, The Abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949 (Constituent Assembly Act No. V of 1949).

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and the Privy Council itself, in a fine (and politically realistic) gesture of self-abnegation, had before the passage of these statutes already ruled that such action could validly be taken by the Parliaments of the individual member-countries of the Commonwealth.[25] The prerogative (or reserve) powers of the British Crown in relation to those countries have long since vanished through desuetude: even the Crown's power of appointment of the titular Executive of those countries (that is, the Governor-General) is to be exercised in strict compliance with the wishes of the governments in power in those countries at the time.[26]

These changes, and the other vast changes that had taken place in such matters as the conduct of foreign affairs and questions of war and peace, were represented symbolically in the Declaration of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers of April 1949, when the ranks of the British Commonwealth (deriving as it did from the old British Empire) were widened to include a "sovereign independent republic" (India). The Crown, however, was retained "as the symbol of the free association of its [the Commonwealth's] independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth"; and the British Commonwealth itself was transformed (one might perhaps say, in preference, transmogrified, for the change took place within the space of a few lines, and almost, it seems, *per incuriam*) into an unprefixed Commonwealth of Nations.

Within the member-countries of the new Commonwealth, however, confusion reigns. What theory, a leading constitutional lawyer asks, will their constitutions now rest upon?[27] In its decision in *Harris* v. *Minister of the Interior*, referred to above, the Supreme Court of South Africa relied on the theory of the continued sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to the countries of the Commonwealth. However, the

[25] Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [1947] A. C. 127 (P. C.).

[26] Though this latter change has no doubt satisfied the demands of local nationalism, it has not necessarily meant an increase in the caliber of holders of the office of Governor-General. For a nostalgic plea for a return to practices of former days in this regard, see Bernard K. Sandwell, "Our Governors-General", 59 *Queen's Quarterly* (No. 1) 84 (1952).

[27] F. R. Scott, "The Re-distribution of Imperial Sovereignty", 44 *Royal Society of Canada* (Series III, Section 2) 27, June 1950.

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Constitution of South Africa, in its present form, contains an ingenious solution of the "sovereignty" problem. As first passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, the Constitution opened with the informative but innocuous statement: "This Act may be cited as the South Africa Act, 1909." As a result of strong pressure within the country the Act was amended by consigning this section to the end of the Constitution and in its place substituting the formula: "The people of the Union acknowledge the sovereignty and guidance of Almighty God." This step suggests the comment that "in South Africa, sovereignty is less a term of art than a complimentary expression."[28]

In Canada, the reactions are equally mixed. There have been demands there recently for the enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament of a "Canada independence act . . . to establish once and for all the solid fact of Canada's legal sovereignty vis-à-vis Great Britain." [29] Although it is concededly possible to do this "by treaty", it is suggested that

> a special statute at Canada's request would seem to be sufficient. In the statute would be a declaration that, as from the "appointed day" (which might well be July 1 so as to co-incide with an existing national holiday) the new constitution of Canada would take effect, and thereafter all jurisdiction heretofore vested in the Parliament of the United Kingdom in and over Canada would cease. The Constitution itself would contain a declaration of sovereignty in the Canadian people, and a provision that no United Kingdom statutes would in future have the force of law in Canada unless adopted by the Canadian Parliament.

All this, it is claimed, would "simply bring the legal theory at last in to line with political realities." [30] In similar vein is recent French Canadian opinion:

> Il (reste) a prévoir le détachement juridique de Londres. . . . Pour atteindre cette fin, le Canada pourrait requérir du Parlement britannique l'adoption d'une dernière loi relative au Canada—une loi de l'indépendance canadienne. . . . L'indépendance juridique du Canada sera ainsi complétée.[31]

[28] Latham, *loc. cit.*, p. 532.

[29] Scott, *loc. cit.*

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Paul Gérin-Lajoie, "Du pouvoir d'amendement constitutionnel au Canada", 29 *Canadian Bar Review* 1136, 1177–8 (1951).

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The Canadian government has taken no official part in any of these proposals, though it is apparently proceeding rather quietly to purge from its Constitution and governmental institutions many of the symbols of Canada's erstwhile political and juridical subordination to the United Kingdom. The term "Dominion Government" has now become the "Government of Canada"; the "Dominion Parliament" is now referred to as the "federal Parliament"; "Royal Mail" is disappearing from trucks and Post Office property, a former Postmaster-General having announced the term "Royal" to be "obsolete".[32] A French Canadian writer (M. Vaillancourt) says: "Australia is a Commonwealth, South Africa is a Union, Ireland is a Republic; Canada is a Dominion. . . . The word Dominion is synonymous with colony, possession, or plantation." But Dr. Eugene Forsey, noting this complaint, defends the word "Dominion" as a "fine old word, with a long and honourable history. In the United States for example, Virginians delight to refer to their State as 'the old Dominion'." This critic of the trend asks: "Where is it all going to end? Are we going to wake up some morning and find ourselves citizens of the Republic of Canada?"[33]

Preoccupation with trappings such as these is perhaps understandable with countries which have, like the countries of the Commonwealth, only recently attained full sovereign status for international purposes and which also have, in many cases, historical and cultural traditions that are neither imperial nor even predominantly British. This is indicated in Prime Minister Malan's reference to the South African national flag as a symbol for both British and Boers within the Union, in contrast to the Union Jack, which has but "limited use and meaning" in South Africa.[34] Prime Minister Nehru has shown himself aware of Indian sensitiveness upon the continued association of the new Republic of India with the United Kingdom, however nominal that association may now be. In recently defending the continued membership of India in the Commonwealth, Prime Minister Nehru commented that

[32] Eugene Forsey, "Republic of Canada?", 14 *Public Affairs* (Canada), No. 2, 11 (1952).

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Speech by Prime Minister Malan to the Union Parliament, 35 *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth* 141 (1952).

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> Those who talked of British imperialism had failed to notice that this imperialism was not what it was formerly. To-day it was an exhausted thing. The British might still be doing things in Malaya and elswhere which Indians did not like, but it was nothing short of ignorance to say that their imperialism was the same as before. . . . To leave the Commonwealth would be acting purely in a sentimental huff, and nations did not act in that way. India's association with the Commonwealth had given her certain advantages and had not been disadvantageous.[35]

An interesting feature of the attainment of Indian independence is that from the strict legal viewpoint it was achieved in full conformity to the theory of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to India up to that time. The Indian Independence Act (1947), enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament, partitioned India into two separate Dominions, India and Pakistan; it also invested Constituent Assemblies in each Dominion with plenary powers to draw up and adopt a constitution. A Constituent Assembly for undivided India had already been convened in December 1946, and after the division of the country and the withdrawal of members from Pakistan its strength was reduced to some 300 members—roughly, one for each million of the population. It took in all some three years for the Constituent Assembly to frame and adopt the new Constitution; for the Constitution was not finally drafted and passed by the Constituent Assembly until November 26, 1949, and it went into force on January 26, 1950. In its Preamble this declares: "We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic Republic . . . in our Constituent Assembly this 26th day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution." But it is still true that the Constituent Assembly in India was elected by only a minority of the people, and the Constitution itself was never submitted directly to the people. To that extent the claim that the Indian Constitution derives its "authority" from the "people of India" cannot be accepted without qualification.

There is, however, this significant difference in the constitutional origins of the Republic of India and those of the other

[35] Speech to the House of the People, 33 *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth* 553 (1952). See also Prime Minister Nehru's speech, *ibid.*, p. 336.

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member-countries of the Commonwealth. With respect to the latter countries, although the constitutions were normally drawn up by representative Assemblies and in some cases (for example, Australia) submitted for popular approval at a referendum, they were in each case finally embodied in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. Professor Joshi has noted:

> In one sense the source of authority of the Indian Constitution is the Act of the British Parliament, as it was under the authority either recognised or granted under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, that the Constituent Assembly framed the Constitution. Hence anything done by the Constituent Assembly acting under the authority contained in the Act of Parliament can be said to have its source in that Act.[36]

Yet in a wider sense, as Professor Joshi also observes, the effect of the Act was that the British Parliament transferred full political power to India, including full power to draft and actually to adopt the Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of India, in contradistinction to the constitutions of the other member-countries of the Commonwealth, thus has an unimpeachable local source for its authority, in terms of both its historical and its juridical origins.

The problem of the nature of the "sanction" attached to the constitutions of the member-countries of the Commonwealth today is not, it is to be noted, created by any present desire on the part of the United Kingdom to exercise any claimed legislative sovereignty in relation to the Commonwealth. Such a claim, if it were now to be asserted, would be resisted, and would no doubt mean the dissolution of the Commonwealth. The changes in the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Dominions that were concretized in positive-law form in the Statute of Westminster in 1931 were already long-settled constitutional practice by that time, and in that respect probably binding anyway, as constitutional conventions. Except perhaps in relation to Ireland and India, the United Kingdom has given way willingly; and even in relation to these countries the surrender of power by the United Kingdom Parliament, when it was finally demonstrated to be inevitable, was made gracefully. After all,

[36] G. N. Joshi, *The Constitution of India* (London, 1950), p. 12.

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as Professor Laski pointed out (somewhat anachronistically, be it noted), the American Revolution was, on the English side anyway, an experiment in applied Austinianism. It is surely obvious that a sovereignty so abstract is practically without utility.[37]

The problem therefore is essentially one as seen by the Commonwealth countries themselves. If the binding force of their constitutions is dependent upon the continued legislative sovereignty of the United Kingdom in relation to those countries, and that legislative sovereignty is withdrawn, as many would say has happened now, what happens to the constitutions and particularly to supposedly fundamental guarantees contained in them? This, for example, is a statement of the constitutional aspects of the present crisis in South Africa, revolving around the question whether the so-called "entrenched clauses" of the South Africa Act are still binding upon the South African Parliament.[38] It is clear that the problem has been much confused by the terminology employed. Instead of searching for Austin's one and indivisible sovereign, one might with greater clarity look to the source of the constitutional law in each country. Most of the constitutions in question were the products of representative

[37] See Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven, 1917), p. 269.

[38] For an assertion of a local (South African) source for the South African Constitution, in place of the traditional conception of that Constitution as having its source and binding force in the original enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament, see Mr. Justice van den Heever's concurring opinion in the second Harris Case (Minister of the Interior v. Harris), [1952] 4 S.A.L.R. 769 (A.D.):

> "The fact that our constitution is the creature of the British Parliament seems to me a fortuitous circumstance which is quite irrelevant; so too is the fact that we have a written constitution. I would have been of the same opinion if it had been framed by a constituent assembly of the people, made by Solon or extracted from the law of Hammurabi. It seems to me immaterial whether one adheres to the mandatory theory of legislative power or any other. The fact remains that the South Africa Act is our constitution and apart from the constitution there are no organs of state and no powers. If you will, call the cohesive force what Jellinek used to term 'die normirende Kraft des Factischen'."

The remaining four Supreme Court judges participating in the second Harris Case (Minister of the Interior v. Harris), each of whom wrote a separate opinion, do not go beyond the views advanced by Chief Justice Centlivres in the first Harris Case (Harris v. Minister of the Interior) referred to earlier.

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conventions in their respective countries, the substance of the drafting being performed by those conventions, and the final product occasionally being submitted for direct popular approval in various forms, before being sent up to the United Kingdom Parliament for embodiment in Acts of that Parliament. Although it may be that there can be only one sovereign, there seems no reason why there cannot be both an imperial and a local root (or *Grundnorm*) for the constitutions of the Commonwealth countries. Even apart from this, continued use and acceptance over a period of years can surely enroot a constitution locally—custom and convention being accepted agencies for the creation of constitutional law in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Kelsen's *Grundnorm* concept at least has the advantage of dispelling a good deal of the mysticism that has attended the search for the "sovereign" in the Commonwealth countries, as the political links with the United Kingdom have loosened and the old juridical subordination has disappeared forever.

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# CATHOLICS AND PEASANTRY IN FRANCE

RURAL France, like most deep-rooted agrarian societies, moves slowly when it moves at all. Tradition weighs heavily on the peasant mind; new currents of thought penetrate gradually and with difficulty. Yet the countryside is not totally stagnant or immune to new ideas—especially in an age of instability and crisis like our own. For a generation now, a slow but constant ferment has been at work in rural France: a "silent revolution", in the phrase of Raymond Aron. So far, it may seem to have produced little change; most peasants live, work, vote and die in much the same pattern as their fathers and grandfathers. The effect, however, promises to be a cumulative one as each new generation succeeds the old. In this silent revolution, the first stage necessarily consists of a change in mental habits—in the peasant's conception of himself, of his traditional institutions, and of his rôle in French society and the state. Only when this process has been under way for a generation or so, and only when a new rural elite has grown to self-consciousness, are important external changes likely to appear.

In part, the contemporary ferment in rural France is spontaneous in origin. It began as the natural reflex of a social group which found itself caught up in a series of economic and political crises beyond its control. Peasant discontent, of course, goes far back of the contemporary era of crisis. Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, France's steady rural exodus has served as a kind of "daily plebiscite" illustrating the frustration and resentment of the peasantry. This ingrained sense of bitterness was merely intensified by the chronic instability which set in after 1914, and even more after 1930. But this spontaneous reflex has been accompanied and strengthened by the conscious action of certain organized groups in the countryside. Two such groups stand out above all others as aggressive, vigorous contributors to the rural ferment. One of them—the Communist party—has come to the peasantry from outside, as a kind of alien force. The second—a complex series of groups within the Catholic Church—can claim a more direct peasant heritage, since the Church is one of the oldest institutions in rural France.



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By long tradition, Catholicism's hold in France has been strongest in the country districts. A century ago, "peasant" and "Catholic" seemed almost inseparable terms. Farm boys furnished most of the recruits for the priesthood; farm families constituted the bulk of the faithful. Agnosticism and anti-clericalism appeared to be urban aberrations, confined for the most part to the atypical townsmen and city-dwellers. Even today, if an opinion poll is to be trusted, the peasantry remains more faithful to the Church than any other social group.[1]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the rural exodus which began a century ago disturbed many Church leaders. As the ratio of the population in rural cantons fell steadily from three-fourths in 1856 to less than half in 1936, Church influence seemed gravely threatened. Some futile efforts were made to check the trend, largely through preaching the virtues of country life and denouncing the error of those who sought worldly diversion.[2] A

[1] *Sondages*, 1952, No. 4, pp. 35–38. This poll classifies as "devoted Catholics" 31 per cent of the men and 45 per cent of the women on the farms. In addition, 29 per cent of the men and 38 per cent of the women are classified as *observants* (i.e., more or less occasional participants in mass and confession). When *dévots* and *observants* are combined, the peasants outrank all other social categories, although the bourgeoisie ranks close behind. The pollsters conclude, however, that there is more habit than fervor in the Catholicism of the peasants, who are less active than bourgeois Catholics in lay associations.

The eminent religious sociologist Abbé Boulard, using different categories and basing his study on parish reports, has concluded that 38 per cent of the rural population are *pratiquants* (i.e., go regularly to mass and confession); 57 per cent are *conformistes saisonniers* (i.e., rarely or never attend mass after childhood); 1.6 per cent are unbelievers; and 2 per cent are Protestants. F. Boulard, *Problèmes missionnaires de la France rurale* (Paris, 1945, I, 136). It should be noted that Abbé Boulard's "rural population" includes not only the peasantry, but all residents of cantons officially classed as rural (i.e., those with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants in the chief town).

[2] This traditionalist approach had a considerable vogue during the Vichy period, and still appeals to many conservative Catholics. A representative example from the Vichy era is Mgr. Chaptal, *Lettres à un curé de campagne* (Paris, 1942). This book is filled with Virgilian praise of rural life; it preaches a return to the soil, and suggests that young peasants should even purify their language by stripping it of city *argot*. The same spirit marked a conference of conservative Catholic rural leaders held at Angers in 1950. The final report of the conference observes that "history proves the validity of the old myth of Anteus: aged, worn-out peoples recover their full vigor by a return to the soil." "According to Genesis," adds the report, "it was not just any sort of work which was assigned to Adam, but work on the soil; metallurgy is the work of a descendant of Cain" (typewritten report dated December 1950).

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more constructive line, encouraged by the Vatican after 1890, was the attempt of the so-called "social Catholics" to adapt the Church to the new urban trend, and to keep the faith alive among the ex-peasants who migrated to the towns. Much of the Church's early social action was concentrated in the cities, where the threat seemed most immediate and most serious. Rural France, meanwhile, was left pretty much to its traditional ways.

The effect of this policy on Catholic influence in many farm areas was disastrous. Large sections of the countryside began to slide with increasing momentum toward indifference or outright unbelief. By 1940, Abbé Boulard estimated that only about 38 per cent of the rural population were still practicing Catholics as measured by participation in mass and confession. Eighty rural cantons in central France had become almost completely de-Christianized, and were labeled "missionary areas".[3] Churches in some villages today stand almost empty except during the summer months, when a flood of vacationists from "atheistic" Paris fills them to unaccustomed capacity. Candidates for the priesthood have grown increasingly hard to find on the farms; the towns and cities are now far better recruiting grounds. In 1943 a Dominican friar was impelled to found a new missionary order, *Frères missionaires des campagnes*, in an effort to win back the domestic heathen. Perhaps, warned Father de Ganay in 1935, the peasantry is on the way to becoming the most valuable trump card of anticlericalism, and may eventually be the most stubborn barrier to the re-Christianization of France.[4]

The reasons for the decline in the Church's rural strength are complex and controversial. Skeptics like Professor Aulard have argued that Christianity never went very deep in the countryside;

[3] Boulard, *op. cit.*, I, 127–36. On this general subject, see also H. Godin and Y. Daniel, *La France, pays de mission?* (Paris, 1943); G. Le Bras, *Introduction à l'histoire de la pratique religieuse en France* (Paris, 1942–45); and *idem*, "Mesure de la vitalité sociale du Catholicisme en France", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, VIII (1950), 3–39.

[4] Father M. de Ganay, *Problèmes paysans et apostolat specialisé* (Paris, 1935), p. 47. According to Abbé Boulard (*Essor ou déclin du clergé français?* [Paris, 1950], p. 479), some churchmen blame the girls' rural youth group, the JACF, for the growing difficulty in recruiting priests from the farms. They allege that the JACF has talked too much, and too effectively, about the virtues of Christian marriage and activity in lay organizations. For the JACF., see *infra*, p. 532.

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that "the French peasant is at bottom indifferent to religion."[5] Such was probably the case in certain parts of France—notably in sections of the South and in Burgundy. In addition, the nineteenth-century spread of materialism, the expansion of public secular education, and the corrosive influence of the cities doubtless had their effect. But part of the responsibility can certainly be traced to the failings of Catholic leaders themselves. The village priests of the last century, although drawn in large part from the farms, showed little concern for the social and economic problems of the peasantry. Their training was too often narrowly theological and even obscurantist; they were more inclined to reconcile the peasant to his lot than to aid and encourage him to improve it.[6] In some country districts which have become de-Christianized, there developed a violent hatred of the "men in black" who, it was believed, had schemed to keep the whole village sunk in ignorance and superstition. This bitterness was fed by returning ex-peasants who had gone off to make a living in Paris or Lyon, and who brought back the radical doctrines of the cities. It was fed also by Radical or Socialist politicians who sought the votes of subsistence farmers in the Center and South, and of farm laborers in the areas of large-scale agriculture.

The clergy's failure to offer adequate leadership in an epoch of changing rural hopes and needs was especially marked in the sphere of technical progress. In the late nineteenth century, a leaven of change began to work slowly in French agricultural life; new methods, new techniques came into use on some of the more progressive farms. For the most part, the pioneers in that process were men of the Left—Radicals, in many cases, whose anticlerical sentiments were notorious. True, there were important exceptions to this rule. In the Nord Department, for example, the self-reliant Catholic smallholders and tenants followed the example of the neighboring Low Countries, and made their farms the most progressive and productive in France by

[5] A. Aulard, *Christianity and the French Revolution* (London, 1927), p. 121.

[6] For an acute commentary on the narrow-mindedness of the nineteenth-century country clergy, see R. F. Byrnes, *Antisemitism in Modern France* (New Brunswick, 1950), I, 298–302. Some young priests in the de-Christianized regions told me frankly that their problems derive in part from the errors of their predecessors.

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1914. In Brittany, Catholics participated in a remarkable evolutionary process which, from 1840 to 1940, converted a million and a half acres of heath-covered meadow into cultivated land. Some Catholic aristocrats or large landowners carried out notable experiments in modernization, founded coöperatives for marketing and purchasing, or made sincere efforts to improve the lot of their tenants. There were even a few far-sighted priests who established agricultural schools. But these cases were exceptional in the pre-1914 era. For the most part, the clergy played a negligible rôle in the modernization of agriculture or in the awakening of the villages to the possibilities of social progress. As for the Catholic laymen who were active in agrarian reform, their efforts were often so strongly saturated with a paternalistic spirit that the peasantry felt little sense of participation or gratitude.[7]

It is true that some parts of rural France remained almost untouched by the rising tide of skepticism. Such was the case along the eastern and western edges of France; such was also the case in most of the mountainous areas. It would be tempting to conclude that the survival of the faith depended on two simple factors: either (a) the presence of an exceptional nucleus of the clergy or the Catholic laity which did lead the way toward agrarian reform, or (b) the isolation from new currents of thought imposed by the rugged terrain of the mountain country. Both of these factors did affect the changing religious map of rural France; but neither one was an absolute determinant. Proof to the contrary was the rugged, isolated western slope of the Massif Central, which by 1940 was perhaps the most thoroughly de-Christianized part of the country. And conversely, some of the most fervently Catholic of all French farmers can still be found in areas like Morbihan, where both clergy and landlords remain feudal and antiprogressive in outlook. The Church's hold seems to have depended less on far-sighted leadership, or on mere isolation, than on the survival of a traditional social elite or a tradi-

[7] On this subject, see M. Augé-Laribé, *La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940* (Paris, 1950); and J. Chombard de Lauwe, *Bretagne et pays de la Garonne: évolution agricole comparée depuis un siècle* (Paris, 1946).

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tional family structure.[8] Perhaps it was an instinctive understanding of this fact that made so many Church leaders cling to the old ways and look suspiciously on change. What they failed to realize was that the traditional structure of rural society might prove to be a rickety barrier in an era of chronic crisis.

From about 1890, two new currents began to make their influence felt within the Church. The social Catholics, led by De Mun and La Tour du Pin, wished to protect the working class against the impact of modern industrial civilization, and sought to develop a doctrine equidistant from collectivism and laissez faire. The Christian democrats, headed by Marc Sangnier, placed greater stress on mass participation both in politics and in syndical activity. From the beginning, the two groups overlapped so that no clear-cut line could be drawn between them; but the social Catholics were more inclined to defend the traditional social hierarchy and to favor a kind of paternalistic leadership by the old elites.

Until the last years of the Third Republic, however, neither group developed a very active interest in the peasantry. The social Catholic propaganda agency *Action Populaire*, founded in 1903, did direct a few of its early educational brochures toward the rural population; but the burden of its teaching was that the peasants should beware of the nefarious designs of Socialist agitators. As for the Christian democrats, their early activity through the *Sillon* and the *Jeune République* movements was centered mainly in the cities. During the 1920's, the Christian democrats set up new trade unions and youth groups for the urban workers (the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* and the *Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*), but attempted no organ-

[8] *Cf.* G. Le Bras, "Secteurs et aspects nouveaux de la sociologie religieuse", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, I (1946), 39–66. Professor Le Bras, while noting that religion sticks best in isolated parishes, concludes that the old contrast between mountain and plain is no longer so sharp as in the past. *Introduction à l'histoire de la pratique religieuse en France*, I, 76. A number of local studies show the frequent correlation between isolation and the persistence of religious practice. See, for example, H. de Farcy, *Paysans du Lyonnais: la vie agricole dans la vallée de l'Yseron* (Lyon, 1950). Father de Farcy (a Jesuit) shows, however, that the forms of religion have survived better than the spirit in the mountainous end of the valley. For example, black-marketing became widespread there during and after the Vichy period.

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ized effort in the countryside. The peasants had to content themselves with organizations set up and run by old-fashioned traditionalists or conservative social Catholics.[9] It is true that after 1924 the peasants in a few regions could turn to the new Popular Democratic party, which had mildly Christian democratic leanings. But in the rural areas where this party took hold, its spirit was predominantly social Catholic and conservative.[10]

In retrospect, 1930 might almost be called "the year of the great change". The symbol of that change (though by no means its only or even its primary cause) was the formation, by a group of young peasants and priests led by Father Foreau, of a rural youth movement called the *Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne.* From that time forward, a small but growing minority within the Church has sought to adapt Catholicism to a changing rural France, and to give Catholics an active share in guiding that change. Not only the Christian democratic JAC, but also the more progressive wing of the social Catholics, have participated in this new active approach to the peasantry.

The depression decade from 1930 to 1940 was chiefly a time of laying foundations. While communism made spectacular gains in some rural areas, the JAC's growth was modest and slow. Limited strictly to practicing Catholics, it made no effort to appeal to young peasants who had slipped away from the Church; its strength, therefore, was mainly concentrated in the strongly Catholic East and West.[11] In these early years, too, JAC leaders stressed the spiritual and apostolic character of the movement, and concerned themselves less with the practical and material problems of French rural life. The JAC's most promising aspect was its grass-roots character and its freedom from clerical control.

[9] For example, the social Catholic *Association catholique de la jeunesse française,* almost half of whose members were rural; and the traditionalist *Union catholique de la France agricole,* whose principal function was to spend an annual night of prayer at Sacré-Coeur-Montmartre.

[10] *Cf.* M. Einaudi and F. Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France* (Notre Dame, 1952), p. 114.

[11] By 1938, there were JAC federations in 89 French dioceses—i.e., in almost every department of France. Many of these federations, however, were skeletal at best. The JACF, a sister organization set up in 1938 for girls, claimed 85,000 members within a year. *Etudes,* 5 June 1938, p. 684.

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Father Foreau had successfully insisted that the movement should be run by laymen, advised and aided by priests but not dominated by the hierarchy. Out of such an organization, new ideas and dynamic leadership could potentially develop at the village level.

Within the clergy too there were signs of a growing interest in the rural world. *Action Populaire* shifted part of its attention to rural problems, technical as well as social and spiritual. Some rudimentary efforts were made to give young priests special training for work in country parishes. At Lauzun in the Southwest, a village curé named Abbé Granereau set up the first *Maison familiale*—a post-primary school where young peasants could learn the rudiments of agronomy or home economics during the off-season. His example, however, was more praised than imitated during the 1930's.[12]

All of this, it must be granted, added up to a rather unimpressive total effort in the pre-war decade. Nevertheless, some rural Catholics of traditionalist sentiments viewed with distaste the infiltration of Christian democratic ideas. They resented a Jacist movement which clung to its independence of hierarchical control, and which began to show signs of an interest in problems of land ownership, social insurance, and technical advance. Their attitude had political overtones as well; for in some strongly Catholic areas, the old Right-wing monopoly was threatened by the Popular Democratic party, which attracted both Christian democratic and social Catholic votes. By 1940, an incipient conflict between the older and the younger generations was in the making in regions like Brittany, the Loire Valley and the Vendée.

While Christian democracy slowly penetrated the countryside, a rival doctrine suddenly began to make spectacular progress among rural Catholics. This was the corporative doctrine, whose chief exponents were young technicians and bureaucrats of social Catholic background. Their inspiration was drawn in

[12] During and after the Vichy period, the *Maison familiale* movement made more rapid progress. By 1949 there were 123 such establishments in 46 departments, with over 4,000 students enrolled annually. *Cahiers d'action religieuse et sociale*, No. 59 (15 May 1949), p. 308.

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part from papal encyclicals like *Quadragesimo anno*, and in part from the spreading example of régimes like those of Mussolini and Dollfuss. But they claimed also a direct French heritage from the theories of La Tour du Pin, one of the outstanding social Catholic leaders of the late nineteenth century. French corporatism found its most eager exponents in certain agricultural circles: notably within the stodgy, traditionalist *Société des Agriculteurs de France* (which represented the interests of large landowners), and in some of the new specialized organizations like the Wheat Growers' Association. In the mid-thirties a group of young officials from these organizations banded together to form the new *Union Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles*, which was dedicated to the corporative doctrine. Their approach to the farm problem was more social and moral than economic and technical; they constantly quoted the phrase of Ramuz, "*Etre paysan, ce n'est pas un métier, c'est un état.*" Along with their quasi-mystical concept of the word "peasant", they insisted upon the organic unity of the farmers as a group, and argued that this peasant community should have the right to shape its own destiny within a corporative state. Their success was striking. By 1940 the UNSA was the largest agricultural organization in France, claiming to represent 1,200,000 families. Among rural leaders, corporatism seemed far more widely accepted than Christian democracy.[13]

The collapse of 1940 provided the corporatists with an unexpected short cut to power. Pétain turned to a young official of the UNSA, Louis Salleron, to design the structure of his Peasant Corporation, and most of the Corporation's officials throughout France were drawn from UNSA ranks. Furthermore, the agrarian legislation of the Vichy period was inspired in large part by the theories of the social Catholic corporatists. The rural elements in Christian democracy, on the other hand, remained generally aloof from the Pétain régime. Some Jacists played active rôles in the underground, and the JAC as a whole emerged in 1944 almost completely pure of the Vichyite taint. The temporary post-war disgrace of the corporatists offered the

[13] On the rise of agricultural corporativism, see L. Salleron, *Naissance de l'état corporatif* (Paris, 1942), and the files of the UNSA's weekly, *Syndicats Paysans*.

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Christian democrats a unique occasion to expand their strength in the countryside.

Jacist leaders lost no time in seizing this opportunity, and decided upon a fundamental change in the spirit and methods of the movement. Henceforth, they agreed, the religious aspect of the JAC would be played down in order to make possible a broader and more flexible appeal to all elements of rural youth. In pre-war days, they declared, many young peasants had mistakenly regarded the JAC as "the curé's group"; and in certain parts of France, village units had often been mere "Jacist ghettos" isolated from the community as a whole. The Jacists proposed, therefore, to undertake a program of mass action, avoiding the JAC label when opportune, and even ruling out the presence of a priest in areas where his participation might frighten away potential followers. "Our goal", declared the JAC president, "remains essentially apostolic, but more and more we intend to incarnate that task in social and human realities."[14]

Alongside the rejuvenated JAC, the newly-created *Mouvement familial rural* gave Christian democracy an even more effective rural weapon. The MFR was a post-war outgrowth of the *Ligue agricole chrétienne*, organized by the hierarchy in 1939 to channel the energies of young peasants who, at the age of 25, had been "graduated" from the JAC and the JACF. During the Vichy period, the *Ligue* in the occupied zone became quasi-Pétainist; but in southern France it broke away from its initial dependence on the hierarchy, and developed remarkable vigor and leadership. The southern leaders distinguished their section of the *Ligue* by adopting the subtitle *Mouvement familial rural;* and in 1944 the reunited organization took over this name.

[14] A. Labardin in *Chef Paysan* (Jan.-Feb., 1946), pp. 1–14. *Chef Paysan* is the organ of JAC leaders; *Jeunes Forces Rurales* is a JAC weekly addressed to all farm youth.

JAC officials admit that their new strategy may have reduced the size of their dues-paying membership since pre-war days, but they insist that a far larger proportion of rural youth has been attracted to participation in JAC activities. Especially in the de-Christianized areas, the number of participants far exceeds the number of formal members. The JAC continues to be weak in several parts of France—notably the Creuse-Haute Vienne-Indre area in the center, the southern segment of the Alps, and parts of the Pyrenees. Current membership figures are not available, but it was estimated that 70,000 delegates attended the JAC's twentieth-anniversary congress in 1950.

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Like the JAC, the MFR has staunchly asserted its right to lay leadership and control. In some areas, even its chaplains are laymen rather than priests. Again like the JAC, it has sought to attract not only active Catholics, but any rural family which might sympathize with its general doctrines. Its weekly newspaper, *Foyer Rural*, now boasts the second largest circulation of any farm journal—exceeded only by the Communist weekly *La Terre*. In some areas, *Foyer Rural* has succeeded in attracting as many non-Catholic as Catholic readers.[15]

Both the JAC and the MFR have plunged actively into the tasks of rural reform. The Jacists specialize in study programs, and have carried out a series of detailed regional surveys which have already served as base for several significant monographs on rural problems.[16] Their chief interest, naturally enough, is in matters which directly concern the young peasant: such problems as more adequate specialized education, improved housing and recreation facilities, and the placement of young families on farms of their own. Groups of Jacists have set up a *Centre national d'études rurales* to encourage and coördinate the careful study of rural problems, and a *Union des ententes et communautés rurales* to stimulate experiments in the joint use of machinery or the joint operation of several adjacent small farms. Both organizations are rudimentary in size and scope, but they illustrate the desire of many JAC leaders to tackle the study of rural France objectively, scientifically, and in the context of the nation's over-all problems.

The MFR, whose members are old enough to be active farmers and voters, is more concerned with seeking to influence legislation on rural social and economic matters, and with entering directly into syndical activity. Many of its members are local or regional

[15] The MFR's regional organizer in Hérault made this estimate on the basis of a wide sampling. Circulation figures for the top four farm weeklies in January 1951, as furnished by the Ministry of Information, were as follows: *La Terre* (Communist), 161,780; *Foyer Rural*, 119,000; *Journal de la France Agricole* (nonpolitical), 86,050; *Jeunes Forces Rurales* (JAC), 54,500.

[16] R. Colson, *Motorisation et avenir rural* (Paris, 1950); Abbé E. Gautier, *La dure existence des paysans et des paysannes; pourquoi les Bretons s'en vont* (Paris, 1950); S. Sailly-Laisné, *Orage sur le moisson: le drame vécu par les jeunes paysans* (Paris, 1941). This latter book grew out of the JAC's first experiment with rural questionnaires, undertaken in 1938.

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officials of the new post-war farmers' syndicate, the *Confédération Générale de l'Agriculture;* one of them, Eugène Forget, was national president of the CGA's most important subdivision from 1946 to 1950. In 1950, when elections were held throughout rural France for a series of new agricultural social security boards, the MFR put up candidates almost everywhere, and found itself overnight in possession of some eighty per cent of the seats on these boards. The MFR's little nucleus of specialists then had to assume the difficult task of educating this mass of board members in the technical intricacies of the social security system. The episode is a striking illustration of the rapid growth of the MFR in the countryside, and of its importance as a rural educational agency.[17]

This new post-war activity within the Catholic laity has been accompanied and encouraged by a more energetic attitude on the part of many members of the clergy, both secular and regular. In the most de-Christianized parts of rural France, the new

[17] This account of the MFR's history and activities is based for the most part on personal observation in the countryside, and on conversations with MFR officials and militants. The same is true of my account of the JAC.

MFR leaders have shown remarkable consistency and forthrightness in seeking to guide their members toward a rational, broad-gauged, non-demagogic understanding of basic agrarian problems. For example, when the new social security system for farmers was set up in 1949, the MFR opposed the suggestion of certain qualified experts that the peasants should not have to bear more than half the cost of the system. The farmers, it argued, should carry the whole burden, since to ask for an increased share of an unchanged total national income would create new social tensions. *Cahiers d'action religieuse et sociale,* Nos. 54 and 68, 1 March and 1 November 1949, pp. 153–57 and 596. Or again, a typical editorial in *Foyer Rural* on 4 May 1951 denounced those political candidates who were spreading loose promises of aid to the little farmer. "Bring on the violoncello and the tremolos!" commented the editors sarcastically. Aid for the little peasant, they declared, must not be merely a slogan; it is a complex subject requiring careful study, extensive state aid, and real civic courage, for not all the small farms can survive.

Two other post-war organizational efforts by Catholic laymen have been an intensified campaign to recruit farm laborers to the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens,* and an effort to create a group of progressive farm employers similar to the *Centre des Jeunes Patrons* in industry. CFTC officials refuse to confirm or deny estimates that they have recruited 20,000 farm laborers. As for the agricultural employers group, which founded a periodical called *Terroir* after the liberation, it faded out of existence within a year or two. Recently the *Jeunes Patrons* have been attempting to break down the hostility between farmers and industrialists by sponsoring conferences between representatives of these two professions. *Le Monde,* 21 May 1953.

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missionary order called *Frères missionaires des campagnes* has been at work since 1943. The order now has about seventy men trained or in process of training.[18] Much more important, however, is the new tendency to provide the secular clergy with an adequate understanding of the social, economic and technical problems which face the peasantry today. Such periodicals as the monthly *Cahiers du clergé rural* (sponsored by the JAC and the MFR) furnish a steady flow of information both general and detailed.[19] Special stress is being placed on training young priests to serve as chaplains to the JAC. The activities of *Action Populaire*, too, have steadily shifted in the direction of greater emphasis on rural areas; two able Jesuit priests (one of whom is a nationally recognized agricultural expert with an advanced degree in the field) devote full time to the rural aspects of Catholic education and propaganda.[20]

One small segment of the clergy has outdone even the laity in advocating the total renovation of French rural life. The Dominican-sponsored study group which calls itself *Economie et humanisme*, founded near Lyon in 1942, represents a kind of Left-wing offshoot of Christian democracy. Such a rôle is probably in character for the Dominicans, who are by tradition

[18] Boulard, *Essor ou déclin du clergé français?*, pp. 224–26. The founder of the order, Father Epagneul, has described his early experiences in *Missionnaire en France* (Houssaye-en-Brie, 1944).

[19] The stated aim of the *Cahiers* is "to awaken the clergy to the revolutionary importance of the period into which the rural world has now entered," and to orient chaplains of the JAC and the MFR in the new post-war methods of those organizations (No. 89, June 1947, p. 241). The spirit of the *Cahiers* can be conveyed by summarizing an article contributed by Pierre Lambert, one of the top officials of the MFR. Tractors, coöperatives, artificial insemination, writes Lambert, can be the most active agents of apostasy, just as the press, the cinema, and the lay school have been in the past. But they can also be devices for liberty, for human and religious progress. Priests now give sermons on the cinema; "can they do the same on the Christian utilization of the tractor?" Yet such things, continues Lambert, are transforming rural parishes. Catholics, unlike Marxists, often lack facts, and are content with sentimental judgments. The new priesthood must be able to prove whether a large farm is better than a small one, whether the present system of property ownership is good or evil, whether agriculture engages too many people or too few. No. 90, Aug.-Sept. 1947, p. 302.

[20] Father Jean Serve is an *Ingénieur civil du génie rural;* Father Drogat is a specialist in rural social problems. *Action Populaire* publishes monographs, a monthly periodical called *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, and a bimonthly organ for militants, *Cahiers d'action religieuse et sociale.*

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the intellectuals and theorizers of French Catholicism. The *Economie et humanisme* group crusades for a complete reconstruction of French economic and social life on the basis of what it calls "*l'esprit communautaire*". In agriculture, this scheme would involve the voluntary pooling of land, equipment and livestock by a group of peasants who would proceed to operate on collective lines. The group also urges the rapid modernization and mechanization of agriculture, in order to maximize production and to make life easier and more comfortable in the countryside. "What's progress, grandfather?" asks a child in one of the pamphlets sponsored by the group. "Progress, my child," answers the sage old man, "means to work little and to live well."[21] Nothing could be farther from the traditional philosophy of Catholic spokesmen in France.

To many French Catholics of the old school, such views are totally irresponsible or even quasi-subversive. The hostility of these conservatives extends not only to the Dominican extremists, but also to such Christian democratic groups as the JAC and the MFR, which have begun to attract mass support. MFR organizers admit frankly that they have been able to make little headway in certain fervently Catholic regions like Morbihan and Alsace where the tradition of clerical control is old and deep. "Some curés", observed a priest in the MFR central offices, "can't understand a movement run by laymen, and therefore resent it. Many laymen aren't used to it either, and take it for granted that the curé ought to be in control. Besides, the nobility is usually against us." In the northwestern section of Brittany, there is open conflict between the MFR-JAC group and the men who operate the great Landerneau coöperative headed by Count de Guébriant. The Christian democrats contend that Landerneau is in fact a giant "trust", and insist that democratic controls must be developed if the word coöperative is to have any meaning. The Landerneau officials, who are Right-wing social Catholics with a strongly corporativist tinge, reply scornfully that the Jacists are immature youngsters who have no patience with the lessons of experience; that they and

[21] M. Artaud, *Le métier d'agriculteur* (Ecully, 1944), p. 33. The group's bimonthly organ *Economie et humanisme*, has been bifurcated since 1949 into the quarterly *Idées et forces* and the monthly *Diagnostic économique et sociale*.

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the MFR are misled by Dominican "crackpots" and celibate priests who have no real understanding of rural life. In some villages, Christian democratic priests are accused of softening up the peasantry for communism by criticizing the existing economic and social structure. Even in areas like the Nord where Christian democracy is firmly rooted, some social Catholics feel that the JAC has sold its birthright in recent years by playing down its religious character in an effort to appeal to non-Catholics. They admit, however, that the new approach has enabled the JAC to make some headway in de-Christianized or indifferent areas.[22]

This friction between Christian democrats on the one hand and traditionalist or corporativist social Catholics on the other extends also into the political realm. "Politically speaking," one Catholic journalist writes, "French Catholics have never been more divided than they are today." This division exists both in the cities and in the countryside, but it is especially striking in the rural areas, where much of the Catholic vote is concentrated. Indeed, rural France may become the central battleground for the various Catholic political tendencies during the next generation.

For a time after the liberation, the new Christian democratic party *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* had almost a clear field in campaigning for Catholic votes. Its founders were mostly urban intellectuals, but they were aware that agriculture is a basic sector of the French economy and that the peasant vote is a sizable one; therefore they sought at once to give their party an agricultural program and a rural organizational base. The program was presented in a pamphlet issued in 1945, and marked by the idealistic reform spirit of the liberation epoch.[23] In it, the

[22] This account is based on conversations with representatives of both sides in the conflict. There is only meager evidence for the charge that the Christian democrats are paving the way for communism. One case cited by observers in the Aisne Department concerns three neighboring villages (Amblény, Saint-Bandry, and Cutry) whose combined Communist vote increased from 38 to 45 per cent between 1946 and 1951, while in almost every other commune in the canton, the Communists lost strength. This result may perhaps be attributed to the activity of a group of young priests at Amblény, who had been attacking the large farm owners of the area and had been urging farm workers and small peasants to demand reforms. The result was to increase the Communist rather than the MRP vote.

[23] *Jalons pour renover notre agriculture* (Paris, 1945).

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MRP advocated what it called "an agricultural revolution". The base for this renovated agriculture would be the family farm, improved and modernized through a combination of organized farmers' action and state planning. Tenants and sharecroppers would be given a new deal, though neither of these landholding practices would be abolished. Coöperatives would be encouraged, but the extremes of excessive bigness (Landerneau style) and of quasi-collectivism (as advocated by the *Economie et humanisme* group) were to be avoided. In many respects, this program resembled that of the Socialist party in the post-liberation epoch, though it was somewhat more cautious in spirit.[24]

It was easier to draft a program than to build a rural organization in time for the flurry of national elections in 1945–46. The party proposed to create a network of specialized groups ranging downward from a National Agricultural Committee to a local "*équipe*" or specialized team in each village or group of villages. The local *équipes*, however, rarely developed beyond the embryo stage. Like the rural cells of the Communist party, they often consisted of a tiny handful of militants no bigger than the traditional electoral committees of the pre-war parties.[25] The JAC and the emergent MFR seemed to offer a ready-made mass organizational base for the party's activities; but neither group

[24] Despite this similarity, the long-standing clerical issue hampers coöperation between Christian democrats and Socialists in the countryside. During the early post-war years, the MRP persistently accused the Socialists of a desire to drive thousands of marginal peasants off the land, and eventually to expropriate all peasants (*Monde paysan*, 8 April, 30 April, and 30 October 1946, and 1 January 1947). These attacks slackened off after 1947, when the Socialists lost control of the Ministry of Agriculture, and when more dangerous rivals to the MRP began to appear on the Right.

Another source of post-war friction between Catholics and Socialists was a program sponsored by the Socialist Minister Tanguy-Prigent to build state-aided village clubhouses (*foyers ruraux*) for young peasants. Both the JAC and the conservative Catholics regarded this plan with suspicion as an attempt to spread free thought in the countryside. The conservative Catholics fought back through an organization called the *Confédération nationale de la famille rurale*, the outgrowth of a group founded under Vichy, which began in 1947 to set up its own clubhouses. Neither movement has made spectacular progress. In 1951 there were 751 *foyers ruraux*, only about 400 of which had some kind of building. The Catholic group has founded about 100 *maisons rurales*.

[25] The MRP admitted this relative failure in a pamphlet published in December 1946: *Comment lancer le MRP dans les campagnes*.

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would formally commit itself to any one party for fear of alienating some potential converts.[26] In practice, however, JAC and MFR members voted almost solidly for the new Christian democratic party, and many of them have become active MRP militants as well. As for MRP propaganda organs aimed at the farmers, none of them ever managed to reach a wide public.[27]

Although the MRP failed to build an effective party organization throughout rural France, it was far more successful in winning rural votes. In the three general elections during 1945–46, more than a quarter of the farmers backed MRP candidates. No other single party did so well in the countryside. The MRP was quick to point out, too, that it had more peasant-deputies than any rival group. On the other hand, the MRP's rural successes did not make it predominantly a farmers' party. Its proportionate strength was just as great in the towns and cities—even greater among the urban bourgeoisie. Of the MRP's total vote, only 15 to 20 per cent came from the peasantry; the rest was drawn from a wide cross-section of social groups.[28]

Meanwhile, the MRP had gradually been working out the details of its rather hazy agricultural program. That program, in its refined form, was typical of the MRP's whole spirit: left of center, but not too far left. Like the Marxist parties, it placed heavy stress on economic factors: on a steady increase in productivity and efficiency, in order to expand total farm output and raise rural living standards. Like the conservative groups, it held that productivity is not the only goal: that farming is not only a business but also a way of life, and that the "human" and

[26] *Chef Paysan*, March-April 1946, p. 12.

[27] The MRP's farm weekly, *Monde paysan*, survived only from 1946 to 1949; it has been replaced by a mimeographed monthly organ called *L'action rurale: bulletin de liaison des équipes rurales*. The MRP's failure here is not unique, however; only two parties (Communists and Peasant Party) have managed to keep their farm weeklies afloat throughout the post-war years.

[28] In June 1946, according to an opinion poll, the MRP won the votes of 37 per cent of the liberal professions; 30 per cent of the business men and industrialists; 28 per cent of the farmers and of the small *rentiers;* 20 per cent of the white-collar employes and civil servants; and 18 per cent of the workers (Einaudi and Goguel, *op. cit.*, p. 179). A rough calculation based in part on these figures suggests that the MRP received between 15 and 20 per cent of its total 1946 vote from farmers (excluding farm workers).

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"social" aspect of agriculture must not be ignored. The MRP argued, therefore, that the family farm must remain the bulwark of French agriculture, and that, by following the Danish or the Dutch example, it could be just as productive as the large mechanized farm.

Privately, however, MRP leaders rejected the viewpoint of many conservatives that the traditional small-farming structure of France would have to be preserved intact. The MRP recognized that if family-type agriculture were to become as prosperous and productive as in Denmark, thousands of marginal or submarginal farms would have to disappear, and the surviving ones would have to specialize. This process of consolidation into middle-sized farms had been going on by natural processes for a generation or more; and the MRP's agricultural policy was more or less consciously designed to encourage that evolution. The party rejected artificial schemes (sponsored mainly by the Communists) such as price differentials in favor of wheat grown on small farms, or special marketing privileges in favor of marginal winegrowers. Its policy of price supports for basic farm products, and of planned state investment to modernize agriculture and to develop steadily expanding foreign markets, would inevitably aid the more efficient and specialized large and middle farmers. Economically, this long-range program was above criticism; but, politically, it could be explosive unless applied cautiously and even, in a sense, surreptitiously. For the defense of the little peasant in French politics is traditionally as sacred as the defense of Southern womanhood among Dixie congressmen.

Almost before the MRP had a fully elaborated program, the party found itself in control of French agricultural policy. In November 1947 a cabinet crisis ended the Socialists' three-year hold on the Ministry of Agriculture, and transferred that post to an MRP deputy, Pierre Pflimlin. Two months later, the chairmanship of the important Agriculture Committee in the National Assembly was shifted from a Communist to another member of the MRP, Gabriel Moussu. For the next four years, the party's responsibility for agricultural policy was unbroken.

This turn of events proved to be a doubtful blessing, so far as the MRP's rural popularity was concerned. It occurred at a

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moment when the post-war period of abnormal farm prosperity was coming to an end; production was once more approaching the level of the nation's food needs, and the peasants' old fear of glutted markets returned to haunt them. Furthermore, one of the first problems facing the new cabinet was the inflation of the franc, which led the government to increase farm taxes and to require the farmers to turn in all 5,000-franc notes in their possession. Highly irritated by these measures, the peasants grew still more nervous when, in 1948, the index of farm prices fell below that of industrial prices for the first time since the war, and remained below it thereafter. In spite of this unfavorable trend, Pflimlin refused to retreat into the economic Malthusianism of the thirties. He clung to the MRP thesis that farm production must be steadily expanded and that new foreign markets should be developed. At the same time, Pflimlin insisted that the government must continue to support farm prices and to share the cost of modernizing agriculture. Such a policy, however, placed the MRP in a serious dilemma. Its leaders were aware that farm price supports and large public investments would probably mean either spiraling inflation or a thoroughgoing tax reform; and they knew, too, that their urban voters disliked farm price supports because such supports meant higher food prices.[29] Caught in this predicament, the MRP found that on balance it lost more peasant backing than it gained by its control of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Meanwhile, the MRP's rural influence was being threatened from another quarter; for the convalescent Right-wing groups were steadily regaining strength and were offering Catholic farmers an alternative leadership. By 1950, the Right-wing social Catholics who had staffed the Vichy Peasant Corporation had made their way back into farm syndicalism, and had displaced the Christian democrats in key positions in the CGA.

[29] Minister Pflimlin committed himself so thoroughly to his policy that in December 1949 he withdrew from the cabinet in protest against the government's refusal to raise the price of sugar beets. The other MRP ministers opposed him on this ssue, and he was replaced by another MRP deputy, Gabriel Valay. There have been periodic reports of friction within the MRP between rural and urban deputies (e.g., *Esprit*, July 1950, p. 133), but there is no real evidence that the party is split into hostile blocs on agricultural policy as a whole. Differences appear to exist on strategy and tactics rather than on aims.

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Corporative doctrines once again began to be voiced openly in CGA councils and in some of the large farm coöperatives. As in pre-war days, many Rightists urged the peasantry to concentrate on the defense of its own interests against the politicians and the urban workers. Some of them also questioned the doctrine of a steadily expanding agriculture, and suggested that it might be wiser to return to the traditional policy of restricted production for a small protected market.

In politics, the vaguely corporative platform of De Gaulle's new RPF attracted some farm support: notably in the West, and among large-scale capitalist farmers of the Northeast who had supported Colonel de la Rocque before 1940. For the most part, however, De Gaulle's threat to the MRP was urban in character. In the rural areas, it was more often the non-Gaullist conservatives who began to undermine MRP strength. These elements, sometimes organized under the Peasant Party label but more often operating as independents, entered lists in about half the rural constituencies in the 1951 elections. Their tickets were heavily loaded with peasant candidates—many of them prominent local officials of the CGA, often with a record of leadership in the Vichy Corporation as well. Most of these candidates were social Catholics of the traditionalist or corporatist variety.

When the returns from the 1951 elections came in, it seemed that the MRP had suffered a disastrous rural defeat. Of the party's twenty-four farmer-deputies, only eight were reëlected; and among those defeated were several leading MRP spokesmen on agricultural policy. Meanwhile the heterogeneous Right-wing groups managed to elect forty-four farmers to parliament, while the Gaullists added fifteen more. It appeared that the peasantry had deserted the MRP en masse and had turned to other saviors.

Such a conclusion, however, would be misleading. The MRP did lose thousands of rural votes to the Right-wing groups, but its decline in the rural constituencies was rarely as great as in the cities, where Gaullism's inroads were heaviest. In some farming regions—notably in the extreme East and West where Christian democracy has its oldest roots—the MRP remained the largest single party. Likewise, its popular vote held up better

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in the southern half of France (where agriculture is predominant) than in the more urbanized North. The MRP's share of the total national vote cast dropped to less than 13 per cent; but its share in the twenty-eight most preponderantly agricultural departments fell only to 14.2 per cent.[30] A subsequent opinion poll indicated that the MRP received 18 per cent of its total 1951 vote from farmers (plus another 2 per cent from farm workers)—a proportion which was certainly no lower than in 1946, and which may have been slightly higher.[31] It can hardly be said, then, that the MRP's rural losses represented an electoral disaster.

In fact, the inferences drawn by MRP leaders at the time may have erred in the contrary direction.[32] They concluded that the party's electoral base had shifted noticeably away from the cities and toward the villages and farms: that the MRP was becoming increasingly "ruralized". While there was some validity in this viewpoint, MRP officials were probably inclined to exaggerate it because of the spectacular impact of Gaullism on their city voters. They concluded also that rural France might now offer the best terrain for recruiting new MRP voters, since the cities were inclined to swing to extremist movements like communism and Gaullism. Finally, they reflected with some bitterness that their most loyal farm support seemed to come from the small peasants in the more static sections of France, and not from the large-farm elements who had benefited most from the MRP's agricultural policy. In the twenty departments with the lowest per capita living standard in France (eighteen of which are mainly subsistence-farming areas), the MRP polled 16.4 per cent of the votes cast; while in nine pros-

[30] These departments, where more than 40 per cent of the total population derives its living from agriculture, are indicated on map 22–05 in the volume published by the *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques* called *L'espace économique français* (Paris, 1951). Most of them are in the Southwest or the West. The MRP's share rises to 15.3 per cent in the 19 departments where over 60 per cent of the active male population is engaged in agriculture.

[31] *Sondages*, 1952, No. 3, p. 66.

[32] This account of MRP reactions is based on conversations with a number of MRP party officials and members of parliament during the weeks just after the 1951 elections. One Catholic sociologist concluded at the time that the MRP vote had shifted to the point where more than half of it was now rural (i.e., from the farms and the small towns): P. Laurac, "Les forces sociales en France", *Economie et humanisme: le diagnostic économique et sociale*, July–August 1951, pp. 208–17.

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perous large-farming departments of the Paris basin and the Northeast, the proportion fell to 8.4 per cent.[33] Some MRP officials concluded that the party ought to repay this loyalty—and seek new converts—by shifting its emphasis to a program of generous aid to the small subsistence farmers, even though this might slow up the program of agricultural modernization and expansion, and even though the urban classes might have to help pay the price.

Such a change in attitude, however, would not be easy for most MRP leaders to accept. For one thing, most of them are still urban intellectuals, a generation or more removed from the farm. Furthermore, four fifths of their voters still come from the nonagricultural segments of the population, whose interests they cannot afford to neglect. The MRP may have become somewhat "ruralized" in the sense that its center of gravity has shifted toward the smaller towns, but it is less dependent on the peasant vote than are either the conservative parties or the Radical Socialists.[34] Finally, most of the MRP leaders are still mild but sincere "new dealers": they remain convinced that France needs drastic modernization and "structural reform" if the nation is to keep its place in the world. No such conversion can be accomplished if the farmers are to be singled out for special protection and aid. Nor can it be accomplished without a gradual but fundamental change in the nation's agrarian structure. Artificial measures designed to insulate the mass of marginal and submarginal peasants against such change would be costly to the state, and would more probably produce stagnation than reform. At heart (though of course not publicly), many MRP leaders agree with those agricultural specialists who

[33] The departments are classified according to living standards in the I.N.S.E.E.'s publication *L'espace économique française*, p. 136. The nine large-farming departments used in this analysis were Aisne, Aube, Eure, Eure-et-Loir, Haute-Marne, Marne, Oise, Seine-et-Marne, and Somme.

[34] According to *Sondages* (1952, No. 3), the non-Gaullist conservative parties received 31 per cent of their total vote from farmers, and the *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines* (Radicals and allied groups) received 28 per cent. The other parties rated as follows: MRP 18 per cent, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* 16 per cent, Socialists 8 per cent, Communists 5 per cent. The Communists, it should be added, got an additional 8 per cent from farm laborers, thus receiving almost half the entire farm labor vote.

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declare that "France has a million too many peasants."[35] They believe that if the nation is ever to approach the productivity and the rural living standard of countries like Denmark, there must be not only steady technical advance, but also a gradual consolidation of many small farms, and a continuing transfer of population away from agriculture. MRP leaders, hampered thus by their conviction that France needs change, find it hard to defend the little peasant with the same fervor as do the Communists and the traditionalist Right-wing groups. Many of the peasants on the more efficient and modernized farms may reject the MRP at the polls, yet the interests of these farmers must almost inevitably be defended by French Christian democrats. For no democracy, Christian or otherwise, is likely to flourish when its economy is stagnant and outmoded.

Rural France, it may be repeated once more, is in slow ferment today. The peasants, divided and often uncertain as to their proper rôle in an evolving society, have reached a point where many of them simultaneously desire and fear change. Many Christian democrats and social Catholics believe (or claim to believe) that the desire for change is dominant; that a basic mental transformation has already taken place in the countryside, and that " . . . a new peasantry is being born." "A colossal transformation is convulsing the soil," writes M. Artaud, "and the greatest revolution of the century is being carried out there, before our very eyes. The rural citizen is preparing to become contemporaneous with his century—a fact which is great with consequences."[36] But for many of those Catholics

[35] This phrase, used privately by a prominent social Catholic agronomist, was publicized in 1951 by an outspoken young Jacist named René Colson (*Témoignages Chrétiennes*, 13 April 1951). The MRP was seriously embarrassed by the article, for the electoral campaign was about to begin, and both Communists and conservatives immediately accused the MRP of aiming to destroy the little peasant. MRP leaders had to repudiate the Colson article, while admitting privately that its main fault was bad timing and excessive bluntness.

[36] "Le monde paysan s'éveille", *Economie et humanisme: le diagnostic économique et sociale*, 30 June 1950, pp. 167–69. This note of enthusiasm and optimism is common in the publications of the Christian democrats and the more progressive social Catholics: e.g., *Cahiers du clergé rural*, No. 88 (May 1947), p. 237; *Cahiers d'action religieuse et sociale*, 1 and 15 Feb. 1950, pp. 88, 111; *Etudes* (Jesuit), July-August 1950, p. 121. But Father Drogat of *Action Populaire*, in noting "an encouraging tidal wave among farm youth toward a new rural civilization," warns Catholics

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who are engaged in daily rural action, it is easy to slip into pessimism or even cynicism. "Never before has there been so much palaver about the coöperative spirit, and so few real co-operators," remarked one MFR militant at a leaders' meeting in Montpellier. "Good intentions—how rich our country is in good intentions!" bitterly commented the government's agricultural agent after a day-long conference of eager young Catholic peasants in the Southwest. The mental habits of the past still constitute a formidable barrier against the reformers, as one incident in Lot-et-Garonne will indicate. An ex-senator there, speaking to a peasant crowd in their local dialect, denounced the Parisians for constantly insisting that the peasants must change their ways. "Let these French-speaking northerners cut our taxes and leave us strictly alone—that's all we ask!" he trumpeted. The crowd gave him an ovation.[37]

A time of ferment can produce emotional reactions as well as rational reflection. Peasant France offers a clear example of such an emotional reflex in the appeal of communism, with its incongruously combined promises of a new age and of protection against the painful impact of change. Perhaps an even more natural impulse within such a group as the peasantry is its widespread tendency to fall back into the negative, defensive attitudes of the past. By tradition, narrow self-interest has marked peasant behavior; the mass of farmers have survived crisis by protecting themselves rather than by adapting themselves to the times. This habit may explain the persistent appeal of old-fashioned conservatism and of its modern offshoot, agrarian corporativism, in rural France. For both elements appeal to the deep-rooted conviction of most peasants that the rest of the world is in league against them, and that their best hope is a kind of individual or group autonomy within French society.

In this state of affairs, the nature of Catholic leadership in the countryside is likely to be of crucial importance during the next generation or two. Outside the Church, communism is virtually

against the possibility that this thirst for change may result in a flight from the Church, as was the case in the cities a century ago. Such a trend is a special danger, he adds, in areas where rural religion is based on nothing more than tradition and ignorance. *Revue de l'Action Populaire,* No. 43 (1950), p. 575.

[37] I cite these incidents from experience in 1950–51.

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the only dynamic, widely organized movement which is stirring the rural population. The Radical party, although it still enjoys wide electoral support in the agricultural Southwest, has clearly lost its dynamism and its appeal to the younger generation. Socialist efforts to exert real influence among the peasantry have failed, except in limited areas and in segments of the coöperative movement. As for the Peasant Party, it scarcely exists except for electoral purposes.

Catholic activity, unlike that of the Communists, is divided against itself. The Christian democrats and the Left-wing social Catholics pull one way, the corporativists and the traditionalists another. Inertia and certain emotional factors in the countryside weigh strongly in favor of the latter groups. Recently, too, there have been some hints of Vatican pressure against those Christian democrats who have been "seeking to build a bridge between the Church and the modern world," and who have been trying to coöperate with non-Catholic democratic groups.[38] Perhaps these hints have no foundation in fact. But even if they do not, those Catholics who hope to "build a bridge" in the French countryside have a long and difficult task ahead. So far, they have made a notable start toward creating a new rural elite, prepared for change through democratic methods. "Fifty years ago," observes one of France's leading non-Catholic agronomists, "it was the Radicals who were leading the way

[38] See *Le Monde's* interview with an anonymous member of the hierarchy who deplored what he called a whispering campaign among French Catholics of the Right wing against the progressive Catholics, and the Vatican's tendency to retreat into a spirit of "doctrinal narrowness, authoritarian prudence and religious conservatism." After praising the work of such lay groups as the JAC and the JOC, he commented: "Rightly or wrongly, it seems that all this is once more being questioned. Against the desires of the bishops, this 'specialization' is being attacked as a form of the class struggle surreptitiously introduced into the bosom of the Church; it is proposed to return to so general a type of Catholic action that it will be incapable of reaching certain milieux and may even be used for political ends." *Le Monde*, 30–31 March 1952.

A curious American reflection of this religious conservatism is cited in the Catholic weekly *Commonweal*, where Joseph M. Duffy, Jr., writes (10 July 1953, p. 345) of " . . . a recent conversation with a priest during which he responded with mingled contempt and alarm to a reference to the Catholic Action movement in France. I realized that, for him, these French Catholics belonged in somewhat the same category as French novels . . . . They appeared to resemble the familiar product, but they also had strange and upsetting ideas about the *status quo*."

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toward agricultural progress in France; today, the Catholics have taken their place."[39] One cannot be sure that a small enlightened elite is capable of transmitting its ideas to a whole segment of society like the peasantry; nor can one be sure that this particular elite will have the requisite energy, toughness and qualities of leadership. What does seem almost certain, however, is that if the Catholics fail, the French peasantry may be left with a choice between communism and stagnation.

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[39] This comment was made by René Dumont, professor at the *Institut Agronomique* in Paris.

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# AMERICAN SUFFRAGE AND SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE

AMONG the many arguments against the abolition of property qualifications for the suffrage in the United States none was more frequently heard than that which said no adult male should be allowed to vote unless he had a "will of his own". Opponents of change in states as widely separated as Virginia and Massachusetts, living in such different times as the Revolution and the era of democratic ascendancy, seized upon this concept as perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of maintaining the *status quo*.

For example, John Adams declared in May 1776 that he was opposed to permitting minors or poor people to vote because they had "no will of their own".[1] James Wilson, celebrated Pennsylvania lawyer, stated the same opinion at greater length. The correct theory about the suffrage, he said, is that only the citizen "whose circumstances do not render him necessarily dependent on the will of another" should possess a vote.[2] Josiah Quincy, Boston's first mayor, invoked this slogan in a slightly different guise in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention in 1820.[3] In the very important New York Convention of 1821 Chancellor James Kent stated the idea in a still different form when he said that no one without sufficient independence should be allowed to vote.[4] As late as the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1845, the argument was still being employed although not, perhaps, with the shrill insistency of earlier times.[5] Even suffrage reformers, including Samuel Young of New York,

[1] Adams, C. F. (ed.), *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1851–60), vol. IX, pp. 375–378.

[2] Andrews, J. D. (ed.), *The Works of James Wilson* (Chicago, 1896), vol. I, p. 16.

[3] *Journal of Debates, and Proceedings in the Convention. . .* (Boston, 1821), p. 251.

[4] Carter, N. H., Stone, W. L., and Gould, M.T.C., *Reports of the Proceedings of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New York* (Albany, 1821), p. 216. Rufus King and Chief Justice C. J. Spencer employed the same argument.

[5] Ker, R. J., *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of Louisiana* (New Orleans, 1845), pp. 19–21 *et seq.*



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vehemently denied that their object was to enfranchise those who did not "possess *capacity* and *independence*." [6]

When opponents or proponents of a broader suffrage talked about men without a will of their own they did not, of course, refer to the controversy over free will and election. That controversy was coming to an end, in informed circles at least, by the time the suffrage issue became acute. Instead they referred to the lack of free will which some men had in their relations to one another in the world of politics. Two kinds of dependency seemed to be the lot of many common men: dependency of tenants upon landlords and dependency of working men upon employers.

Americans who were acquainted with the contemporary scene in England were acutely aware that these dependents presented a knotty problem to statesmen and reformers. They knew that in England men dependent upon landlords or employers very frequently sold their votes to the highest bidder or were shepherded to the polls and told how they should cast them. This was often true whether or not they were qualified to vote. Many Englishmen disliked these practices, but the heat of a local campaign was sufficient to consume the finest scruples. Corrupt practices won many an election not only in the counties but also in the boroughs.[7] English reformers were alarmed by what they thought the increasing power of the very rich in English political life. William Cobbett, journalist and agitator, expressed these fears when he wrote in 1809 that persons believed "to have no will of their own" should always be excluded from the polls. Why? Because to admit them would give the "artful, wealthy man" too large a share of influence.[8]

While some Englishmen feared that the poor were increasing the power of the rich, others were alarmed by the prospect that the poor might become too independent. In this case, it was thought that they would vote in great numbers for a demagogic program of despoiling the rich. Conservatives' fears were seemingly confirmed by the history of the Gracchi of Imperial Rome, to say nothing of attacks upon private property during the French

[6] Carter, Stone and Gould, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[7] Porrit, E., *The Unreformed House of Commons* (Cambridge, 1903), vol. I, pp. 166–181.

[8] Cobbett, J. M. and J. P. (eds.), *Selections from Cobbett's Political Works* (London, n. d.), vol. III, pp. 230–231.

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Revolution. History and experience seemed to point a finger of warning at those who contemplated with equanimity the abolition of property qualifications for voting. The burgeoning Industrial Revolution in England, accompanied by the growth of a large dependent working-class population, increased further the desire to maintain existing suffrage arrangements.

These fears certainly placed the poor in a hopeless position in politics. They were deemed a positive menace, whether dependent or independent. A sizable proportion of the population, it was said, did not have a will of its own, nor was it desirable that it should! To many thoughtful individuals, the dilemma was a serious one, incapable of any real solution.

Many conservatives, as well as some reformers, considered that the only solid and permanent basis for society and government was the yeomanry, the small farmer and the freeholder.[9] He could be safely entrusted with the responsibility for electing his betters to represent him. In his hands, they believed, rested the stability, order and liberty of the present and of the future as well. The owner of real property, they felt, was truly independent. He would resist equally the blandishments of the demagogue and of the very rich.

The phrase that the poor had no will of their own must have summed up this point of view admirably or it would not have been used so frequently. Of some interest, therefore, is the question of who actually coined it. An examination of likely English sources led in time to Sir William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England*. He digressed at one point to talk about the suffrage, favoring property qualifications. "The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters", he wrote, "is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own." [10]

Blackstone conveyed the impression that the phrase was his, but the real source seems to have been Montesquieu. In his celebrated work, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu wrote that all inhabitants should have a right to vote "except such as are in

[9] For an interesting discussion of this view, see Griswold, A. W., *Farming and Democracy* (New York, 1948), pp. 19–29.

[10] Blackstone, W., *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (Philadelphia, 1771), vol. I, p. 171.

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so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own."[11] The concept of the desirability of men's exercising free will in their relations with one another can in turn be traced to Algernon Sidney who argued against divine monarchy because dependency upon the will of another was slavery.[12]

Americans were, therefore, probably quoting either Montesquieu or Blackstone. Like the latter, they seldom cited the source of the slogan which they used repeatedly before the Civil War. Investigations have determined that Montesquieu's great work was becoming well known as early as 1770 and that his influence upon American institutional developments was direct and considerable.[13] Edmund Randolph approved heartily of Montesquieu's views on suffrage, as did James Wilson.[14] Nevertheless, it probably is safe to say that Blackstone's works were cited much more often than were Montesquieu's. This assumption seems reasonable in the light of Blackstone's immense prestige among lawyers who made up for their deficiency in numbers, in some conventions, by doing most of the talking. A modern student of Blackstone states that almost all American lawyers before 1900 read all or part of the *Commentaries*,[15] which certainly could not be said of the writings of Montesquieu.

Not only did American students of the law read Blackstone, but also they were profoundly influenced by his ideas. His popularity was so great that an American edition was published in Philadelphia as early as 1771. Heading the list of subscribers was John Adams. Other subscribers included seven men bearing the familiar name of Livingston as well as John Jay, James De Lancey, Abraham C. Cuyler, Egbert Benson and Thomas Marshall, father of the Chief Justice.[16] The young James Kent was introduced to Blackstone in 1779. He thereupon resolved to become a lawyer and he later spoke of the spell which Black-

[11] Montesquieu, Baron de, *The Spirit of the Laws* (New York, 1949), vol. I, p. 155.

[12] Sidney, A., *Political Classics* (London, 1794), vol. I, p. 271.

[13] Spurlin, P. N., *Montesquieu in America, 1760–1801* (Baton Rouge, 1940); Cattelain, F., *Étude sur l'influence de Montesquieu dans les Constitutions Américaines* (Besançon, 1927).

[14] Spurlin, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Elliot, J. (ed.), *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*. . . (Philadelphia, 1888), vol. II, p. 482.

[15] Lockmiller, D. A., *Sir William Blackstone* (Chapel Hill, 1938), p. 177.

[16] See the list of subscribers in Blackstone, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, n. p. (in front of book).

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stone had cast over him.[17] When William C. C. Claiborne, future governor of Mississippi Territory, first left Richmond to go west he carried with him only two works, the Revised Statutes of Virginia and "a copy of Blackstone".[18] The impressive evidence that Blackstone was a sort of Holy Writ for lawyers explains the widespread use of the slogan. It explains also the near hysteria of James Kent when, in 1821, New York reformers challenged his ideas about the suffrage, not always knowing that they were really Blackstone's.

Reformers had to meet the Blackstonian challenge head on. It was not wholly satisfactory to say dogmatically that the act of voting was a natural right. This was excellent oratory but it did not answer the real questions which conservatives raised so insistently. The challenge was met, in and out of conventions, in several ways. Some pointed to the very comprehensive laws against corrupting elections, of which the Pennsylvania Act of 1752 was typical. This act prohibited gratuities, wagers, gifts, bribes and the tendering of strong drink, treats and entertainment by or on behalf of anyone connected with the electoral process.[19] Other reformers argued that dependency could be reduced by abandoning *viva voce* elections in favor of the ballot, a reform which the Sons of Liberty had popularized in New York before the Revolution.[20] In the nineteenth century this proposal had the support of Jeremy Bentham. He thought it possible to eliminate the problem of what he too called "dependency", referring to the example set by New York when it adopted the ballot after the Revolution.[21]

Still another solution was proposed by Thomas Jefferson. During the Revolution he supported a property qualification, but with the very important proviso that every adult male should be given the opportunity to secure a freehold.[22] Ignoring the proviso, critics of suffrage reform invoked Jefferson in their

[17] Horton, J. K., *Life of James Kent* (New York, 1939), pp. 21–22, 31.

[18] Rowland, D. (ed.), *The Mississippi Territorial Archives: 1798–1803* (Nashville, 1905), p. 338.

[19] *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, 1896–1911), vol. V, pp. 159–169.

[20] Bernheim, A. C., "The Ballot in New York", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. IV (March 1889), pp. 130–152.

[21] Bentham, J., *Bentham's Radical Reform Bill* (London, 1819), pp. 4–5.

[22] Malone, D., *Jefferson the Virginian* (Boston, 1948), p. 238.

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defense of property qualifications. If it was neither desirable nor expedient to adopt the Jeffersonian solution, reformers could argue that the poor were relatively few and far between in America and would always be so. The pessimistic conclusions of Ricardo and Malthus, they said, did not apply to American society. In contradiction to some of the facts, Jacob Sutherland declared in the New York Convention that population had not pressed upon the means of subsistence. Samuel Young supported this view, saying that the abundance of land and the absence of large manufacturing establishments made the United States unique. The melancholy reflections of Thomas Gray in his "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard", he concluded, would not apply here.[23]

The reformers, of course, won, and Blackstone and Montesquieu lost. Their success came so easily and so early, in comparison with the rest of the world, partly because American society was different and partly because they suggested political techniques which promised to decrease the dependence of voters who were poor. Furthermore, Americans denied that wealth or poverty was any index of a man's worth. "Man is man," queried one reformer, "and who is more?"[24] Another ridiculed the cult of the freeholder with the remark that, if it had been God's will that only freeholders and the rich should vote, why did He not send people into the world with "a purse of gold by their side, or a deed in their hands?"[25]

For all of these reasons, the ideas of Blackstone which proved uncongenial to a democratically-minded people were introduced into this country only in time to be rejected. Count Metternich, famous Austrian statesman, went to the root of the matter when he told an American that in the United States democracy was natural.[26]

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[23] Carter, Stone and Gould, *op. cit.*, pp. 274, 280.

[24] *Connecticut Republican Magazine*, vol. I, p. 65.

[25] *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 155.

[26] Ticknor, G., *Life, Letters, and Journals* (Boston and New York, 1909), vol. II, p. 14.

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# PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGY IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

DISQUISITIONS on method bear a heavy burden. If by method we mean the logic of scientific procedure or the conceptual structure of analytical investigation, the preponderant weight of distinguished thought on the subject warns us of the slight gains to be derived from reading or talking about method in general, or from evaluating the belief-postulates of conflicting logical or philosophical schools.[1] The writer personally believes that the most productive context for methodological discussion is that of the seminar-conference, concerned with the design, procedure and evaluation of specific inquiries into significant problems of human behavior—in relation to the most concise possible statement of existing knowledge on the topic.

The purpose of this paper is not to express such preferences; nor to engage in such controversies as whether political science is a contradiction in terms because of the normative character of its data and its problems. Nor is it to debate the merits of such propositions as: "Hypotheses should be suggested by detailed factual study rather than posited at the start of investigation", or, "Empirical inquiries are meaningless unless they first identify the phenomenon to be investigated, and in doing so introduce concepts and categories which inevitably influence our factual research." Our attempt will be to point out several problems of orientation that confront students of political behavior and institutions, and to restate explicitly some assumptions and

[1] References: M. R. Cohen and E. Nagel, *Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York, 1934); J. Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938); R. von Mises, *Positivism* (Cambridge, 1950); S. A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science* (Chicago, 1931); L. Wirth, ed., *Eleven Twenty-Six* (Chicago, 1940); Brookings Institution, *Essays on Research in the Social Sciences* (Washington, 1931); R. S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, 1939); H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York, 1946), Part I, pp. 77–156; H. D. Lasswell, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), pp. ix–xxiv.



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criteria underlying political research that aspires to be scientific, that is, both theoretically systematic and empirically factual in character.

The reader will note that the word "methodology" is assumed to include three kinds of problems: (1) those relating to the personality, motivation or purposes of the researcher—in brief, his orientation; (2) problems of conceptualization—organizing ideas or tools of analytical thought; and (3) problems that are often exclusively denoted by the word "method"—techniques of collecting, organizing and presenting data. These categories do not describe the process by which research investigation is carried on. They are suggested as aids in reflecting upon the influences which distract and divert the scientific worker from the laborious work of advancing human knowledge and understanding.

### 1. *Programmatic v. Systematic Research*

The value problem—the researcher's preferences and biases, his biological and social conditioning—has been a constant topic in the literature of social science during the past twenty-five years,[2] so much so that today the elementary problems are now properly relegated to introductory courses, while the more abstruse aspects of epistemology and cultural relativism are taken up in political and economic theory or the sociology of knowledge. For our discussion, I am assuming the *possibility* of the scientific study of political behavior, notwithstanding the volitional qualities of our data and our own culture-bound predispositions. Further, I presume that when we are interested in observing and reaching generalizations about patterns of behavior in types of situations it is not necessary at the same time to impute ethical qualities or to pass judgment upon their correctness in terms of individual dignity, justice, freedom or the good life. The results of scientific inquiry are always subject to ex post facto interpretation in terms of ethically approvable goal values. In the process of investigation we

[2] The most relevant item for political scientists is perhaps the Whyte-Hallowell-Almond controversy in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. 37 (1943), pp. 692–97; vol. 38 (1944), pp. 639–55; vol. 40 (1946), pp. 283–312.

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simply say: "For the moment, that is not our problem." Personally, the writer is not sure that as absolute a distinction between fact and value in scientific work is possible as Weber and Simon seem to indicate,[3] but in this age of the statistical conception of truth we surely can distinguish between fact, belief or opinion, and norm.[4] The utility of these distinctions, indeed the principal purpose of recognizing the influence of what we call "the value problem" upon the initiation and orientation of inquiry, consists in eliminating the confusion that arises when these terms are used interchangeably. But we probably spend too much time worrying about epistemological and teleological questions. There are many *motivations* for doing (and not doing) research, and there are also various *objectives* in research. A classification of the reasons why people engage in research would undoubtedly reveal decisions of a highly ethical and emotional nature.[5] What of it? The whole educational process in life, and not only research training in particular, constitutes a gradual transition from (a) the stage of emotional responses to socially indoctrinated preferences and subconscious urges, to (b) the intellectual discipline of subjecting personal preferences to criteria and procedures of collecting, analyzing, verifying and evaluating *evidence*. If the question is raised as to the meaning or relevance of evidence in a more inclusive frame of reference, it is certainly worth while to appraise the rationality or non-rationality of the researcher's motivation, but a more economical way of achieving intellectual clarification is simply to ask whether the research objective is appropriate to the problem at hand.

It is at this point, I believe, that the most serious dilemma

[3] E. Shils and H. Finch, eds., *The Methodology of Social Science* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949); Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1947), ch. 3.

[4] In using the phrase "statistical conception of truth" I am not referring to doctrinal ends or moral truths. These I place in the category of faith, or norms. One can study the origins and effects of beliefs scientifically, but their inner meaning and validation evade the methods of science.

[5] The most severely scientific discussion of this problem I have seen is W. F. Ogburn's "Considerations in Choosing Problems of Research", in *Essays on Research in the Social Sciences*", Brookings Institution. See also, M. Jahoda, M. Deutsch, and S. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations* (New York, 1951), vol. 1, chs. 2–3; Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), Appendix 1–2; Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937).

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arises in the orientation of research in political science. Granting that the sustained impulse to investigation arises out of problem situations, it is often uncritically assumed that the appropriate end of social science research is policy recommendation or a program aimed at resolution of the problem situation. Not only neophyte graduate students, both governmental and private, but sponsors of research enterprises tend to seek solutions to such problems as world government, morality in public life, legislative-executive relations, efficiency in business or government organization, freedom of the press, labor-management relations, responsible party organizations, regulation of monopoly, conservation and development of natural resources, and so on. In the planning movement we find deliberate advocacy of research to clarify goals, to explore the total problem situation, to select and weigh the consequences of alternative courses of action, and to determine the appropriate aims of policy. There is more than a trace of this orientation in the developing "science of human relations" and in proposals for "institutes of behavioral sciences". Harold Lasswell has suggested the term "policy sciences", although his conception is restricted to the study of the policy-making process and the data appropriate to the needs of policy, and is thus carefully distinguished from socioeconomic planning, from applied science, and from the advocacy of particular institutional reforms.

The point I wish to make is not that program-oriented policy research should not be undertaken, but that this kind of research is sharply differentiated from that which is aimed at the discovery of empirically based principles or uniformities, or at the formulation of explicit theoretic assumptions or propositions concerning the behavior of men in relation to government, from which propositions empirical regularities can be derived or anticipated. I am not arguing that either type of research is better or worse; I am saying that one type is directed toward the achievement of personal or group ends, while the other is directed toward this systematization of knowledge about politics and government. We have had a great deal of research that has produced isolated bits and pieces of generalization; we have had a fatiguing amount of critical discussion concerning the relative importance of

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empirical generalization *vs.* value theory; but the present-day separation of political theory from empirical research in political science is reflected in the relative absence of theorists who seek to find ways of formulating relationships between significant variables (concepts) that enable the analyst of behavior to get at the strategic factors involved in the problem he is studying.

This is the underlying reason, I believe, why problem-oriented research is rarely, and most often accidentally, productive of significant theoretical results. When attention is fixed on a desirable end to be achieved, an objective defined in advance by authority (project directors or sponsors), data are usually organized around findings of fact *pro* or *con* the desired objective. Not fundamental explanation and understanding, but winning the argument through appeal to normative standards, initiating some action, advancing or maintaining the interests of some groups or individuals as against others—these are the criteria of successful programmatic researches. In such a context, the systematic accumulation and advancement of knowledge tends to be haphazard, accidental, and conceptually ambiguous, if not irrelevant and even dangerous to the ends sought by the controllers of research policy.

If truly scientific work in political investigation is taken as the desired goal, it is fair to ask what criteria the researcher should expect of himself and in others.[6] If he starts from the findings of fact—generalizations or uniformities drawn from empirical data—the test is whether he can formulate statements of relationships between his empirically based concepts, so that the behavioral uniformities can be logically deduced or derived. Significant empirical work may of course be restricted to a single set of relationships, such as the connection between socioeconomic status and political activity, the gold standard and the price level, religious membership and the suicide rate, and so on. The mark of theoretical significance appears when the empirical uniformities can be stated in terms of higher-order concepts

[6] Statements of the requirements for theoretical significance in empirical research may be found in R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), chs. ii–iii; J. A. Schumpeter, *Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes* (New York, 1951), particularly the essays on Böhm-Bawerk, Mitchell and Keynes.

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(assumptions and postulates) to which the empirically confirmed hypothesis can be logically related. This act of intellectual synthesis provides the basis whereby diverse conditions *under which the uniformity does not hold* can be taken in account. It also enables us to reconcile disconnected or apparently conflicting empirical generalizations, and to cumulate them with existing knowledge, rather than complacently use the facts to justify a lazy epistemological eclecticism.

Starting from the other end, the deduction of empirical uniformities from more general definitions and assumptions, a second test of theoretical adequacy is whether the a priori hypothesized statement of relationships between variables is expressed in a form that is capable of demonstration. Since this process of intellectual clarification is extraordinarily difficult even for trained minds, many good research men tend to rationalize their preference for collecting and classifying information on a variety of topics related to the problem, rather than specifying in advance the data relevant to the hypotheses delimiting the problem under investigation. Failure to undertake this essential step at some stage of empirical work usually results in a research report that is essentially historical, descriptive and diagnostic, rather than theoretical in the sense of stating the effects of varying conditions upon the factors specified in the base-line proposition or hypothesis.

The third criterion of scientific investigation is the formal or statistical elegance of the verification (or disproof) of the hypothesis in question. In the natural sciences much more emphasis is placed upon this test than in the social sciences, where the processes of inspiration, insight, and ability to formulate fresh statements of the problem tend to receive greater approbation. Nevertheless, there are encouraging signs that more political scientists are becoming concerned with the adequacy of their techniques, even if for no more elevated reason than the recognition received by psychologists for their methods of measuring traits, attitudes and predispositions, or by economists for their methods of analyzing the effects of taxes, tariffs, fiscal, monetary and other economic policies upon income, prices and employment.

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## 2. *The Scope of Political Behavior Research—or, "How Interdisciplinary Can You Get?"*

What events, what acts, what patterns of interpersonal relationships, constitute the data for behavioral research in politics? Following but expanding the German *Staatslehre* tradition, Charles Merriam listed four categories as relevant to the science and process of governing men: personality conflicts and adjustments, social and economic groupings and interests, demographic divisions of the population, and physical habitat (including climate, geography and natural resources).[7] Casting aside the older juristic notion of the state, he postulated the central concept of power, or the interplay of personal, symbolic and situational[8] factors conditioning the relations of rulers and ruled, as the criteria delimiting the data of concern to political science. Hobbes, Machiavelli, Mosca, Hermann Heller, G. E. G. Catlin, Bertrand Russell, C. J. Friedrich and Harold Lasswell have amplified the same ideas, before and since, but no one more than Merriam stimulated his students and followers to develop more adequate conceptual tools for "general field analysis of politics as power". Again, not originally but with insistence second to none, Merriam pointed out the similarities between governing processes in public and private organizations, the origins of public policy in the internal conflicts and external pressures generated by the behavior of men organized in groups, and the research potentialities in comparative analyses of diverse political techniques in public and private government as providing a basis for intelligence in political action.

[7] C. E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (Chicago, 1945), ch. i; *idem, Political Power* (New York, 1934), Introduction, chs. 1–2, 4, 7. For a reminder of the importance of situational and institutional factors, as well as the personal, see David Easton, "Problems of Method in Political Science", *International Social Science Bulletin*, vol. IV, No. 1 (1952), pp. 107–124.

[8] Nowhere is the political scientist's problem of index ambiguity and instability more apparent than in devising adequate conceptual terms for "the situational factor". The sociometric model of "patterns of interpersonal relations" has thus far been proved of operational value only within limited types of face-to-face, small-group relations. *Cf.* Lester Seligman, "The Study of Political Leadership", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 44 (1950), pp. 904–15; W. F. Whyte, "Small Groups and Large Organizations", in J. H. Rohrer and M. Sherif, *Social Psychology at the Crossroads* (New York, 1951), pp. 297–312.

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Political analysts who perceive politics as (1) power or control-oriented behavior (Catlin), (2) the power or policy-making process (Lasswell), or, more generally, (3) the discrete, interlapping patterns of group activity whereby citizens are related to the makers of public policy[9] feel no anxieties over the difficulty of differentiating sharply between the data of political and the other social sciences. Without following Talcott Parsons to the position that empirical theory in political science is simply a subsection of a general theory of social action,[10] political behaviorists find little difficulty in accepting the view that they are studying the political aspects of human behavior—the human events and acts that (a) comprise the policy-making process of government, (b) influence that process, or (c) are influenced by it. The questions whether "the political" or the "social" is the more inclusive term, and whether "the economic" determines "the political", are problems of semantic definition that become important only in relation to the problem specified for investigation. From the behavioral standpoint it is far more important that political research be oriented toward, and rooted in, the data of human beings influencing, constituting, or being influenced by the governmental process, and, *particularly*, that research not be hung up over arguments over the priority of the different social sciences. In short, political behavior research in the first instance seeks data expressible in terms of persons behaving in types of situations involving the exercise of governmental authority, rather than finding evidence to glorify or excoriate such personified entities as "The State", "Society", "Community", "Economy", or "Class", with imputed qualities of omniscience, omnipotence and inevitability.

Three implications of the behavioral approach to politics will be discussed briefly. The first, for our purposes, concerns the question whether the data of politics, defined as interpersonal relations in a power-oriented context, exclude studies of institutional or organized behavior, as Paul Appleby, for example,

[9] O. Garceau, "Research in the Political Process", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 44 (1950), p. 69.

[10] "The Position of Sociological Theory", *Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), pp. 3–14; *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, 1951), edited by Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils.

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seems to fear.[11] This apprehension is founded, in part, upon antipathy to the tendency of political behaviorists to formulate their projects in hypothetical and conceptual terms rather than as concrete questions aimed at institutional description and empirical generalization based upon the insights of practical experience. Beyond this, however, there is a genuine problem, particularly as access to institutional sources of data may be blocked by the employment of concepts and categories which seem quite unrealistic or skewed to policy makers (party officials, administrators, judges, or interest group leaders) whose perspectives are influenced by other considerations than the "search for functional co-relations". The difficulties posed by the incompatibility of rôles between the outside researcher and the responsible administrator can be solved only partially by improving the vocabulary and channels of communication. Nevertheless it is clear that, notwithstanding communication difficulties and the obstacles to "getting at" informal relations of influence between power holders and policy makers in organizations, there is no necessary reason for excluding studies of organized structure and process from the scope of political behavior research. When Michels studied the relations of leaders and members of labor and socialist parties of Western Europe, or Laski analyzed the changes in the social composition of the British cabinet, or Pritchett analyzed the divisions of opinion among Supreme Court justices, or Macmahon and Millett traced the career lines of bureau chiefs and top staff personnel in federal departments, each was studying personal aspects of institutional behavior. The fact that each research enterprise failed to penetrate to the total reality of the institution being investigated is less a criticism of the emphasis on personal or psychological factors than witness to the limited nature of the hypotheses, the absence or the inaccessibility of (unsponsored or "censorable") data, and the crudeness of empirical techniques for studying institutional behavior. The fact that we still find it necessary to differentiate between (a) patterns of political behavior common to both governmental and nongovernmental

[11] "Political Science: The Next Twenty-Five Years", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 44 (1950), p. 924.

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political situations, and (b) the specialized institutions and processes peculiar to government,[12] is not conclusive evidence that common concepts of sufficient generality will not be found to integrate the data of interpersonal and institutional behavior into an inclusive, logically consistent body of theoretical propositions.

The second implication of political behavior research for political scientists concerns the effects of this orientation toward the conventional "fields" or divisions of political science. From what has already been said, it should be evident that political behavior should not be considered as the specialized province of a single group. Potentially, all political scientists other than value theorists, that is, goal-oriented political philosophers, are behaviorists. As an orientation, the political behavior approach aims at broadening and recasting the traditional fields of government and politics (political parties and public opinion, legislative, administrative and judicial processes, comparative government and international relations) so that (a) existing principles and empirical generalizations can be stated in behavioral rather than normative terms, and (b) emphasis in research will be placed upon explicit formulation of assumptions and hypotheses, to the end that empirical investigations can be made, wherever and as far as possible, systematic, quantitative and cumulative. Political behaviorists postulate the belief in a science of politics defined as the policy-making process in human society, the possibility of valid generalizations describing uniformities of human behavior in that process, and the systematic specification, or differentiation, of conditions under which such uniformities have some probability of recurrence. Political behaviorists demand no premature or rigid quantification, but insist that the reliability of empirical generalizations varies directly with the degree to which concepts and indices for classifying data can be expressed in terms that are non-ambiguous, intelligible, and connectible with other propositions of tested knowledge.

Finally, the scope of political inquiries cannot be arbitrarily

[12] In David B. Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), Parts I and II are based on different conceptual categories than Part III (*vide* the Introduction). Alfred de Grazia, in his *Elements of Political Science* (New York, 1952), explicitly makes the distinction noted in the text (*cf.* pp. 65, 289).

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restricted to behavior that is presumed to be the exclusive province of political scientists. Political analysis from the time of Aristotle's classic work on city government has been based on sociological and economic, as well as governmental, data. Our modern surveys of government reorganization do not exclude technological, demographic, ideological, or economic factors because they are "nonpolitical". Conversely, political concepts and data are important in the prosecution of economic or sociological inquiries. Employment by political scientists of the concepts of other disciplines may well be selective, particularly in relation to the problem being investigated. The validity of many techniques drawn from other fields for analyzing complex political phenomena is constantly open to question. But it is no longer open to question that empirical political inquiry can gain from communication and consultation with other social scientists in the planning and design of projects, or from coöperating in the development and prosecution of inquiries that contemplate subordinate or coördinate projects utilizing other social science techniques in conducting political or governmental investigations. Political scientists as individualists may prefer to concentrate and specialize upon descriptive, policy-oriented surveys of governmental agencies and processes. In so far as they confine themselves to this conception of their rôle, it is highly probable that the field of political science will drift toward the status of an applied science like education or engineering, and our Association will remain a loose coalition of ethical philosophers, armchair politicians, administrative technicians and nonprofessional lawyers. If political science is to retain and advance the high conception entertained by its founders around the turn of the century for the science of government, its members will have to acquire and demonstrate competence to visualize and carry out systematic research into theoretically significant aspects of political knowledge (*vide* the field of public opinion). An adequate conception of a science of political behavior is the first counterstep; the second is the development of willingness, competence and financial support for systematic research; the third is to acquire the skills and knowledge of the limits of interdisciplinary coöperation in the administration of research projects The latter topic lies outside the scope of this paper.

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### 3. *Model Construction in Political Science: Institutional Description v. Propositional Formulation of Recurrent Relationships*

The term "conceptual framework" is a bugaboo to many empirically-minded political scientists. Some simply reject it completely, saying in effect that the term has no meaning beyond vague speculations concerning the connection between their findings and general ideas like democracy, freedom, justice, individual dignity, and so on. Others go overboard and spend so much time defining concepts, stating postulates, searching for the significance of ideas, that they never get to the stage of actual research. In systematic theory, the conceptual framework consists of the organizing ideas and concepts which, expressed in rigorous and orderly statements of relationships between variables, provide the basis for deriving hypotheses about behavior that can be tested empirically.

Most political scientists, although perhaps a diminishing majority, are skeptical of both the possibility and importance of systematic theory in this sense. They point to the values of factual discovery in itself, to the clarification of complex empirical relationships to which a priori concepts and ideas are so often extraneous, and above all they insist upon the necessity of understanding the reality of something called "the institution-in-action". This position implicitly contains a set of postulates that have produced a great deal of valuable work. It underlies the useful analyses over the last fifty years of political parties in the electoral process, of pressure groups in the formation of public opinion, the conflict and coördination of organized interests in legislative, administrative and the judicial processes. The basic assumption has been that effective influence in the formulation and execution of policy is a function of the patterns of interpersonal and intergroup relationships between people implicated in these processes as well as of formal organizational structure and rules of procedure.[13] Nevertheless, the empirical studies have been in method essentially descriptive, historical and subjectively analytical. They rarely rise to the heights of

[13] A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908); Truman, *op. cit.*; E. Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, 1952).

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the classic analysts of governmental systems as a whole (Bryce, Wilson, Lowell), and for the most part certainly do not aspire even to the conception of science held by the great pioneers. Only a few political scientists today really believe in the science of political analysis that Graham Wallas suggested in his *Human Nature and Politics* over forty years ago (1908), or that President Lowell hoped for when he suggested the need for a "psychology of political parties". Taken by itself, institutional description seems to lead no further than analysis of norms of governmental behavior, and the content and effects of proposals for structural or procedural reform of governmental processes.[14]

The writer has no intention of disparaging this level of motivation or knowledge. Historical, descriptive and diagnostic studies can be carried on by systematic methods, and their findings can be translated into theoretic propositions. As already indicated, however, it is his conviction that other directions of research training and application of effort are necessary in order to sustain our pretensions to the status of a true political science. One of these is the development of a systematic body of theoretical propositions; another is the acquisition of analytical skills and data-collecting procedures for relating empirical uniformities and deviations to our theoretical concepts and categories, to the end that we can specify the conditions under which uniformities of political behavior can be expected to hold true. I am under no illusions as to how far we have progressed toward this goal, or how soon we shall penetrate to the key concepts that will unlock the doors to the inner mysteries of political reality. Be that as it may, the road to that goal will be paved not only by descriptive surveys and historical reports, but by cumulative, relatively microscopic studies which have undertaken the tedious task of identifying and validating the conceptual variables that enable us to explain uniformities and deviations of human behavior in politics.

The important question is whether, as researchers, we accept the obligation to make explicit our postulates, working assump-

[14] *Cf.* L. H. Chamberlain, "Government and Administration in the United States", pp. 355–369, and P. Odegard, "Factors in the Study of Pressure Groups and Political Parties in the United States", U.N.E.S.C.O., *Contemporary Political Science* (Paris, 1950), pp. 515–525.

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tions and hypotheses, to ask constantly what their status is as knowledge, and to strive to make them theoretically significant—that is, to relate them back to the more general concepts and principles of political knowledge. In so far as the theorist concentrates on the latter problem he engages in system-building rather than the validation and accretion of knowledge. This is valuable work, but in our time relatively few minds seem to be motivated and equipped for it. Quantitatively, most research planning is concerned with hypothesis formulation and conditions of testing them.

One of the best examples of systematic research planning is R. M. Williams' monograph *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions.*[15] This was admittedly a survey of existing research in a problem-area of intergroup relations. It may overstate the amount of systematic preparation that goes into the development of narrower projects,[16] but even as a caricature the report is extraordinarily helpful in tracing the connections between research in race relations back to the most general postulates of a science of society. Williams' categories for classifying research proposals are useful not only in differentiating between types of empirical inquiries, but in cutting across the artificial boundaries of the social sciences to expose the psychological, legal and political as well as sociological aspects of his problems. It may also be noted that his groupings minimize the proportion of exploratory and descriptive studies required as compared with the number of suggestions for experimental research designs.

I. General: Historical, Comparative, Genetic
II. Effects of Information, Education, Propaganda
III. Effects of Personal Contacts
IV. Effects of Legal Enactments, Law-Enforcement and Pressure Activities
V. Effects of Alternative Programs for Organizing Minority Group Members in Specific Situations.

A second example of systematic research planning may be found in the introductory volumes of the RADIR project, where

[15] Social Science Research Council *Bulletin* 57, 1947, esp. chapters ii and iii.

[16] A similar, if less comprehensive, example is the Report of the Seminar in Political Behavior in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. 46 (December 1952), p. 1003.

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Lerner's and Pool's volumes on the comparative study of "elites" and "symbols" are explicitly related to H. D. Lasswell's postulate that revolutionary changes in political systems are reflected in changes in social attributes and vocabulary of leaders in the ruling strata of society.[17] This project is distinctive, as compared with Williams', in that (1) the reports carry through the research design; (2) they are based upon a "developmental construct", that is, a movement of events from the past to the present and projectible to the future, as distinct from a cross-sectional analysis of interdependent variables in a system assumed to be in equilibrium, where the effects of a limited change upon a given variable is studied for a short time period.

A third type of research planning that includes several techniques of observation is concerned with the effort to secure an adequate conceptual model of group activity and organization. The techniques range from participant observation, sociometric recordings, the psycho-drama, experimental manipulation of the situation, community surveys, intensive interviews, and analyses of interpersonal relationships in industrial or governmental organization.[18] For political scientists, perhaps the most intelligible and elaborate effort to combine both analysis and synthesis of the key variables in group behavior is George C. Homans' *The Human Group* (1950). Political scientists for the most part

[17] H. D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 46 (1941), pp. 455–68; H. D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, 1951), and H. D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel Pool, *The Comparative Study of Symbols* (Stanford, 1951). The cumulative relation of these researches to Harold Laski and J. G. Heinberg's earlier studies of the British and French cabinets is also instructive.

[18] Relevant titles are Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1929); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, 1934); J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (Washington, 1934); H. H. Jennings, *Leadership and Isolation* (New York, 1943); W. F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, 1943); K. Lewin, R. Lippitt and S. Escalona, *Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology* (University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, 1940, 1944), Parts I, III; W. F. Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* and *The Social System of a Modern Factory* (New Haven, 1941; 1947); W. F. Whyte, *Industry and Society* (New York, 1946); P. Selznick, *T. V. A. and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, 1949); H. A. Simon, D. W. Smithberg and V. A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950). See also R. K. Merton *et al.*, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), and R. Dubin, *Readings in Human Relations in Administration* (New York, 1951).

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have not yet developed the taste or aptitude for a general theory of group organization as such. Their skepticism is perhaps best described in some of V. O. Key's writings, Garceau's article mentioned above, and in Paul Appleby's *Policy and Administration* (1947), where the concepts of political distance and the pluralistic complexity of institutional processes connecting citizen and government are emphasized to the point of rejecting any conceptual model of group behavior in the political continuum. On the other side may be ranged Herring, Truman, Latham and the present writer.[19] Some aspects of this controversy could be clarified if the distinction between patterns of *intra*group and *inter*group relationships were kept in mind, but basically the division remains between those willing to postulate a concept of group activity as the foundation of a theory of political behavior and those who see only discontinuous patterns produced by the fluidity of political interests, processes and situations. Fortunately, the theoretical point does not stand in the way of empirical investigation (see Key's statement on page 24 of his *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*) that "the study of politics must rest upon analysis of the objectives and composition of interest groups in society," and Garceau's studies of *The Political Life of the American Medical Association* and *The Public Library in the Political Process* (particularly the note on "Method"). Finally, the parallel in research orientation between the group concept in political behavior and the institutional approach of economists like Walton Hamilton, Gardner Means, A. R. Burns, R. A. Gordon, R. A. Brady, and Stocking and Watkins should be noted. John R. Commons' *Economics of Collective Action* (1950) and J. K. Galbraith's *American Capitalism* (1952) represent two efforts at explicit construction of models incorporating both power (control) and economic (maximizing material welfare) variables.

Most of the empirical studies in the field of voting behavior and public opinion have not been based upon an adequate

[19] P. Herring, "Political Science in the Next Decade", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 39 (1945), p. 757; Truman, *op. cit.*; Latham, *op. cit.*; A. Leiserson, "Problems of Representation in the Government of Private Groups", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 11 (1949), p. 566; *idem*, "Organized Labor as a Pressure Group", *Annals*, March 1951.

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theoretical conception of the political process. The sample-opinion survey, at least until very recently, seems to have assumed a sort of "town meeting" conception of democracy, in which the polling organization provides a technical description of the distribution of public attitudes, classified by demographic variables, or issues, personalities or events, upon which policy makers are supposed to act.[20] Since the debacle of the polls in 1948, a more modest conception of the sample-opinion survey has taken vogue as a vehicle for obtaining data on variables which affect attitudes toward and perceptions of the political process in the population. The attitude or opinion survey thus loses a determinate relation to the policy-making process, but gains in value as a technique for gathering political intelligence, or extending our knowledge of political attitudes and behavior. As such it supplements earlier studies based upon aggregative voting statistics such as Rice's *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928), Tingsten's *Political Behavior* (1937), Robinson's and Ewing's analyses of the presidential and congressional voting, Ogburn's analysis of the 1932 election, Bean's *Ballot Behavior* (1940), E. H. Litchfield's *Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area* (1941), and Gosnell's factorial analysis of the vote in Chicago and several states (*Machine Politics: Chicago Model; Grass Roots Politics*). It should also be noted that the sample surveys, no less than the earlier statistical studies of voting behavior, have been essentially empirical, in that they simply sought to establish relationships between demographic or socioeconomic variables and voting preferences, political participation, or attitudes. No distinctive conception of the political process illuminates most opinion surveys, any more than in the case of Merriam and Gosnell's *Non-Voting* (1924) or L. D. White's *Prestige Value of Public Employment* (1929).[21] Again, this does

[20] Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters* (New York, 1948).

[21] Gabriel Almond has sought to relate poll data to a conception of the political process in *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950). See also: R. Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, 1948); A. W. Kornhauser, "Public Opinion and Social Class", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 55 (1950), p. 333; A. M. Rose, "Public Opinion Research Techniques Suggested by Sociological Theory", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 14 (1950), p. 205; George Belknap and A. Campbell, "Party Identification and Foreign Policy", *ibid.*, vol. 15 (1951), p. 601.

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not detract from their potential theoretical contribution or empirical value.

So far as political behavior is concerned, the same comment holds true for the most part with respect to community surveys, although these have been linked to other base-concepts: (1) the determining influence of social or class structure upon political attitudes, and (2) "culture" theory—the reciprocal influences of individuality and culture in the formation of personality. The deliberate neglect of the power factor, or the policy-making process, in cultural-psychological studies, which assume that political phenomena are explainable in such terms as cultural norms, personality, or class-and-status relationships, has already been referred to in the previous section. It is significant that anthropological and socio-psychological studies of community organization are increasingly taking note of the phenomena of leadership, or leader-follower behavior, in a specifically political context of decision-making rather than as part of a generalized cultural whole, and emphasizing the influence of skill factors and intergroup relations quite as much as ideological or class affiliations.[22] One might wish that political scientists had contributed more to this trend.

Intensive case studies of political personality have provided a mine of political behavior data.[23] It may long be debated whether the analytical apparatus associated with the name of Freud has advanced beyond the conception of human nature to be found in religious theology or the classical works of political theory. Rather more significant for research planning is the question whether selective analysis of personality on an intensive basis provides a reliable basis for generalizing about distributions of political attitudes in the population, or predicting conditions under which these distributions will be altered.[24] Political

[22] A. H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, 1945); H. D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948); D. Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950).

[23] L. Steffens, *Autobiography* (New York, 1931); C. E. Merriam, *Four American Party Leaders* (New York, 1926); J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule* (New York, 1935); H. Zink, "A Case Study of a Political Boss", *Psychiatry* (1938), p. 527.

[24] H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930); N. Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts", *World Politics*, vol. 1 (1948), p. 102; T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

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scientists have usually contented themselves with descriptive and static analyses of personality traits rather than combining their personality and institutional sensitivities with social identification data into hypothetical formulations with high generalizing potential.

No review, however sketchy, of model building in the social sciences relevant to political behavior can avoid mentioning the "*Who* says *what* to *whom*, *how*, with what *effect?*" formula that has appeared in communications research.[25] Even if most political scientists find that these categories are essentially criteria for classifying different types of data or technique (content analysis, audience analysis, propaganda effects, and so on) rather than adequate conceptual tools for comprehending political processes, they will not be able to pass over the value of communications studies for their own work in political-party and pressure-group publicity, communications between representatives and constituents in policy-making, administrative public relations, and, on a broader level, revolutionary and war propaganda.[26] Again, however, the question is not whether the process categories of political science or the methodological classifications of communications analysis are preferable, but whether they can be related through hypothetical formulation to systematic understanding (an improved framework of interpretation) of the empirical factors governing the formulation of policy.[27] Need-

[25] B. Berelson, "Communications and Public Opinion", in *Communications in Modern Society*, ed. by W. Schramm (Urbana, 1948), pp. 167–185, contains an able summary of empirical generalizations classified by the five categories of communicants, content, audience, channels, and effects; see also, B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell and R. D. Casey, *Communication, Propaganda and Public Opinion* (Princeton, 1946).

[26] Compare Leonard Doob's interpretation of empirical communications studies for politics in chapter 10 of his *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1948). The bibliography on pages 570–72 is especially valuable. A more acceptable framework to political scientists will be found in N. J. Powell, *The Anatomy of Public Opinion* (New York, 1951), ch. 4.

[27] Examples of this approach are S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier* (Princeton, 1949), esp. vol. I, ch. 8, and vol, II, chs. 12–13; also, E. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 12 (1948), p. 300; H. Speier, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in David Lerner and H. D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), ch. 14. P. M. A. Linebarger, "Psychological Warfare", *Infantry Journal*, 1948, treats similar data almost exclusively from a manipulative standpoint.

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less to say, communications research rests upon established techniques of sampling, questionnaire construction, interviewing, recording, coding, and classifying data, that more political scientists would do well to master. In conclusion, the preceding points may be restated as follows:

1. There is an important, if diminishing, cleavage among political scientists as to whether descriptive, process analysis of political institutions and their effects is inevitably opposed to theoretic clarification of observational standpoints and base-line assumptions to which empirical studies can be logically related through a systematic series of scientific propositions.
2. Adequate research planning in political behavior must explicitly take into account: (a) the problem of transforming descriptive accounts of policy-making institutions and processes into propositions about behavior in political situations, (b) the relating of these propositions to concepts and research techniques in other disciplines relevant to the area of political behavior delimited for investigation.

### 4. *The Hypothesis-Data Dilemma—or, "How Systematic Must a Social Scientist Be?"*[28]

It should be clear that a great deal of scientific research goes on without worrying about "conceptual frameworks", "postulates", or "working assumptions". The latter become critically important only when the question of the interpretation or meaning of empirical uniformities or generalizations is raised. Scientific workers cannot escape the obligation, however, to define and delimit the problem for investigation, and this usually (though not necessarily) involves agreement with colleagues and other social scientists on the importance of the problem and the appropriateness of the approach to be taken in observation and analysis.

For students of political behavior, in common with other

[28] All students of political behavior, after reading Max Weber's analysis of the political in "Politics as a Vocation", and Harold Lasswell's model of "the political man" (*Power and Personality*, ch. 3), should compare David Riesman's "Observations on Social Science Research", *The Antioch Review* (Fall, 1951), with W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff's "Sociology and Science", ch. 1, *Sociology* (Boston, 1952—2d edition).

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social scientists, a problem becomes scientific when it can be formulated in such a way as to test the main proposition asserted about personal or group behavior in a given political situation. Usually the main proposition does not hold true under all conditions, so it becomes necessary to set forth sub-propositions specifying the variables or factors which affect the degree of conformity to or deviation from the general principle. An example of this process in the field of legislative behavior might result in statements of the following order:

1. *Main Proposition*—Party responsibility in legislation is a function of the status of party members in legislative organization, their affiliation with blocs in legislative membership, the influential persons composing their legislative constituency, the nature of the issue.

2. *Hypothesis*—Chairmen and party members of congressional committees with long tenure of office vote more frequently to support legislative proposals of the Chief Executive than party members with short terms of office. (Truman)

3. *Hypothesis*—Party members who come from "sure" legislative districts vote to support Administration proposals less frequently than those who come from "doubtful" districts. (Huntington)

4. *Hypothesis*—Many more legislative votes are taken unanimously or without division along party lines than bills which divide legislators strictly according to party affiliation. (Lowell)

5. *Hypothesis*—Members of interest "blocs" in legislative bodies vote together more frequently than members of the major parties. (Rice)

6. *Hypothesis*—On key legislative votes in similar areas of public policy (foreign policy, expenditure policy, labor policy), Northern Democrats and Northern Republicans vote together as groups more consistently than Southern Democrats. (Belknap)

Several comments emerge from this illustration. First of all, it may be admitted that the relationships asserted in the sub-hypotheses were formulated before and independently of the main proposition; indeed several are generalizations which were arrived at in the course of studies which had a quite different orientation than the problem of testing what we know about the

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facts of party responsibility. Such admission does not damage the importance of distinguishing between base values (orientation), postulates (working assumptions), and hypotheses.[29] The distinction, rather, releases scientific research from the notion that valuable results follow only when the investigator rigidly adheres to the "assumption-hypothesis-data" scheme. The stages do not necessarily occur in fixed order; they constantly interact; additional variables occur in the data-gathering stage, necessitating reformulation of hypotheses, and so on.

In the second place, the illustration provides a basis for understanding the rôle of quantification in social science. Propositional formulations of functional relationships between variables can ideally be stated in terms of mathematics or symbolic logic, but mathematical expression per se is not necessary. Essentially, such formulation is a matter of securing as clear and unambiguous a qualitative statement of the key variables involved in the behavioral events being studied.[30] Quantification problems arise when it becomes important to classify behavior, to find categories appropriate to organize the data at hand, and to employ indices by which the category (factor, variable, or attribute) of behavior is to be measured. The formulation of a hypothesis thus involves the reduction of a functional proposition describing corelations (assumptions or postulates) to categories or attributes of people and events which can be compared with one another in quantitative terms of "more-or-less". Political science propositions obviously do not require precision and exactness in their categories, indices and units to the same degree as chemical formulae or engineering specifications, but political scientists cannot escape the problem of identifying and specifying relationships between the variables involved in analyzing political behavior. Once this objective is agreed upon, the critical question becomes: "Under what condi-

[29] Merton, *Social Theory ond Social Structure*; A. de Grazia, "The Process of Theory-Research Interaction", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 13 (1951), p. 88.

[30] *Cf.* K. J. Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences", and P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences", in Lerner and Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences*, chs. 8–9. One of the most balanced discussions of quantification problems is E. D. Chapple and C. Arensberg, "Measuring Human Relations", *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, vol. 32 (August 1940), or E. D. Chapple and C. S. Coon, *Principles of Anthropology* (New York, 1942).

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tions do these relationships hold good?" The threshold of systematic empirical inquiry has been crossed, and the process has begun of mutual interaction between explanatory theoretical configurations and the relatively miniscular research operations of testing limited hypothetical formulations.

Thirdly, the theory-hypothesis-data pattern reveals a method of eliminating the troublesome arguments that come about when basic propositions are stated in a form that is not susceptible to empirical test. An example of this sort of controversy is the H. J. Ford-F. J. Goodnow-A. L. Lowell argument whether the primary function of political parties is (1) to establish accord among organs of government formally separated by constitutional structure and norm, or (2) to provide organized means for the recruitment and selection of candidates for elective office. As long as the debate remains on the level of logical argument from an assumption or point of view there is no way of reconciling these positions; in the premises, one assumption is as good as the other and only by an act of extraneous divine or human will and judgment can the rational dilemma be resolved. But if each functional proposition is broken down into its conceptual elements, the research hypotheses derived therefrom provide an empirical basis for evaluating the main propositions. Further, this same process is likely to develop other functional attributes of party organization—such as personalizing and humanizing government for lower-income groups, providing an avenue of upward mobility for able members of underprivileged groups, promoting or protecting the interests of business, farmer and labor groups, etc. In time it is discovered that the original dispute no longer seems quite as important and that the different concepts may reveal more adequate ways of analyzing and interpreting the rôle of political parties.[31]

One final point should be made about systematic formulation of research problems in political behavior, namely, that the empirical researcher rarely is in a position to claim that his conceptual formulation encompasses *all* aspects of the problem he is investigating. Nor does he need to worry about this,

[31] The text oversimplifies the logical problems of rational proof, and neglects such problems as cause-and-effect relationships or the historical origins of institutions.

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provided he can state adequately how his findings are related to existing knowledge in the field.

We may now turn our attention from the relation between assumptions and hypotheses to the connection between hypotheses and techniques of data collection. Here, no more than in the previous case, does hypothesis *necessarily* precede the fact-gathering operation. On the contrary, many field studies are made with a view to exploration and description without any rigorous delimitation, in advance, of the data to the terms of an hypothesis, and perhaps systematic techniques are more frequently applied to produce data in support of concepts and hypotheses not necessarily relevant to the underlying political behavior patterns being studied. The latter has been the case in a number of sample-opinion surveys. There has been also a tendency among some devotees of systematic method to apply by analogy conclusions drawn from highly artificial experimental situations (for example, classroom analyses of political attitudes, clinical diagnoses of personality types) to the complex institutional patterns of political behavior. Above all, perhaps the most frequent methodological fallacy is the notion that the only function of rigorous data-collecting procedure is to test the original hypothesis, whereas all good empirical analysts know that the most difficult part of the job consists in unraveling unanticipated implications of the data, reformulating the original hypotheses to take account of unforeseen relationships, and extracting the significant conceptual linkages in the data that were never dreamed of in the advance planning.[32]

When all is said and done about the indeterminateness of the "hypothesis-data" relation, the fact remains that technical mastery of systematic techniques of collecting data is necessary, in some degree. These techniques vary from elementary rudiments of participant or external observation and recording, through questionnaire construction, extensive and intensive interviewing methods, sociometric and scaling techniques, projective and objective attitude tests, use of existing statistical resources,

[32] These points are admirably made in the essays by R. K. Merton, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and S. A. Stouffer, in the authors' *Continuities in Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill., 1950).

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personal and historical documents, and techniques of analyzing communication content.[33] For some political scientists who have experienced the joy of learning to use one of these instruments it becomes a problem to avoid utilizing the technique simply as a toy-mechanism for producing data about insignificant or superficial relationships; while others seem to enjoy the perverse pleasure of denying the relevance of such procedures to political behavior at all. From our point of view both reactions fall on either side of the scientific norm of adjusting significant hypotheses about behavior to types of data available to the analyst, plus his need to subject his own tendencies toward unsystematic recording and interpreting "facts" to objective standards by which the reliability of his procedures and results can be judged. Stouffer has said somewhere that scientific procedures at bottom are nothing more than ways of improving our work habits. Translated into the context of research planning, this means: (1) we should be able *in advance of field work to specify the data requirements necessary* to confirm or deny our hypotheses; (2) for budgetary, if for no more personal or scientific, reasons, we should be able to specify the analytical operations the project proposes to undertake, together with a realistic estimate of duration and cost. Undergraduate teachers may apply these tests, on successive levels of skill, in common with graduate thesis advisers, research project directors and foundation sponsors. In each case, the supervisor's interest lies in detecting: (1) the political and social sensitivity of the writer to the problem distinguished as important, (2) the conceptual ability reflected in the form of questions asked or the assumptions proposed as the context of inquiry, (3) the analytical quality revealed in the *researchability* of the hypotheses suggested, (4) the feasibility of securing the data and the relevance of the analytical operations envisaged as necessary for getting at the specified problem of knowledge or policy.

At this point it seems no longer necessary to emphasize that systematic-empirical method is *not* incompatible with any of the

[33] H. D. Lasswell has suggested how some of these can be utilized in a policy-oriented context in "The Immediate Future of Research Policy and Method in Political Science", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 45 (1951), p. 133.

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traditional categories of method in collecting and analyzing data in political science: historical, comparative, statistical, psychological, or descriptive-analytical case studies. Each has a contribution to make in getting at the significant variables involved in the understanding of political processes or behavior patterns. The inadequacy of such categories, for scientific purposes, lies in their ambiguity and noncumulative character, and in their inability to provide a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing with the strategic or limiting factors in the relations of the political scientist to his observational methods and the uniformities or regularities in his data. If experimental situations approximating the laboratory or clinic are rarely, if ever, possible for the analyst of political behavior, he may nevertheless hope to contribute toward a science of political behavior by: (a) intellectual clarification of the objectives and postulates of inquiry, (b) unrelenting effort to relate his limited empirical generalizations to higher-order propositions of functional relations between variables, and (c) through constant professional and personal criticism to deepen his understanding of the conditions under which uniformities of political behavior occur or may be modified.[34]

In summarizing the issue involved in the relation between hypotheses and data, perhaps the most dramatic way of putting it is to ask whether the political analyst is content with plausible interpretations and penetrating suggestions that seem to explain the problem he is studying, or whether he yearns for the logical and statistical standards of proof that test his generalizations to the point of measuring the probable or standard error of deviation. To some social scientists the criteria of science are met by constructing a general framework of concepts such as the Freudian or neo-Freudian theory of personality formation, a cultural theory of learning, the competitive equilibrium in economic-value theory, social rôle and stratification as determinants of political attitudes, and so on. Others stress the operational

[34] Political scientists will find a congenial statement of the foregoing position in A. L. Lowell, *Conflicts of Principle* (Cambridge, 1932). The briefest statement I know of the logical problems is M. R. Cohen, *A Preface to Logic* (New York, 1944), and a more extensive treatment in terms of the history of ideas is Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Berkeley, 1951).

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aspects of science as verifiable techniques of testing knowledge. Political behaviorists, as the writer recognizes in social scientists who are advancing the frontiers of conceptual understanding of politics through the application of systematic procedures of data collection and interpretation, probably still fall closer to the theory than the data end of the scale. That is to say, they are still more concerned with conceptual analysis than with improving their techniques of observation. In aspiration, however, they look forward to the development of political analysis as a skill in its own right, not merely as a derivative of practical experience, but based upon concepts incorporating the most systematic possible methods of political observation and interpretation.

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## REVIEWS

*The Conservative Mind from Burke to Santayana.* By RUSSELL KIRK. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953.—ix, 458 pp. $6.50.

When Lionel Trilling published *The Liberal Imagination* in 1950 he argued that American conservatism had no philosophy. "The conservative impulse and the reactionary impulse", he wrote, "do not . . . express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas." In this comprehensive survey of the Anglo-American conservative tradition since the French Revolution Mr. Kirk enters a vigorous dissent and attempts to show, instead, that "conservative ideas are struggling toward ascendancy in the United States" (p. 428).

Mr. Kirk appropriately begins his history with Burke, to whom he devotes the longest chapter in the book. His narrative continues with briefer glimpses at a familiar cast of characters: John Adams, Coleridge, Randolph, Calhoun, Tocqueville, Disraeli, Henry Adams, and a small assortment of twentieth-century figures. While the account is largely free from the vituperation to which liberals have had to become accustomed in recent years, the analysis is often marred by Mr. Kirk's polemical approach. For the author is not content with his exposition of conservative doctrine; he engages in a running battle with utilitarianism, secularism, and the leveling tendencies which he attributes to such villains as Bentham, J. S. Mill and John Dewey.

It is Mr. Kirk's thesis not only that a conservative tradition exists but that it alone can save "most that is lovely and honorable in civilization" (p. 428). He defines the conservative creed to be: "(1) Belief that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience. . . . (2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life. . . . (3) Conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes. . . . (4) Persuasion that property and freedom are inseparably connected. . . . (5) Faith in prescription and distrust of 'sophisters and calculators'. . . . (6) Recognition that change and reform are not identical . . ." (pp. 7–8).

No one will begrudge Mr. Kirk his admiration for Burke and Tocqueville. No one who is familiar with radical or liberal doctrines will deny their frequent naïveté, their occasional philistinism, or their unjustified faith in the beneficial results of tinkering with political machinery. In-



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deed, the conservative emphasis on the mysterious variety of the human animal has served and can serve as a welcome correction for the shallowness of the traditional liberal theory of man. It has been a long time since the contributions of conservative doctrine to political thought have been summed up as well as they have in *The Conservative Mind*.

But Mr. Kirk's main thesis—that the various forms of liberalism have been responsible for the troubles of modern society and that conservatism alone can be the great healer—is, I believe, not borne out by history. Nevertheless it is a position that is urged upon us with increasing frequency. While conservatives have talked of dignity and continuity and respect for man, radicals have fought for humane legislation and against nihilism. (Indeed, the most serious charge which can be leveled against our contemporary American conservatives is their failure to distinguish themselves from, and to crush, the Nihilists in their own ranks.) It is a commonplace that modern society is mass society, but its grossness is hardly the work of socialists or their allies. True, the lines can never be sharply drawn—some liberal movements have been guilty of cruel insensitivity (we need only recall the radical Dickens' indictment of the utilitarian poor law), while some conservatives like Shaftesbury have championed the cause of humanity. Radicalism may often have failed to take into account the irrational factors in man which conservative anthropology stresses (and stresses unduly), but the very omissions have permitted radicalism to set up critical postulates without which little social progress would have been possible.

Mr. Kirk's difficulties in attempting to resurrect conservatism as an ideology emerge most clearly in his treatment of individual authors. He praises such writers as Paul Elmer More (whose phrase—"To the civilized man the *rights of property are more important than the right to life*"—he quotes with approval, p. 382), and Irving Babbitt, in whom, Mr. Kirk holds, "American conservatism attains maturity" (p. 366). But recent scholarship has pointed out again and again the fundamental vulgarity of Mr. Babbitt's criticism—for instance his substitution of personal attacks on his archenemy Rousseau for an attempt to understand Rousseau's work. Mr. Kirk, somewhat lamely, tries to find a political explanation for the low esteem in which Babbitt is now held—he cites the attacks on him by "writers of the Left" (p. 366)—but such a defense is hardly impressive.

Conversely, Mr. Kirk is compelled to attribute to his adversaries opinions to which they certainly never subscribed. "Dewey's postulates", he writes, " . . . are simple and quite comprehensible. He commenced with a thoroughgoing naturalism, like Diderot's and Holbach's, denying

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the whole realm of spiritual values: nothing exists but physical sensation, and life has no aims but physical satisfaction. He proceeded to a utilitarianism which carried Benthamite ideas to their logical culmination, making material production the goal and standard of human endeavor . . ." (p. 365).

In thus attempting to prove the existence and the moral and intellectual respectability of a conservative ideology, Mr. Kirk has only succeeded in doing the opposite; in trying to confute Lionel Trilling's position he has only confirmed it.

PETER GAY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Economic Planning for the Peace.* By E. F. PENROSE. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953.—xiv, 384 pp. $7.50.

As economic adviser to Ambassador Winant, 1941–1946, Dr. Penrose had excellent opportunities to observe, and to participate in, Anglo-American planning for post-war relief and reconstruction. In the first part of his book, chapters i to x, he tells of the negotiation of the Mutual Aid Agreement, the evolution of the International Fund and the Bank, the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization, of UNRRA, and the unsuccessful attempts to set up an International Trade Organization. In these chapters the author throws new light on the reasons why certain proposals were adopted and others discarded. Unusually valuable are his conversations with Lord Keynes and his account of the views of British and American political leaders, and their advisers, on disputed questions of economic policy.

The second part of the book deals principally with economic policy toward defeated Germany, a prize example, according to the author, of bad post-war planning, or lack of planning. Chapter xiv contains a dramatic account of Secretary Morgenthau's exposition of his Plan at Ambassador Winant's country house in Wiltshire. His judgments are well reasoned but the frequent intrusion of personal pronouns will irritate some readers.

Dr. Penrose was well acquainted with the progress of post-war planning in London, but, as he admits, was less informed about similar activities in Washington. He makes only passing reference to the work of Dr. Pasvolsky's Division of Special Research in the State Department. Apparently he had no knowledge of the War and Peace studies initiated by the Council on Foreign Relations in coöperation with the Department. Isolation from the American scene may explain also his error in ascribing British origin to an American invention, the ill-fated International Trade Organization (p. 89).

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Surveying the record of post-war international coöperation, Dr. Penrose finds real accomplishment in the relief of immediate needs by controlling the distribution of scarce goods and services, food, coal, shipping, inland transport, and so on. Here planning paid off. But the longer-range projects which aimed to restore a functioning world economy, the International Fund and Bank and the International Trade Organization, proved disappointing. The causes were partly institutional, the peculiar nature of the American Constitution, for example. But principally the reasons for failure were personal. The experts lacked foresight and understanding. They underestimated the length of the transition from relief to reconstruction and they failed to anticipate Russian recalcitrance. Government officials lacked courage; they shied away from bold projects for fear of hostile legislative groups. "Behind the legislatures lay public opinion often believed by the politicians to be more hostile to bold measures than it really was, always difficult to ascertain, and sometimes led astray by the demagoguery of groups with vested interests to serve" (p. 354).

In his summary the author emphasizes the moral factor, in determining the course of international affairs. An Englishman by birth and training, but for many years an American citizen, Dr. Penrose obviously takes pains to allocate praise and blame equitably as between the two great partners in the Grand Alliance. The American reader nevertheless may at times feel he is called upon to shoulder too great a burden of original sin.

The book is eminently readable. The narrative flows easily, unhindered by the paraphernalia of pseudo erudition. It is a human document in which the author does not attempt to conceal his enthusiasms and his disappointments, his likes and dislikes.

PERCY W. BIDWELL

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

*The Triumph of Science and Reason, 1660–1685.* By FREDERICK L. NUSSBAUM. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953.—xiv, 304 pp. $5.00.

This volume in "The Rise of Modern Europe" series fits between those by C. J. Friedrich and J. B. Wolf so that the seventeenth century, from 1610 to 1715, long one of the major gaps in this series, is covered at last. It is good to see an undertaking, so useful and so creditable to American scholarship, finally drawing near to completion. Two more volumes for the sixteenth century and one more for the nineteenth will provide American students with a competent account of European history up to at least the brink of contemporary times, a set of volumes able to bear

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comparison with the distinguished French and German ventures in collaborative history on which it is modeled.

The announced object of this series is to give the general reader and student an intelligent synthesis of the accumulations of monographic research, and thus "a reliable survey of European history written by experts." Expertness on the scale imposed by a plan which makes a single author responsible for a quarter of a century, more or less, of all aspects of European history has its inevitable limitations. Few scholars are able to command with equal facility the dozen or more European languages in which important monographs may be found, and fewer still have devoted themselves with equal intensity to politics, economics, philosophy, science, religion, literature and fine arts. By necessity, then, we must expect that each of these volumes will offer, at least in part, not so much a fresh synthesis of a given period, as a synthesis of syntheses, a guide to the present state of knowledge and opinion as set forth by the authors currently most in repute. Such a guide can be invaluable to students and to the general reader, and this function the volumes of "The Rise of Modern Europe" have performed, on the whole, conscientiously and efficiently.

As one would expect of its author, this volume is no exception. Professor Nussbaum has not allowed his special interests to unbalance his presentation. His succinct account of the religious movements of the second half of the seventeenth century shows a critical command of the voluminous literature and a sure sense of relative values. If the chapter on arts and letters is less striking, it is as useful for reference as its space allows, and the treatment of the internal and international politics of the age of Louis XIV, even though much compressed, is brilliantly sustained narrative, illuminated by some shrewd and penetrating judgments. About details of fact and interpretation occasional disagreement is possible, but on the whole this volume serves admirably its primary purpose.

A good many of the volumes in this series have envisaged, however, a secondary purpose. When one is charged with the description of some chronological period of European history, it is tempting to seek to impose a unity upon one's discourse by finding and revealing the essential *Zeitgeist* of the age in question. As Professor Nussbaum puts it, "the problem of the historian is somewhat that of the portraitist, to see the prime element of the character structure of the past that he is attempting to portray." Certainly, historians who are so inclined may address themselves to this problem, and there are parts of the past which do submit to and even invite this sort of portraiture, though the historian attempting it is probably happiest when he can choose his own time span. This portrait selects "the triumph of science and reason" as "the prime element and

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unifying principle" of European experience from 1660 to 1685, invoking the spirits of Descartes and Newton as leading examples. It is probably irrelevant that Descartes died in 1650 and Newton's *Principia* was not published until 1687, but one wonders whether a period which opened with the condemnation of the Jansenists and ended with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, a period of continuous theological squabbling, of dragonnades and Popish Plots and the coursing of Covenanters through the heather, was really characterized by the triumph of science and reason. In fact, how many historians presented with three titles, "The Age of the Baroque", "The Triumph of Science and Reason", and "The Emergence of the Great Powers", and three sets of dates, 1610–1660, 1660–1685, 1685–1715, would pair them up as they have been in this series? But it is, at least, the advantage of this game of historical psychography that it tempts each author to stray beyond the chronological limits set him in pursuit of an interpretation, and a multiplicity of interpretations is always useful. Absorption in the game has not tempted Professor Nussbaum to suppress or distort facts, so that the value of his survey is independent of the validity of his psychograph.

GARRETT MATTINGLY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*English Historical Documents.* Volume II: *1042–1189.* Edited by DAVID C. DOUGLAS and GEORGE W. GREENAWAY. New York, Oxford University Press, 1953.—xxiv, 1014 pp. $17.50.

This massive volume is the first to appear, though the second in chronological sequence, of a collection of documentary sources for the study of English history from early Anglo-Saxon times to the beginning of World War I that has been planned to run to thirteen volumes of similar length, to be published simultaneously by Eyre & Spottiswoode in London and the Oxford University Press in New York. It is a colossal enterprise in which the well-known medievalist Professor David Douglas, the general editor of the series, and the scholars responsible for editing the individual volumes are engaged; and it is of unprecedented scope, for no such extensive publication of documents for English history as a whole has hitherto been attempted. The project was conceived in a belief that the sources on which historical specialists have based their work are in the main unknown to most of those who study and teach history and, *a fortiori*, to the reading public, that this situation is unfortunate, and that it can be remedied by making readily available a representative collection of such documents as supply specialists with their raw materials. If such a corpus of historical evidence is to serve its purpose, the documents must be intel-

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ligible to those who read English only; for, as Professor Douglas remarks in his general preface to the series, "those who, today, can utilize a document in Anglo-Saxon, Latin or Old French are few, and are decreasing in number." All of the documentary materials contained in the present volume, all of which, of course, were written before modern English had come into existence, are accordingly given in translation, but the editors have been careful to indicate in every case where the text in its original language can be found.

The documents here presented, in whole or in part, number 303 and are grouped in four main parts under the following respective headings: Select Chronicles and Narratives relating to the History of England, 1042–1189; Government and Administration; the Church; Land and People. These, as the editors are careful to point out, are not watertight compartments. Chronicles throw light on matters pertaining to government and administration, to the Church, and to the land and the people, and many of the documents that appear appropriately under any one of these latter headings are closely related to the subject matter of one or more of the other parts. The Constitutions of Clarendon, for example, which is given in Part III, under the heading "The Church", is important in relation to royal administration and the judicial system under Henry II. As the editors observe, "a text may legitimately be placed as illustrating the historical problem to which it most particularly relates, but it will, most probably, also serve as testimony to other aspects of contemporary life." Some of the documents here offered to the public have long been famous, but a great many of them have been very little known and hitherto accessible only in learned monographs and journals beyond the ken of most students and of all general readers interested in history.

Only a few of the notable features of the documentary contents of this volume that give it distinction can be mentioned. Reference may be made, however, to the admirable edition and translation by Miss S. I. Tucker of the University of Bristol of the versions of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (printed in parallel columns) which relate to the reigns of Edward the Confessor, Harold, and the Norman kings; to the inclusion of plates (with explanatory comment by the editors) representing the whole of the surviving Bayeux Tapistry; to bodies of evidence (mainly in the form of contemporary letters) bearing upon the lives and policies of Archbishops Lanfranc and Anselm and the relations between Thomas Becket and Henry II; to the materials dealing with the Domesday survey and the representative selection of the *Cartae Baronum* of 1166; and to the inclusion of the entire Dialogue of the Exchequer.

The editorial work has been executed in the grand style. The general

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introduction, some eighty pages in length, is, so far as I know, the best short history in existence of the century and a half covered by this volume. It is organized by topics and makes constant reference to the documents. It is followed by a select bibliography of the principal modern works relating to English history between 1042 and 1189. In addition, each of the four parts contains a brief introduction and a more specialized select bibliography. The individual documents, moreover, are preceded by explanatory notes indicating their significance and in many cases giving bibliographical information regarding them. It may be doubted, perhaps, whether many members of the reading public will have the leisure or inclination to pursue researches of their own to which this volume opens the way. It is certain, however, that no serious student of English history in the period which Professor Douglas and Mr. Greenaway have so industriously, so thoroughly, and so skilfully explored can afford to neglect their work. If as high a level of scholarship is reached in the volumes of this series that are to follow, an immense service will be rendered to the cause of English historical study.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

HOBART COLLEGE
GENEVA, N. Y.

*Ernest Bevin: Portrait of a Great Englishman.* By FRANCIS WILLIAMS. With a Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee. London, Hutchinson & Co.; New York, The British Book Centre, Inc., 1952.—288 pp. $4.50.

The principal figures in the Labor governments of 1945 to 1951 were a godsend to cartoonists. Biographers have a much harder job than had Vicky or Low, but Mr. Francis Williams has begun well. This most readable book, properly called a portrait, is neither an official nor a definitive life. It has not had the advantage of access to papers. But it is important because, in finding persistent elements, it restores perspective; and because it captures, thanks to the author's close association with his subject, some of the immediacy and impact of a powerful personality.

Although Mr. Williams leaves no doubt about his own favorable judgment on Bevin's tenure as foreign secretary, he simply sketches the period in thirty-five pages and makes no attempt at a final assessment, for which Bevin himself advised a twenty-year wait. But Mr. Williams has done a service in pointing to the roots of Bevin's foreign policy in past experience and emotions. And the career which produced them—from farm boy to drayman to powerful union official and "Dockers' K.C."—is re-created

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most impressively. It was in tough dealings with dockers and with men like Lord Devenport that Bevin learned to appreciate and to use power, came truly by his ruthlessness, and developed his almost fanatic concern for loyalty. It is important to be reminded, too, that Bevin was always a man of the Left, touched with syndicalism, and given to thinking until the thirties in terms of industrial rather than political power. His positions, usually personalized, were basically emotional; and Mr. Williams makes very plain how deeply Bevin's references to "my people" were felt—however much his egotism might lead him to use the pronoun in less defensible instances. Yet he was a pragmatist, distrustful of intellectuals, and from the first violently opposed to the British Communists.

Mr. Williams clearly writes as an admirer, but he is certainly alive to the faults which Bevin possessed in such abundance—to take one list, amply illustrated: "his intolerance of opposition, his suspicious hatred of values he did not share, his egotism and his ferocity." On the other hand are his amazing intuition, his ability as organizer and negotiator, and his unfailing concern for the ordinary man and woman—"his people". His Englishness, Mr. Williams insists rightly, was of an earlier type, eighteenth-century, country, untouched by recent habits of understatement or the modern conception of the gentleman. The comparison to Cobbett on the first page is well taken. Of that brilliant, forceful, egotistical and prejudiced man, the *Poor Man's Guardian* once said that, because of his services, he had established a kind of prescriptive right to be inconsistent. So too with Bevin. He was so right so often that his faults could be overlooked, and they were good English faults in any event. He could sweep a labor audience to the end, and Mr. Williams has done a valuable service in showing us again how remarkably that confidence was justified.

R. K. Webb

Columbia University

*Harold Laski (1893–1950): A Biographical Memoir.* By Kingsley Martin. New York, The Viking Press, 1953.—x, 278 pp. $4.00.

Mr. Kingsley Martin's account of the life of his intimate friend, the late Professor Harold J. Laski, appeared at the same time that we were offered in two volumes the gigantic Holmes-Laski letters. Assuredly there will be more studies of Laski. This reviewer, who has periodically pursued such a task over the past seven years, has occasionally received inquiries from scholars also engaged in such purpose. Included was a notice some two years ago that one young American, whose researches are yet un-

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published, was at the time in England doing "a full-dress study of Laski". Mr. Martin's in some ways admirable book does not achieve such distinction.

Among all of the more or less scholarly hurly-burly concerning Laski, one often hears from professional brethren the slightly derisive enquiry, "Why on earth should any one of serious purpose waste time writing about Laski?" Thus it would appear that in death as in life the name "Laski" can create ardent talk among differing men of good will. This physically frail man with a vigorous personality was indeed one of the most controversial figures in the academic and political world of the first half of the present century. Mr. Martin has underscored some of the reasons for this, concentrating almost exclusively upon the last ten years of his good friend's life.

This particular emphasis is unfortunate because Laski was almost continually "in the center of the ring" both academically and politically during his entire lifetime. Also, there is fairly general agreement that the most seminal part of Laski's life as teacher-friend and author was in the period between 1916 and 1934. If Laski makes his mark upon intellectual history it will be because of his pluralist and demi-anarchist forays against the monistic defenders of state sovereignty, plus his later, almost excruciatingly painful efforts to develop a political philosophy which could successfully combine democratic socialism and contingent anarchy. Mr. Martin devotes most of his account to the time when Laski was what might best be called a "Laskian Marxist". (In his Marxist stage Laski, who tried to be both a liberal and a Marxist, was criticized by many as being neither. Sir Ernest Barker, Laski's former Oxford tutor, in his *Reflections on Government* argues that Laski was unfaithful to both liberalism and Marxism. In a letter to this reviewer some years back, Louis Boudin suggested that Laski might pass as an English variety of a species of Leninist, but never as a Marxist.)

In the meager analysis of Laski's ideas which Mr. Martin does serve us, Laski's view of the United States is given special consideration. Here the author approvingly reiterates the basic theme of Laski's *The American Presidency* and, more especially, *The American Democracy;* namely, that in the race between reform and the crypto-fascism of Big Business in America, the odds appeared to favor the latter, which would furthermore seek to dominate the world. Laski wrote this a little sadly while calling upon the American liberals of different shades, especially those of the trade unions, to form a labor party and push for socialism. At the same time in his sighs over the America he loved, Laski repeatedly in *The American Democracy* had pointed to the Soviet Union as the better guide to the

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future. At bottom Laski acknowledged America's democratic tradition and warm generosity toward the world, but feared that this country was too much controlled by Big Business, which must eventually destroy democracy. He gave us a chance to maintain our democracy if we would follow his well-intentioned advice. So far, we have not seen fit to do so. (Incidentally the British public and Labor leaders had previously rejected Laski's demand for socialism *while World War II was raging*, only to elect in 1945 the first Socialist government, something which Laski had predicted would not take place once the crisis of the wartime emergency had passed.)

The cause of Laski's faulty analyses appears to have been his dogmatic devotion to an *a priori* crude empirical Marxism. Mr. Martin tells us that Laski was frequently accused of such *a priorism*, it being said that "he sought to squeeze American phenomena into a Procrustean bed of a quasi-Marxist and European outlook." Certainly, writes Mr. Martin, Laski "did not accept the doctrine of 'American exceptionalism', which has at times seized most American political scientists, and once became a recognized 'deviation' among U. S. Communists." Whatever "most" American political scientists and "once Communists" may believe, the basic oversimplism of Laski's Marxist analysis of America is notorious—and tragic. Among other things it led him to a distorted view of the country which, seen in perspective, has so far realized more than any other Laski's own dream of equality and opportunity for the masses of men. Such is the feeling of many people including some who were friendly to Laski. Max Beloff, for example, makes this point in the article "The Age of Laski" which he wrote shortly after Laski's untimely passing.

Despite the many faults in the book, some of which are understandable in view of the relation of author to subject, Mr. Martin does make us see why Laski was attractive to thousands and beloved by hundreds. His devotion to his students, his frequently inspiring lectures, his penetrating criticisms of capitalism, his continuous championship of civil rights against crypto-Fascists, his occasional vigorous attacks upon communism, his vigorous fight as a non-Zionist Jew against the post-war betrayal of the British Labor policy concerning Palestine by anti-Semitic Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, his life-long devotion to equality and to the Labor party—all these and more are indicated. One must also add again the reminder that Laski before he turned to Marxism made more of a place in the world of ideas than Mr. Martin appears to indicate. Thus Mr. Martin unwittingly has not done full justice to his subject.

CARROLL HAWKINS

MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

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*The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick.* By S. E. FINER. London, Methuen & Company, Ltd.; New York, The British Book Centre, Inc., 1952.—xi, 555 pp. 42*s.*; $9.00.

*Edwin Chadwick and the Public Health Movement, 1832–1854.* By R. A. LEWIS. London, New York, Toronto, Longmans, Green & Co., 1952.—viii, 411 pp. 24*s.*; $5.00.

Edwin Chadwick was a Colbert for the first industrialized, urbanized society—a relentless and knowing diagnostician of its internal woes and an utterly confident prescriber of their remedies. As the British state relaxed its grip on external economic relations, it was faced with domestic dislocations in society and its enterprises that were patently destructive and potentially breeders of revolution in a revolutionary age. Fifteen years after Jeremy Bentham had dropped his interest in economics, the genius of the Westminster Philosopher had culminated, between 1820 and 1832, in the *Constitutional Code*, which was a consistent blueprint for a collective state. Chadwick had entered Bentham's circle about 1824, armed with knowledge of the casualties of society as they were to be seen by an impecunious law student and journalist in London. The two incurable "fixers" took to each other at once. Moreover, Napoleon's codes and political administration stood as reproachful criteria for Britain's common-law chaos and limping local government, and seemed to confirm the practicability of Bentham's distilled principles.

When Bentham died in 1832, on the morrow of industrial England's bold, contradictory "New Deal", Chadwick was the only "brain-truster" who had no doubts whatever about how to proceed to the solutions of his society's problems. Debarred until 1848 by his station in society from an administrative commissionership or equivalent senior office, his striking capacities in lower ranks won for him the devoted alliance of Lord Ashley (later Earl of Shaftesbury), the Evangelical Tory humanitarian. For about twenty-five years, therefore, Chadwick was able to bring his immense talents to bear on such problems as life insurance, preventive police, vital statistics, poor relief, factory and labor legislation, education, epidemiology, sanitation and its engineering, and so on. He even designed a paving stone which would interlock to provide a proper surface for children to play hopscotch on!

And then, in 1854, while he was in full career, his enemies brought him down, without, however, being able to do more than maim his creations temporarily. Probably the owners and custodians of the properties that his sanitary reforms invaded could have destroyed him alone, but they

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were immeasurably aided by Chadwick himself. In Finer's words, "Unable to bend, he was made to be broken." Significantly, it had been the reforming and unpopular Prince Albert who had exercised royal prerogative to make him Companion of the Bath while he was under violent attack in 1848. Perhaps equally significantly, it was not until 1889, when much of the world outside Britain had acclaimed Chadwick, that he was admitted to knighthood in that Order, almost "a prophet without honor", for he died next year.

Before the appearance of the two books under review, the student had no nearly adequate account of Chadwick's work of a century ago. This was partly owing to the great bulk of relevant blue books, white papers, pamphlets, and so on, and of manuscript materials at University College, the Public Record Office, Westminster County Hall, and other repositories. Both Professor Finer and Dr. Lewis have been known to be at work on Chadwick for at least fifteen years. Probably the reason why they had no substantial predecessors, however, was the persistence of the myth that the United Kingdom had been a nonintervèntionist state since the destruction of conciliar government in 1641. Elie Halévy's scholarship of 1903–1936 had failed to destroy that myth, as had Sir Cecil Carr's work on English administrative law. Not until the agitation of Lord Hewart and others over "bureaucracy triumphant", did students wake up to their failure to examine the nature and mass of domestic administration that had been necessary during the nineteenth century. Sidney Webb had known better, as his contribution to the *Fabian Essays in Socialism* indicates, but even in their many volumes on British local government he and his wife found Chadwick and his endless ramifications too much to digest. Only during the past twenty years or so has there been growing up a corpus of studies of Bentham and of the part played by his ideas and disciples during the legislative, judicial, administrative and social experimentation that characterized the generation after 1820.

Both books under review are excellent. Finer's is especially praiseworthy for its resoluteness in achieving a comprehensive and penetrating account and explanation of what was achieved up till 1854. A page and a half suffices for the remaining thirty-six years, for there was little that was new and Chadwick remained impervious to the new bacteriology until his death. Moreover, Sir Benjamin W. Richardson's *Festschrift* for Chadwick, *The Health of Nations* (2 vols., 1887), is a sufficient record of his later work and influence, with one exception not remedied by either Finer or Lewis, namely, the interplay with the dynamic recluse, Florence Nightingale, that was indicated by Cecil Woodham-Smith in her biography (1951). Finer writes well and wittily, so much so that he deserves the

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reader's interest through the manifold maneuvers, triumphs and frustrations of Chadwick's administrative life, a discourse that would have required two volumes but for the skills of printer and publisher. The first two books (pp. 1–111) are brilliant.

One of the welcome features of the introductory matter is the ingenious thesis as to how Chadwick reconciled laissez-faire political economy with state intervention in economic affairs (Book I, chapter ii). One might add to it that sometimes (as in the relation of the labor of women and children to that of men) Chadwick seems either to have deceived himself or had his tongue in his cheek. Another suggestion might be that the device of investigation by Royal Commission is pure Benthamism; still another that, while Finer admirably relates philosophical utilitarianism to that of business men, he might have made more of the initiative and support given to state intervention by "good", that is, established, industrialists, in opposition to "bad", that is, aspiring, competitors. Happily, both Finer and Lewis emphasize how coherent Chadwick's manifold intentions were and how unfair have been the criticisms based upon his maimed and mangled achievements. Again both are in agreement that his humorless, stubborn personality, coupled with astounding capacity for work, goes far to explain the illogical public opinion that could be marshaled against him by vested interests.

Dr. Lewis makes a flying start so as to get going on his subject in detail about 1838. This involves him in some small errors of omission and commission, but it allows him to discuss more extensively and fruitfully than Finer the operation and effects of the Board of Health (1848–1854) on central and local administration. In this sense, although overlapping, the books are complementary. It would be a pity if Lewis' book were overshadowed, for its scholarship and expository grace and power are notable. Differences of opinion, naturally, chiefly concern personalities and, if one were writing an account of Chadwick's destroyer, Lord Seymour, Lewis' demonstration of his perfidy would provide a desirable supplement to Finer. Lewis, again (see pp. 100–101, 116–121, 188, 307–308), methodically traces the disintegration of Chadwick's faith in the efficiency of private enterprise for public ends and his conversion to the public corporation.

Even a cholera epidemic could not save Chadwick, and one sentence from the valedictory of hate (p. 369, n. 2) suggests why. "He was determined that the British world should be clean, and live a century, but on one condition only—that they consented to purchase the real patent Chadwickian soap, the Chadwickian officially-gathered soft water, and the true impermeable telescopic earthenware pipe, and when they did die,

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were interred by his official undertakers in the Chadwickian necropolis." This hero-villain was the only member of his family who did not emigrate to the United States. What would have happened to him if he had?

J. B. Brebner

Columbia University

*The Zone of Indifference.* By Robert Strausz-Hupé. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952.—vii, 312 pp. $3.75.

The underlying hypothesis of this perceptive study is stated to be: "If Western culture shall endure it must remain whole." To Mr. Strausz-Hupé the Western community represents a unique blending of three legacies—Greece, Rome and Christianity—shaped under the continuing and menacing pressure of a fourth—the Asiatic hinterland. This community is in a state of profound crisis. The old, external pressure is now represented by the Soviet Union, which the author regards as a military not a spiritual threat, and at the same time the community itself is paralyzed by a mood of alienation, both within and between its members. In many European countries the schism seems permanent. American society has thus far avoided this division: the United States is still "one nation". This, combined with the fact that the present survival of Western culture is "by the grace of American power", makes it indispensable that America and Europe remain united. Yet the author is properly troubled by an ominous tendency: the alienation of the American and European intellectual elites.

Such is the somber picture Mr. Strausz-Hupé presents. Diagnostic rather than prescriptive, the bulk of the book is a sensitive and informed exploration of the implications of this crisis, within the European and American societies and in the arena of international politics. The author is persuaded of the prior importance of Europe to the United States and contends that the positive significance of Asia has been much inflated. Yet the ultimate ordering of American-European relations remains uncertain. Two mutually exclusive outcomes are seen: "An American empire or the Great Republic of the West composed of the United States and a federated Europe affiliated with the British Commonwealth as a separate, yet closely associated member." The author naturally hopes for the latter but finds many historical forces working for the former.

If there is any answer to the problems raised here, it is suggested by the rather cryptic title, which is derived from a passage by Kenneth Boulding: "Survival in competition depends on the ability to maintain *relative* competitive strength at a level which permits the existence of a boundary of indifference." But, except for his discussion of certain positive aspects

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of European neutralism—the need to build up Europe's economic and spiritual reserves before straining its military effort—Mr. Strausz-Hupé does not explicitly develop this theme at any length.

Indeed, the principal criticism to be made of the book is the author's inclination to stray from one subject to another and, perhaps more seriously, from one level of thought to another. At times we are in a Spenglerian situation; at others Alfred Weber or David Riesman becomes our guide. This rather eclectic treatment produces some uncertainty as to whether the author really thinks there is a way out of the crisis. Early in the book he argues that the elements of the crisis are susceptible of logical analysis and can be remedied by purposeful action. Later, however, he holds that "Cultures do not transcend themselves," and toward the end of the book he says, "It is not proposed here to invent solutions to problems for which there are no solutions now and for which there were none in the past."

The fact that the book does not create a unity of thought and perspective was probably inherent in the author's method. "At best," he remarks, at one point, "our efforts will yield those impressionistic *aperçus* which are the despair of the social scientist." These the author has presented in abundance; most of them are illuminating and not a few, in this reader's judgment, are very wise.

HENRY L. ROBERTS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945.* By WALTER GOERLITZ. Translated by Brian Battershaw with an Introduction by Walter Millis. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953.—xix, 508 pp. $7.50.

*The Rommel Papers.* Edited by B. H. LIDDELL HART. Translated by Paul Findlay. New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1953.—xxx, 545 pp. $6.00.

To the long list of books on the German army which have come out since the end of the war these two are interesting additions. Herr Goerlitz' volume is an ambitious attempt to recount the history of the General Staff from its origins to its destruction under Hitler—an attempt which, despite serious limitations, is not entirely unsuccessful. Captain Liddell Hart's volume is an admirably organized edition of the papers of one of the most successful German commanders in the recent war and a work which, incidentally, tells us a good deal about the deficiencies of the institution upon which Herr Goerlitz lavishes so many encomiums.

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Of the five hundred odd pages of the Goerlitz volume only two hundred are devoted to the period before 1918, and even these suffer from the author's obvious desire to get down to the post-war years just as fast as he can. The numerous factual errors which marred the original German edition have, for the most part, been corrected in this, but nothing has been done about the author's heavy reliance on historical stereotypes. "Politics", Herr Goerlitz says on one occasion, "was something which Moltke [the elder] almost nervously avoided." Moltke, of course, did nothing of the sort, as any serious student of the early 1860's or the war of 1870 knows; and to say that he did merely perpetuates one of those myths that obscure the facts in German history. Herr Goerlitz' account of the General Staff in the nineteenth century is studded with statements of this nature, and it can scarcely be described as searching or critical. The political and social motivation behind the arrangement of 1883, by which the General Staff was freed from War Ministry control, is barely touched upon; Schlieffen's desire for war in 1906 is referred to only in passing; the part played by Moltke the younger in inviting war by his telegrams to the Austrian Chief of Staff in 1909 and July 1914 is not mentioned; and there are other equally grave omissions.

When he writes of the General Staff in the post-war period, Herr Goerlitz has more to offer. His account of the recovery of the army from its defeat of 1918, its baleful political rôle under the republic, its share in the responsibility for Hitler's rise to power and its subsequent subordination to the Fuehrer is told with a wealth of interesting detail, much of it based, apparently, on extensive interviews with former military leaders; and his description of the officers' plot of 1944 is well written and carefully documented. It is a pity that these chapters are weakened by some alarming misconceptions concerning countries other than Germany and by laborious and unconvincing explanations of the generals' continued obedience to Hitler long after his criminal folly and its inevitable consequences were apparent to them.

To pass from the Goerlitz volume to that of Captain Liddell Hart is to move from the study to the open field, from the *Büro-Generalen* to the front-line commanders and, specifically, to one front-line commander who came to detest the General Staff and all its works. The main importance of *The Rommel Papers*, of course, is the light which they shed on Rommel's military leadership. Although supplemented by Captain Liddell Hart's introduction and his unusually helpful notes and by essays written by Manfred Rommel and General Fritz Bayerlein, the book is composed largely of Rommel's own narrative account of his campaigns and of letters written during the fighting. Here in Rommel's own words, therefore, is the most complete account available of the German assault on

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France in 1940 and the desperate fighting in Africa. And here, also in Rommel's words, are some remarkable reflections on generalship, the theory and practice of the blitzkrieg, the problems of control and coordination in battle and the relative merits of offensive and defensive war.

But not the least notable feature of this volume is the light it throws on the rigidity of mind which had come, over the years, to characterize the General Staff, and which Herr Goerlitz never adequately discusses. The tendency to think almost exclusively in terms of continental war and to exclude other factors from consideration had been a major deficiency in the war plans of Schlieffen and the younger Moltke. It was equally apparent in the thinking of the General Staff during the Second World War. General Halder, for whom Herr Goerlitz seems to have a sympathy which approaches admiration, could not prevent himself from regarding the Mediterranean war as a kind of side show, and one, moreover, which diverted resources from the important theaters of war. This idea was, not unnaturally, fatal to any hope of success in Africa.

Rommel's papers are filled with attacks on the General Staff point of view. "The German High Command", he notes on one occasion, "still . . . did not realize that, with relatively small means, we could have won victories in the Near East which, in their strategic and economic value, would have far surpassed the conquest of the Don Bend." Again, speaking of the defeat at El Alamein, he writes:

> Eighteen months before, senior officers of the German General Staff had declared that maintenance of the African theater was an insoluble problem. The fact that this opinion was shared in the highest circles of the Wehrmacht command made it possible for the people in Italy and Europe who were lying down on the job to continue in their posts because, at the top level, their arguments always fell on receptive ears . . . .Their estimate of the transport system . . . was completely without foundation; it was the product of obsolete opinions and betrayed the tendency of the academic mind to evade all difficulties and prove them insurmountable.

Rommel was, of course, pleading a special case, but it is unwise to disregard his criticisms of the General Staff for that reason. There is an unfortunate tendency, among Germany's former antagonists, to regard the General Staff with a respect bordering upon awe. It might be well to remember that, in the last fifty years of its existence, it was dominated by academic minds, by men whose technical virtuosity lacked that solid underpinning of political understanding which is required if soldiers are to serve their country well—or even to be proficient in their professional calling.

GORDON A. CRAIG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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*The Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries.* By Norbert Muhlen. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953.—310 pp. $4.50.

Better than two-thirds through his excellent report on contemporary Germany Mr. Muhlen notes in passing what seems to this reviewer one of the most significant problems confronting that country. "Hitler", he writes, "succeeded to a frightening degree in killing off the German elite" which could have provided a strong succession leadership to his totalitarian system (p. 220). In the Soviet zone the vacuum was filled by returned émigrés like Walter Ulbricht, loyal executors of the commands of their masters in the Kremlin. In Western Germany, aside from the septuagenarian Adenauer, the late Kurt Schumacher—who deserves better treatment—and the recently deceased Lord Mayor of Berlin, Reuter, the new political order found no strong leadership. The "unpolitical" Germans want to tend their own gardens; in Eastern Germany they desperately seek to evade the endeavor to remake them in the image of the Soviet man; in Western Germany efforts of American "reëducators" have, according to Muhlen, boomeranged: ". . . many Germans . . . see democracy as a verbal fetish of the Americans" (p. 284). Neither the Soviets nor the Western democracies have succeeded in "winning" the support of more than a small minority after seven years of alternately threatening and wooing. Let those who see in the recent electoral victory of Adenauer a popular manifestation of a new-found democratic faith be warned: Nazism may be dead, but West Germans—most important of all, young Germans—have become "non-Nazis", rather than anti-Nazis. Muhlen makes it abundantly clear that Germans resented efforts to provide political guidance from abroad, but he fails to stress the corollary that a new and young political elite has not emerged to give the country a leadership which can overcome "the basic conflict between individual and society" and guide Germans toward political responsibility and democratic citizenship.

The subtitle of Muhlen's book underlines the division which remains a fundamental problem in German politics, as the riots of June 1953 in Eastern Germany confirmed. Yet he ignores the unification issue and the domestic political problems posed by the efforts to integrate Western Germany into a Western military alliance. On the last page he calls upon America to promise "that it will eventually liberate the suppressed" East Germans, but nowhere in his book does he indicate how "the ruling totalitarians" can be induced "to quit the scene" short of war (p. 302). Rather, the reader is left with the impression that Muhlen accepts the division of the country, hoping vaguely that a strong democratic Western

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Germany will somehow present an inducement for the Soviets to permit "their" Germans to join the West. The excellence of Muhlen's reports on life in both Germanies is marred here and there by exaggerated or superficial statements, such as that "American investigators" after the war "maimed Germans in order to extract confessions" (p. 279). His claim that West Germans were more antagonistic to communism than to Nazism because the former proved to be "more totalitarian" ignores the element of nationalism inherent in this problem. That "to hold hands or kiss in public was taboo among the boys and girls of Germany" seems to this reviewer poor reporting. On the positive side, Muhlen's discussion of "Jews, Germans, Anti-Semitism", his description of the "Red Reich", of "co-determination", and his criticism of post-war American policy in Germany should be singled out as highlights of the most objective report on post-war Germany which has come to this reviewer's attention.

LEWIS J. EDINGER

NEW YORK, N. Y.

*The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism.* By DINKO TOMASIC. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1953.—287 pp. $4.50.

In the current dissatisfaction with the old-fashioned historical explanations of the wonder and mystery of the Russian character that have brought about the establishment of the present Soviet state, recourse has been had to various other approaches ranging from geographical and climatic influences to the swaddling of the anthropological school of diaper determinism. Professor Tomasic has elected to combine the historical with a sociological approach in an effort to find an answer to the everlasting "why?" though it must be admitted that we are still badly informed as to precisely what this Soviet state is and the real nature of its threat to the Western World.

The assumption of some historians that the development of the Soviet Union may best be explained by a study of the political institutions and intellectual thought of pre-revolutionary Russia provides the starting point of Professor Tomasic's theorizing. As a sociologist, he believes that an understanding of the dynamics of Soviet total power must be sought in the "social agents which have affected the formation of power and the growth of personality in Russian society and which might be the source of its political explosiveness." Particularly in the two contrasting cultures "of the power-seeking and self-oriented nomadic horsemen of the Eurasian steppes" and the "anarchic and group-oriented tillers of the land in the

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river basins of Eastern Europe," does he find an explanation of the formation of political elites in Russian society and an "identification of conflicting orientations which have been at the root of its social instability and political aggression throughout the ages of its growth." In this process he also considers other factors contributing to the content of Russia's culture and social structure, such as the Byzantine system of administration, church-state relations, serfdom and the retarded growth of the middle classes, and the influence of Western European technology and political and social philosophies.

Thus the greater part of Professor Tomasic's book is concerned with an analysis of the structure of czardom; of ideologies and movements; and of the personality development of the Russian people, in which he considers such themes as paternal violence and compassion, family conflicts, mother-child attachment, dependence, sense of guilt, power-seeking, mistrust, destructive aggression, and emotional instability. The last and least extensive part of the book is concerned with the broad subject of "power and personality in Soviet Russia".

A result of this rather lopsided emphasis between the old and the new is that "The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism"—the real subject of the book—is never conclusively demonstrated. In many cases the influences of the old on the new are implied rather than convincingly argued. The increment of sociological interpretation in establishing the personality of the Russian and the power structure in the period of the czars makes for an original contribution, though the reader is often at a loss because of the failure to indicate clearly chronological divisions in the process of development. But the sparse treatment of the Soviet period advances little that is new. Perhaps because of the insufficient space allotted to this part of the book, Professor Tomasic is obliged to authenticate broad generalizations on highly significant movements and practices of the Soviet government by a single citation in each case from a Soviet newspaper or secondary source. For example, the reader is not convinced by the scant evidence adduced that it was a general practice of the Soviet régime to arouse "son against father and brother against brother" in order to bring about agricultural collectivization; or that the principal motivation behind the vast program of industrialization and collectivization was the determination of the party leaders to perpetuate their own power; or that the government deliberately encourages parents to punish their children in order to induce a willing acceptance of communist ideology. Finally, the customary and exclusive concentration on all the well-known and endlessly reiterated evils of Soviet society leaves unexplained the equally important sources of Soviet strengths and accomplishments.

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Nevertheless, the huge net that Professor Tomasic throws out brings to the surface many illuminating and provocative confrontations of the old and the new which contribute to our understanding of the personality of the Soviet man and of the totalitarian power structure that has formed it.

ERNEST J. SIMMONS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Sociology and Psychology of Communism.* By JULES MONNEROT. Translated by Jane Degras and Richard Rees. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1953.—339 pp. $6.00.

This is a bewildering book—rambling, disorganized, sometimes bordering on the incoherent—and yet learned, penetrating in its analysis of the appeal of communism, and illumined by flashes of insight that compensate for the digressions to which the author is prone. First published in France in 1949 under the title of *Sociologie du communisme*, it now appears in a somewhat shortened version which preserves the essential argument and flavor of the original edition.

Monnerot's basic thesis may be conveyed by a series of quotations: "To understand a movement it is indispensable to understand the psychology of its sincere believers . . . .Without believers the [Communist] Campaign would be practically defeated, for their fervour is one of the motive forces of its machine; and it is an error of positivism to underestimate this source of energy" (p. 255). "When an entire category of events and peoples and ideas becomes *immune from criticism*, we are in the presence of a religious phenomenon; a distinction is being established between a sacred sphere and a profane one. In secular religion . . . this phenomenon is recognizable by the active presence of a *faith*, and of *myths* and *dogmas*" (p. 146). "The attractive power of Marxism is that of an *orthodoxy* manifested simultaneously on the intellectual plane as a *system*, on the religious plane as *Einfühlung* (or affective communism), and on the plane of *praxis* as an adventure of the whole man which gives human existence a goal, a meaning, a direction, and a flavour . . . " (pp. 127–128). "Communism takes the field both as a secular religion and as a universal state . . . it is a religious sect of world conquerors for whom Russia is simply the strong point from which the attack is launched" (pp. 18, 20).

The strength of Monnerot's treatment consists in the light which it sheds on the psychology of the true believers. His treatment of the phenomenon of conversion represents an ingenious adaptation of Freudian psycho-analytic doctrine, Sorelian myth, and Nietzschean *aperçus*. The emphasis of the author is almost entirely on the processes by which the

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loyalty of the faithful is consolidated; the psychology of the disillusioned and disenchanted receives short shrift.

While Monnerot has performed a useful service in stressing the religious element in modern totalitarianism, his interpretation of communism as a secular religion does not discriminate sufficiently between the *élan* which animates the first generation of Communist revolutionaries and the bureaucratic reliance on indoctrination which characterizes Communist régimes after they have established themselves in power. There is an important distinction between a faith that is embraced and an orthodoxy that is enforced which Monnerot has not adequately explored. The power of indoctrination may be formidable, but the tendency of Communist rulers to put increasing reliance on incentives and repression points to a decline in the magic power of the religious appeal.

Monnerot is at his best in conveying the attraction of communism for the Western European intellectual. His discussion of developments inside the Soviet Union is less sure-footed. Although he makes extensive use of available secondary sources to portray the broad lines of institutional change since the Bolshevik revolution, the author's lack of access to primary Russian sources represents a handicap which he has not been altogether successful in transcending. As a result the substantial sections of the book devoted to the Soviet Union will be of more interest to the general reader than to the specialist; they constitute a synthesis of the familiar rather than a revelation of fresh vistas.

Merle Fainsod

Harvard University

*Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology.* By Hans Kohn. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.—x, 356 pp. $6.25.

For well over a century the idea of Pan-Slavism has inspired grand visions among certain Slavs and equally terrible visions among those Europeans who feared they might be engulfed in a vast Slavic sea. Despite its importance in the intellectual and diplomatic development of modern Europe, the subject has been largely neglected by historians. Up to now not a single comprehensive book on Pan-Slavism existed in the English language, but Professor Kohn and the Notre Dame Committee on International Relations have seen the need and filled it. It would have been difficult to find a person better qualified to write on Pan-Slavism than Hans Kohn. That he has spent a good part of his life studying the various manifestations of modern nationalism is well known, but perhaps not

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so many know that he grew up in Prague, a center of Pan-Slav agitation, and that he lived for five years in Russia, the chief exploiter of Pan-Slav aspirations.

One of the chief services which the book performs is to explode the myth of Slavic unity. Both the rabid opponents and the rabid proponents of Pan-Slavism have tried to create the impression that all the peoples who speak Slavic tongues are burning with a desire to unite in a great Slavic empire, and that the achievement of this unity is somehow inevitable. Professor Kohn correctly points out that the similarity of languages of the various Slavic peoples is more than offset by differences of religion, culture, historical tradition, and economic development. The closer the contacts between the different Slavic branches have been, the more bitter have been the conflicts. Thus Czechs and Slovaks united only to quarrel and separate, Serbs and Croats took turns in massacring one another, and Poles carried on an unremitting struggle with their Russian neighbors for century after century. As Professor Kohn says, "Slavs have fought and hated other Slavs at least as bitterly and consistently as they have fought and hated non-Slavs."

Still, the idea of Slavic unity has exercised a powerful influence over the minds of men. Pan-Slavism first became strong among West Slav scholars and writers who rallied to resist the cultural absorption of their peoples by increasingly nationalistic Germans and Magyars. Slavs living in the Habsburg Empire looked to the Russians for moral support in their struggle for autonomy, while Serbs and Bulgars sought military aid in their fight for independence from the Turks. The lesser Slavs discovered, however, that the Russian concept of Pan-Slavism was quite different from theirs. When the second Pan-Slav Congress met in Moscow in 1867, the visiting Slavs were told that Slavic unity demanded "the acceptance by all the Slavs of Orthodoxy, of the Cyrillic alphabet and of the Russian language." In the hands of Russian chauvinists Pan-Slavism became (and has remained) little more than a convenient excuse for Russian expansionism.

By chance I read this book on a street in Paris where Adam Mickiewicz, Poland's greatest poet, once lived in bitter exile, and I am writing this review in the Yugoslavia of Marshal Tito. These two Russophobes, one in the nineteenth century and one in the twentieth, epitomize the historic failure of Pan-Slavism. Just as Poland after 1795 was an eloquent example of the true meaning of Russian talk about "Slavic brotherhood", so Yugoslavia since 1948 has demonstrated the difficulties involved in selling the Soviet brand of Pan-Russianism thinly disguised as Pan-Slavism and Communist Internationalism. When the Communists seized power

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in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Stalin had at last achieved the long-sought Russian goal of political domination of all the Slavic peoples. Yet at the very moment of his triumph the selfish Russian chauvinism which he had fostered caused the proud Yugoslavs to break away and once more divide the Slavic world. Nationalism, whether Russian, Yugoslav or any other, has generally proved much stronger than Pan-Slavism.

What about the faults of the book? The sentences are often constructed in an involved, foreign way. More serious, the book is to a large extent a string of loosely connected biographies of various Slavophile and Pan-Slav writers, with the Pan-Slav movement itself sometimes getting lost in the maze of personalities. If Professor Kohn had devoted more attention to tying the different parts together, he could have made an excellent book even better.

THOMAS T. HAMMOND

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

*Tito.* By VLADIMIR DEDIJER. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1953.—vii, 443 pp. $5.00.

"Some will say that I have written this biography with bias, with passion, with hatred or love", Dedijer writes in his prologue. "This I shall not deny. I love my country and I love Tito."

Certainly none would expect scholarly detachment from the editor of *Borba*, Yugoslavia's leading Communist daily, especially when he is writing a biography of his chief which is so obviously meant to win friends. Yet this book is infused with a sincerity not to be found in most Communist hagiographies. After all, it was written by a man reared in the Communist faith, who fought at Tito's side throughout four years of the Second World War, who still bears the scars of that struggle and the haunting memory of his guerrilla wife's death in battle. Sincere devotion is hardly a guaranty of the biographer's veracity. Indeed, it tends to be the opposite. In this case, nevertheless, it does offer a valuable clue to that fierce pride which led Tito's followers to defy the Kremlin.

Dedijer's volume may be divided into three parts. The first section deals with Tito's life up to the German invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. The second part describes Tito's leadership of the "National Liberation Movement" and his rise to power at the head of a new Yugoslavia. The final third examines the origins and the course of the Tito-Cominform rift. Being a political biography, the volume is as much a history of the Yugoslav Communist party as it is the account of one man's spectacular career.

About 40 per cent of the story, we are told, is in Tito's own words.

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Dedijer culled much of this autobiographical material from Tito's various public interviews as reported in the Yugoslav press over the past eight years. While this writing in the first person adds much to the narrative's vitality, one wonders whether, at any given point, Tito is talking, or Dedijer. Nonetheless, Vladimir Dedijer has compiled one of the most significant political accounts to be published in the post-war period. He has written the first official biography of Tito to appear in any language, and has thus helped to dispel some myths about that hitherto mysterious figure known as Josip Broz, alias Gligorijević, Zagorac, Rudi, Walter, Spiridon Mekas, Ivan Kostanjšek, Slavko Babić, John Alexander Karlsson, Tomanek, Tito.

Unfortunately, Dedijer's labor of love spawns new myths of its own. One of these is presented in true Orwellian fashion: Tito is now opposed to Soviet communism; therefore, he must be portrayed as always having abhorred it. For example, speaking of his tour of the Soviet Union in 1935–36, Tito remarks: "I knew that many things were wrong while I was working there; I witnessed a lot of careerism and elbow-pushing . . . .Men vanished overnight . . . .I witnessed a great many injustices." Why, one must ask, did Tito then pledge loyalty to Soviet communism? Tito's answer: "It was my revolutionary duty at the time not to criticize . . . .I, like many others, thought this was only a temporary internal matter." The reply sounds hollow, coming from a dictator whose own régime has been polluted with the same injustices he professed to abhor in Moscow.

One must not allow repugnance for this typical fact-stacking to obscure the value of Dedijer's account—especially of his discussion of the sources of friction between Tito and Stalin long before the Cominform rift in 1948. Dedijer's description is quite one-sided in failing to admit the now embarrassing extent to which Tito has been a slavish imitator of Soviet policies and methods; hence the skimpy treatment accorded to the period from Tito's entry in Belgrade in October 1944 to his break with Moscow in mid-1948. Yet Dedijer's frequent references to Soviet wrongs against Tito's movement before the schism offer a revealing preface to the published correspondence between the Yugoslav Communists and the Kremlin in 1948.

Dedijer describes Tito's horror in 1941 on hearing a broadcast from Moscow which hailed General Draža Mihailović as the leader of all the forces of resistance in Yugoslavia. He offers documents to show how, despite protests by Tito, Soviet policy favored the ill-starred Chetnik leader as late as the fall of 1942, while it frowned upon a separate Partisan movement. Dedijer recalls that in October 1943 the Soviet government made no effort to include a discussion of Yugoslavia on the agenda of the

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Moscow Conference though Tito had specifically requested it. Indeed, when soon thereafter—in November 1943—Tito's Anti-Fascist Council deprived King Peter and the royal government-in-exile of their powers, Manuilski informed Tito that Stalin (the *khoziain* or "Boss", as the dispatch called him) was "extremely angry" and considered this "a stab in the back of the Soviet Union and the Teheran decisions." Dedijer also attacks the secret agreement (since made public by Hull and Stettinius) by which Churchill and Stalin recognized in 1944 an equal interest in Yugoslavia as their common sphere of influence. Tito himself offers a fascinating account of his personal clash with Stalin during their meeting in Moscow in late September 1944. Dedijer reveals that Tito's government was not even informed of the Big Three meeting in Yalta. American critics of that meeting may be surprised to learn that Yugoslav Communists regarded the Yalta decision calling for a coalition government in Yugoslavia as a Soviet betrayal and as an unwarranted concession to the West.

The author offers many informative and sometimes piquant examples of Soviet arrogance in dealings with Yugoslavia which shed more light on Soviet tactics and propaganda techniques. Here one discovers how editors of Soviet periodicals altered articles by Tito and other Yugoslav leaders, how Yugoslavia was fleeced in contracts with the U.S.S.R., how Russians belittled Yugoslav culture, how they rewrote the biographies of Yugoslav leaders in post-schismatic editions of Soviet encyclopedias, and so on down to the pettiest details.

Of particular interest are various personal accounts by Yugoslav Communist leaders of their meetings with Stalin. When Tito and his delegation called on Stalin in the spring of 1946, Koča Popović—one of Tito's ministers—recalled how during a supper Stalin turned suddenly to Ranković, the Yugoslav Minister of Interior and hence chief of security police, advising him to be careful of Beria, and then turned to Beria, asking him, "And you two? Which of you will trap the other?"

Another of Tito's ministers, Djilas, recalled how Stalin suggested to him in early 1948, "Yugoslavia is free to swallow Albania any time it wishes to do so"—then punctuated his remark by licking the fingers of his right hand! Kardelj, Tito's second in command, remembers how he tried in vain to convince Stalin that the word "Benelux" stood for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and how Stalin petulantly ended the argument by stating, "When I say 'no' it means NO."

More important, Dedijer's account of the Cominform rift includes material not found in the published correspondence. Especially significant is his discussion of negotiations for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation

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and of the ambivalence of Soviet attitudes regarding such a union. One wishes Dedijer would tell the whole story.

The American reader may find in Dedijer's recital of Soviet wrongs some important political lessons—the folly of assuming that the Soviet empire is a monolith of harmonious interests, the error of regarding Soviet policy as something inflexible or particularly clever, and the need for recognizing that the interests of any Great Power are ultimately ill-served by riding roughshod over weaker but proud national states.

Most readers will not need to be told that Dedijer's benign Tito is still a Communist dictator whose régime holds in subjection an unwilling people. Dedijer impressively describes a doughty country that has once again offered resistance to foreign domination. He tells nothing about an unfortunate people which yearns to be free from communism—whether Soviet or Titoist.

MICHAEL B. PETROVICH

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

*Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919–1951.* By RODGER SWEARINGEN and PAUL LANGER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952.—xii, 276 pp. $5.00.

While Communist China may represent the political and military arch stone of Soviet policy in Asia, the question whether all Asia will eventually be within the Soviet empire or not will probably be determined by the struggle which is now going on over control of the human, strategic and industrial resources of Japan. In this struggle, the Communist party of Japan, one of the three major political forces in the country, is a factor of great importance. In preparing this detailed and objective study of communism in Japan, Swearingen and Langer have made a valuable contribution to the study of Japanese political forces and of Soviet policy.

The history of the pre-1945 party was one of persistent efforts to create an operating party on the Soviet model and under increasingly close control from Moscow. Even more clearly than in the more advanced industrial countries, the insistence upon dictation of programs, organizational methods and control by the Soviet-dominated Comintern brought disruption and defeat upon all attempts to build up a native party which could have fought for the interests of labor within the limits, narrow as they were in Japan, of parliamentary action. A new freedom for all parties and for the trade-union movement, enacted in 1945 by the Allied Supreme Command, opened previously unknown opportunities to the Japanese Communists. In addition to building up both a legal party and an underground organization, the Japanese party made elaborate and

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successful efforts to win support among trade unions, women, youth, students, and small minorities, and to infiltrate the government apparatus. During 1945–1949 the party also concentrated its efforts on discrediting the more conservative parties, which have generally dominated Japan's domestic policies since the war, and on trying to form a coalition with the influential Socialist party, in order to absorb its membership and destroy its independent existence as competing party of the working class.

Basing their work on a painstaking use of all published sources, even obscure and rare ones, in Japanese, Chinese and Russian, and on a wealth of unpublished reports and memoirs, Swearingen and Langer have also brought to bear their detailed and prolonged acquaintance with Japanese political life. The result of their work sets a new standard of completeness and objectivity in a sorely neglected field, the study of Communist parties operating in national environments and within the framework of Moscow control.

Even these deeply informed students of Japanese communism are hard put to interpret the sudden shift of January 1950, which was signalized by an attack of the Cominform weekly newspaper on the Nozaka line of 1946–1949, based on the building of a mass party, on agitation for "intermediate" reforms rather than preparation for an immediate seizure of power, and on the notion of "peaceful revolution". Was this sudden change of direction, which confused and to some extent shook the Japanese party, imposed as part of a deal between Moscow and Mao Tse-tung? Or was it a Soviet warning to Mao and Nozaka, his close associate from Yenan days, that the party in Japan was to follow Moscow, rather than Peking, instructions?

Another point of great obscurity relates to the reaction of the Japanese Communist leadership to the MacArthur letter of June 6, 1950, which directed the Japanese government to "remove from public service" the members of the Communist Central Committee. The tone and purpose of this directive hardly explain the haste with which most of the Communist leaders disappeared into the underground, or why they have remained invisible. Perhaps this sudden reorganization of the apparatus was based on a Soviet assumption that the expected quick capture of South Korea would lead to panic in Japan, and that the underground forces should be prepared to take decisive action in a crisis situation. Alternatively, Moscow may have assumed that the attack on South Korea would result in severe reprisals against its apparatus in Japan, and, recalling the effectiveness of the suppression between 1928 and 1945, wished to husband its cadres for a later offensive. These are speculations of the reviewer, not of the authors, of course.

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Another, even larger study would be required to analyze fully the problems and forces which may foster or limit the influence and political power of the Japanese Communist party in coming years. Meanwhile, *Red Flag in Japan* deserves to be widely read and pondered by students and policy-makers alike.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*The Middle East in the War: Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946.* By GEORGE KIRK. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Second impression (revised).—xiii, 511 pp. $10.00.

This is a work of unusual distinction. It is, indeed, set apart from all others on the recent Middle East by a glaringly uneven quality. For the author has contrived indiscriminately to mix unemotional, and occasionally brilliant, analysis with intense, and at times obsessive, passion. Kirk's intemperance lashed, primarily and in descending order, at the Zionists and their sympathizers, the Free French and their collaborators, and the British Labor party. Owing to generally censorious reviews in England, Chatham House took the unprecedented step of recalling the 1952 edition. The substitution of some thirty-odd graceful for abusive phrases in the text and footnotes of the second impression was calculated, apparently, to remove the main basis for complaint. Yet the narrative, modified in form but not in content, remains largely out of focus, since the invidious judgments constituted only surface symptoms of the author's distorted frame of reference.

The merits of the book need not long detain us. The reader is not spared particulars, assembled from a wide range of sources—official documents, war memoirs (in the major European but not Middle East languages), journalist and scholarly tomes, European and Middle East press and periodical data, and private interviews. The sections on the interaction of Great-Power and domestic politics in Egypt, Iraq, the Levant States and the Arabian Peninsula penetrate into cause and effect more deeply and persuasively than do the others. And the study as a whole is indispensable, if only for its immense detail and inclusive bibliography. Still the volume, doubtless conceived by its sponsors as a definitive survey of the impact of the Second World War on the Middle East, falls far short of the goal.

No close student of the subject would quarrel with Kirk's major premise;

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the British wartime policy in the Middle East, especially in the Arab zone, of reaching an entente with moderate nationalist opinion, even at the expense of the interests of other groups, was "dictated by [the] iron necessity" of preventing the pivotal region from falling into Axis hands. The thesis did not originate with Kirk. It represents the consensus of most impartial observers.

But were not the actions of the Free French and of the Zionists, considered from their respective viewpoints, also dictated by iron necessity? Could Generals de Gaulle and Catroux, in the light of the Nazi occupation of France and the claims of Vichy that it was defending the integrity of the French Empire, have been expected willingly to surrender French prerogatives in Syria and Lebanon? Could the Zionists, in view of the Nazi aim of exterminating the Jews in Europe, have been expected to abandon their aspirations for sovereignty in Palestine? Historical accuracy was not served by disregarding these forces. Instead of allowing the unavoidable clashes between the segmental purposes of the Free French and the Zionists and the area-wide efforts of the British to speak for themselves, Kirk has given precedence to exculpating the United Kingdom's Middle East policy and those responsible for it from the strictures of their most outspoken critics.

Kirk reiterates that he can only conjecture about certain developments, because confirmatory evidence is locked in confidential files. The reservations, instructively, apply wholly to British official sources. While the bulk of the pertinent archives of other governments and organizations concerned have also not been opened, the author does not always demonstrate the same restraint in handling the published materials. In most instances, moreover, the British official rather than the Arab, the Frenchman or the Zionist is given the benefit of the doubt. The opponents of British policy clearly were not blameless; but British officials contributed as much as their adversaries to the tensions and recurrent crises.

Kirk devotes so much space to vindicating the position of the United Kingdom that he fails even explicitly to mention that the British war effort in the Middle East was a Commonwealth (and Imperial) effort. Special contributors, it is true, survey briefly and competently the problems of coördinating Commonwealth activities in the Middle East (H. L. d'A. Hopkinson) and mobilizing the region's economies (Guy Hunter). But Kirk overlooks entirely the political complications arising in the individual countries from the operations of the Office of the British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and of the Middle East Supply Center. Hopkinson includes a paragraph on the supervision by the Minister of State's Office at Cairo of postal, telegraphic and press censor-

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ship in many, but unnamed, countries. Kirk has nothing further to say on this topic (except for a single sentence in a footnote), although the direction of censorship, linked as it was to the mastery over communications generally, formed one of the most potent British controls in the region. So significant was this control—or lack of it—that it helped explain why in the early war years the British were able to impose without bloodshed governments of their own choice on Egypt but not on Iraq. As for the Middle East Supply Center, the fact that local governments as such, apart from those directly administered by the United Kingdom, were not represented in the agency produced deep resentment in the self-governing states toward the close of the war. These issues, too, are nowhere discussed.

Germany and Italy posed for the Allies in the Middle East as for the local lands far greater problems in 1939–42 than did the Soviet Union in 1943–45. Kirk's final section, dealing with the U.S.S.R., is highly useful. Comparable treatment of Germany and Italy in the beginning of the study would have been equally helpful, for the nature of the problems raised by Axis machinations in the early war years does not emerge with sufficient clarity from the analyses of military and political crises. Similarly, in the opening section, where the political motives of Britain and her allies are examined, no account is taken of German and Italian objectives. Space should also have been given to the political forces at play in the non-Arab lands, since they were no less cogent than Arab nationalism and Zionism.

When to these serious shortcomings are added the author's moralistic subjectivity and his occasional addiction to racist clichés, it becomes self-evident that the reader must treat the volume with utmost caution.

J. C. Hurewitz

Columbia University

*The United States and India and Pakistan.* By W. Norman Brown. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.—x, 308 pp. $4.50.

The serious interest in the political problems of India and Pakistan that has arisen in recent years has not been accompanied by a literature equal to the task of informing an expectant public. Misinformation bordering on the irresponsible has appeared in a number of recent books on the area written by authors of competence—on other subjects. South Asia has become a literary playground, with the threat of communism in Asia being the excuse for all kinds of analyses, some hopelessly sentimental and others critical without the benefit of foundation in fact. It is a pleasure to note

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the appearance of Professor Brown's study, which avoids most of the errors to be found elsewhere.

This book does not fit precisely into the series "The American Foreign Policy Library". The author has written an introduction to India and Pakistan that does not confine itself to the area of foreign policy, nor to the relations between India and Pakistan and the United States. In fact, the best chapters in Brown's book deal with the cultural history of undivided India, the impact of Western ideas and institutions on India, and the background of the social and economic problems that have shaped the domestic policies in each country. It appears to be the author's view that foreign policy is best understood in terms of domestic issues. This is a conviction shared by the reviewer. It follows that a book such as the one being considered, while giving emphasis to internal matters, indirectly provides the careful reader with vivid insights into the foreign policy attitudes of the countries concerned. From this point of view, no better study of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies exists in print today.

Professor Brown is too well informed about his subject matter to be strictly "objective". He does not hesitate to state his opinion when an issue is controversial. Nor will one find many instances of well-meaning, but ill informed, praise for India or Pakistan when the facts point to other conclusions. Criticisms of Pakistan and the "Islamic State" at times seem to reflect a bias that can be challenged. Suggestions for improving Indo-American relations often appear to accept Indian aspirations as the counterpart of American actions in the analysis. This is a mixing of categories of discourse that does a disservice to the United States position. But malice and ignorance are not to be found in this book. The "Dean" of South Asian studies in the United States gives status to neither.

The main criticism to be made of this study is that it is more encyclopaedic than interpretative; more inclusive than selective. One faced with the problem of condensing materials about India and Pakistan is aware of the immensity of the task. The literature on modern India and Pakistan is large in quantity, if low in quality. Professor Brown has attempted to present a synthesis of the best information available on the area without selecting a theme of moderate dimensions. The book emerging thus suffers from a lack of internal orderliness, but gains in breadth of understanding. This study can be recommended as the best introduction to India and Pakistan available for the general reader; it is an excellent beginning text for students of South Asian history and politics.

Richard L. Park

University of California
Berkeley

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*Southeast Asia in the Coming World.* Edited by PHILIP W. THAYER. With a Foreword by William O. Douglas. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953.—xii, 306 pp. $4.75.

This book is a collection of papers presented by various experts at the 1952 conference on "Southeast Asia in the Coming World", organized by the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. It deals, in five parts, with the political, economic, cultural, and legal aspects of the subject and the future prospects of the region. Thus, only the last and very stimulating part of the book attempts to live up to its ambitious title.

The part on politics covers almost exclusively United States relations with the region. There is a general agreement that during the brief period since the United States discovered her interests in Southeast Asia she has not yet succeeded in developing an altogether successful policy. Most contributors to this part of the work ascribe this failure to the strong suspicion with which every Western Power is met by the native peoples and to lack of knowledge of the region. In some measure the book itself testifies to the last fact; for there is only incomplete discussion of the social revolution proceeding in many parts of the region. Yet this revolution influences the positions of the countries of Southeast Asia in the cold war as much as the more customarily-stressed poverty and foreign attitudes toward nationalist movements. Interrelations among the states of Southeast Asia are entirely ignored, though they will presumably play an important rôle in "the coming world".

Some of the economic essays are among the most substantial of the book. They indicate that many of the continuing economic difficulties can be traced to the manner in which governments handle the resources of their countries, to the retarding influence of cultural habits upon modernization and to desires for economic independence and self-sufficiency. However, whether the laissez-faire approach to the problems of these mostly underdeveloped countries is a promising one is not fully investigated.

The section on culture contains little new material. It deals, somewhat abstractly, with ideologies and how they affect each other. Some attempt is made to relate them to the realities of present-day political and economic problems. But their place in the daily routine of the peoples of Southeast Asia is not analyzed. This section creates the impression that they are effective in the struggle for higher standards of living. Yet there is much evidence to the contrary. Discussions among the leaders of Asia usually deal with the problems of technical progress rather than with the merits of their ideologies. Western fascination with the Asian-inspired and largely fictitious dichotomy of Eastern spirituality and Western materialism too often befogs this issue.

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The scholarship of the contributors guaranteed the generally high level of the discussions in this book. The editor has provided as much uniformity of emphasis and coherence among the contributions as is possible in such collective efforts as this. One might question, first, whether the existence of several good general treatments of Southeast Asia does not obviate the necessity for further additions to their number. The need now is for studies in depth rather than breadth. One might question, second, whether the lumping together of the countries of Southeast Asia and their, obviously forced, treatment as a unit really contributes to the understanding of the region. In spite of careful qualifications and corrections of generalizations, the discussion of Southeast Asia in all its aspects as a unit is bound to create misconceptions. Besides, it can be carried on only on a level of abstraction which does not permit a full appreciation of the problems created by the diversity of the units composing the region. The countries of Southeast Asia have their individualities which should be recognized and emphasized.

Werner Levi

University of Minnesota

*Nationalism and Communism in East Asia.* By W. Macmahon Ball. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1953.—viii, 210 pp. 3 maps. 25*s.*; $4.50.

This is a provocative and interesting book about the revolutionary ferment disturbing the billion people who live in Eastern Asia. Viewing the scene from "down under", Macmahon Ball, an Australian political scientist, has many shrewd and unconventional things to say. Each of the nations he examines—Japan, China, Korea, the six countries of Southeast Asia, and India—is in a state of great instability. Their internal social and economic problems are complex. Most of them raise baffling issues for American policy.

Ball's central theme is that there is a threefold revolution at work throughout East Asia. First is the nationalist revolt, strikingly successful since the war, against foreign political control, colonialism and imperialism: the drive for full national independence. Second is the revolt against poverty and misery: a drive for more food, better health, education and security for the masses. Finally there is the emerging struggle of East against West arising from the determination of Asians to decide their own destinies. Mr. Nehru recently reëmphasized the latter point when he noted the scant representation of Asia in the United Nations Security

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Council where many Asian problems are settled. Syngman Rhee becomes most troublesome just when someone in Washington tries to decide Korea's destiny. Any country which hopes for influence and support in Eastern Asia will have to work with rather than against these elemental movements.

Nationalism is everywhere a dynamic force. The drive against foreign political control has won the day in India, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines; it fans the revolt in Indochina and the demands of the "Associated States" for full independence from France. Nationalism also has its affirmative aspect in the attempt to reconstruct the shattered societies and bring welfare to the masses. Communism is favored by many factors in the situation. Its emphasis on economic security and its promise to eliminate social inequalities have a powerful appeal to Asian masses who live close to starvation yet see the privileged all around them. The decisive political issue today in the uncommitted countries is whether the Communist or the non-Communist leaders show the greater energy and sincerity in their efforts to improve the position of the underprivileged. In this matter the Russian and Chinese Communist examples have a powerful appeal. The potential conflict between nationalism and communism centers on the issue whether the native Communist leaders are working for the benefit of their fellow citizens or for the Soviet Union.

Opinions will differ as to the adequacy of Professor Ball's treatment and the soundness of his conclusions with respect to the individual countries he surveys. For those who think of defeated and disarmed Japan as dependent upon the United States, his discussion of Japan's power to bargain between the United States and the Russian-Chinese world—and the attractions of the latter for Japan—may be rather startling. In his appraisal of the Korean dilemma he achieves a detachment which leads to tentative conclusions which would be difficult for many Americans to accept. He seems to say that in a sharply divided world the long-run interests of the Korean people might be better served—or at least less imperiled—if Korea were to become part of the mainland Communist bloc. His account of Communist China seems to me to have been out of date even when written. Nor does he venture near an answer to the questions he raises at the beginning of the chapter as to the meaning for China and for the rest of the world of the new régime there. There is no space to comment on his treatment of each of the countries he places under his lense. In no other recent work, however, can one find so concise and provocative a survey.

The chief present concern of the West with East Asia is that no more of it should go communist. In his concluding chapter Professor Ball analyzes the means open to the West to influence the decision: military, economic

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and psychological. He warns of the urgency for unity with the non-Communist East to prevent the struggle from becoming identified as a racial conflict. The military approach is very difficult and dangerous; it inevitably makes enemies of neutral Asians. The danger with economic aid is that it may prosper only the influential minority. In aid to governments Ball would apply only one condition, that the government be sincere and determined to promote the welfare of its people and that its efforts result in increased popular support. Propaganda, like military and economic programs, must work through and not against the movements for national independence, a new social order, and Asia for Asians. For Ball is certain that the struggle to prevent more of Asia from going communist depends fundamentally upon the peoples themselves. The best hope is that they will resist domination by the Soviet Union with the same resolve they have shown in winning freedom from domination by the West.

C. MARTIN WILBUR

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Public Administration in Burma: A Study of Development during the British Connexion.* By F. S. V. DONNISON. London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.—vii, 119 pp. $2.50.

*Public Administration in Malaya.* By S. W. JONES. London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.—viii, 229 pp. $3.00.

Studies of those regions either included in the Commonwealth of Nations or administered by Her Majesty's subjects are appearing regularly.

Mr. Donnison, the author of *Public Administration in Burma*, was a member of the Indian Civil Service from 1922 to 1948, serving in Burma. The last post held by him was that of Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma. His book deals with the Indian system, including the years of control by the East India Company; Burma and the indigenous system; Burma and Bengal, 1824–62; the chief commissioners, 1862–97; the lieutenant-governors, 1897–1922; the years of self-government, 1922–37; separation from India and further self-government, 1937–1941; the end of the British connection; and the problems of defense. The book ends with a brief summary and an adequate index, an unusual feature of English publications.

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One aspect of Burma's development important enough to require special consideration is the provision made for military forces within the country. The author discusses defense from the viewpoints of dependence on the Indian Army, Burma's separation from India, and the Burma National Army. Between 1919 and 1922 it was clear that Burma eventually would separate from India as a self-governing dominion. In the following fifteen years, no moves were made to build a Burma army. Actually, the small Burman element in the Army was completely wiped out. The government of Burma protested but nothing was done because defense was administered by the government of India. After the defeat of Japan, the civil government was faced with the problem of creating an army including the Burmese. The efforts made to absorb the Burma National Army into the regular forces were hardly successful because no moves were made to respect the identity of the units of the former. Even if this course had been followed, the loyalty of ex-members of the Burma National Army to their own leaders, rather than to the regular army or to the new state of Burma, would have to be recognized.

S. W. Jones, who was Colonial Secretary for the Straits Settlements from 1940 to 1942, is the author of *Public Administration in Malaya*. This well-documented book considers the East India Company and the transfer to the Colonial Office in 1867; entry into the Malay States, and the Malay States under the Residential System; administrative development of the offices of Health, Education, Agriculture, Co-operatives, Labor, Forestry, and Mining; constitutional history of the Straits Settlements, Federated and Unfederated Malay States and a comparative study of the contrasts between the Federated and Unfederated systems; emergence of political problems connected with a plural society, dual mandate, and decline of district administration; rehabilitation in the fields of medicine, education, social welfare, housing, police, and labor and trade unions; and constitutional and political developments since 1946 in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. The last chapter discusses the planning for economic and social development.

These final pages of *Public Administration in Malaya* will interest the general reader, wearied of administrative trivia. The Federation produces valuable world commodities but is unable to raise sufficient food for the inhabitants. The government, therefore, in June 1950, made public a Draft Development Plan. This is an ambitious prospectus for the cultivation of national resources and the encouragement of trade and industry. The Draft Plan emphasizes the need to expand the country's economy and to produce to a greater degree Malaya's own foodstuffs. In order to attain this goal, the Agricultural, Fisheries, Veterinary, Geol-

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ogy, Drainage and Irrigation Departments and Co-operative Societies are to be strengthened.

The Draft Plan recognizes, however, the financial barriers blocking development. It makes clear the fact that reserves of $10 million a year must be restored and that revenue of $43 million a year more must be found to finance the project. There is also the enormous problem of additional expenditures caused by the guerrilla war. These amounted to $24 million in 1948 and $85 million in 1949. Estimates for 1950 reached $144 million. The British government contributed $40 million in 1949 and promised $10 million in 1951. The Federation is spending about 45 per cent of its annual revenue on internal security and defense.

THOMAS E. ENNIS

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

*The Forging of American Socialism: Origins of the Modern Movement.* By HOWARD H. QUINT. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1953.—xi, 409 pp. $6.00.

Howard Quint begins his study of American socialism in 1886, after a compressed opening chapter on the period since 1870, and carries his narrative down to the founding of the Socialist Party of America in 1901. An intensive exploration of a brief period, his volume comes in chronological sequence just before Ira Kipnis' *The American Socialist Movement 1897–1912* (New York, 1952), although the Quint and Kipnis studies are independent of one another and not part of any series. With the recent two-volume Princeton study, Ray Ginger's biography of Debs, and the current research of David Shannon and others, there appears to be a considerable concentration of historical research on American socialism today.

Fifteen years ago, in the era of the Popular Front, a history of American socialism would have been a major event, regarded by many, including those who did not identify themselves with the fortunes of the Socialist party, as a tribute to pioneers of a new and better order of society. Today, the history of socialism has come to have an antiquarian flavor; at best, there is something warmly nostalgic about the memory of Debs, at worst, something suffocatingly tiresome about the fights between small bands of men for control of splinter parties. For most historians, interest in American socialism has dwindled in proportion to the falling off of Norman Thomas' vote in the quadrennial elections; it no longer seems to matter, if it ever did, whether the *Volkszeitung* group or the Rosenberg-Busche faction gained control of the Socialist Labor party, whether the *Abendblatt* and the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* were or were not placed under direct party control.

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The great achievement of Professor Quint in his study of American socialism is not merely that he has written an impressive monograph on his subject, but that he has succeeded in making clear that the history of American socialism is of major importance to students in all fields of American history. What the political failure of the Socialist party has done is to free the historian from an undue concentration on the problem of the tactics of social change, making it possible for him to view American socialism as a mirror of American experience.

Professor Quint has based his study less on convention proceedings and manuscripts, although he has used both to good advantage, than on files of Socialist periodicals, including numbers of obscure party organs which he unearthed in what was obviously a labor of love. Yet it is less his original research than his brilliant job of synthesis which is the strong point of the book. He has taken the different strands of American utopianism, German Marxism, Bellamy nationalism, Christian socialism, latter-day communitarianism, and grass-roots Western socialism and woven them together so skillfully that when he ends his chronicle with the creation of the Socialist Party of America in 1901, you are left with the feeling that you understand thoroughly the roots of American socialism, and that no alternative way of organizing the material would have been nearly so effective.

The ending of the book with the creation of the new unified party is logical, but abrupt. The study would have gained from a concluding chapter giving the author's views on the meaning of a "socialist" party in a capitalist democracy, particularly in comparison with European experiences. Occasionally, he uses the term "middle class" too loosely, particularly with respect to the Bellamyites. But these are minor points, and, even in these instances, the author does far more than most American historians have done in comparing American and European developments (relating American struggles to European quarrels over the doctrines of Lassalle and Bernstein), while his chapter on the Bellamy movement is fresh and provocative, although one would have supposed that this subject had been run into the ground by now.

Professor Quint is judicious in his handling of factional quarrels, where it would be easy to lose one's perspective in the mountains of invective spewed by both sides. This is particularly true of his treatment of the unpleasant quarrels between the Socialist Laborites and the followers of Henry George and between Gompers and the Socialist faction within the American Federation of Labor. This same discriminating balance can be seen as well in his treatment of the Christian Socialists, where he warns that "there is always the danger of assuming that the views of a small number

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of forceful, articulate, and liberal clergymen represent those of the pulpit as a whole. For purposes of perspective, it should be re-emphasized that the radical social Christianity of Bliss and Herron affected only a very thin part of the Protestant clergy in the 1890's." Well organized, thoughtfully written, and based on careful research, this is a model monograph for students of American radicalism.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Who Speaks for Man?* By NORMAN COUSINS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953.—xii, 318 pp. $3.50.

Back in 1945 when the world was in a state of shock from the atomic destruction of Hiroshima, Norman Cousins expressed what less articulate people felt but could not put into words in his widely read editorial, "Modern Man Is Obsolete". The point he stressed then is the underlying theme of the present book: man's technology of self-destruction has outdistanced his equipment for self-preservation; unless he acts to modernize his political structure so as to bring it back into balance with his scientific progress he will indeed be obsolete.

Mr. Cousins, who is editor of the *Saturday Review*, has thought, written and worked in public affairs all his adult life. He is an idealist but a practical one. He is also an optimist—or at least not a pessimist. He believes that people—whether as individuals or collectively as communities, nations or groups of nations—are or can be masters of their own destiny. If they will exercise "anticipatory wisdom" to avoid the horrors of atomic anarchy by trading an illusory, nonexistent national sovereignty for a world government in which national sovereignty will once again have real meaning, the possibility of eliminating war, hence increasing their likelihood of survival, will be increased.

*Who Speaks for Man?* is in part a chronicle of the author's experiences in Europe and Asia during the years since Hiroshima. Roughly two thirds of the book is given over to brief though penetrating glimpses of such diverse topics as DP camps in Germany, the guilt psychology of post-war German youth, the reincarnation of Hiroshima, the hostage city of Hong Kong, the Korean War, and varied incidents of his travels in India and Pakistan. This part of the book is fascinating reading. Mr. Cousins can write sympathetically and stir the emotions without becoming sentimental. These chapters are written for Americans; they should be read by Americans of all ages, for they supply useful information that will fill many voids. More important, perhaps, they provide valuable correctives

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to the vast amount of misinformation that is even more detrimental to international understanding.

This biographical portion of the book, entitled "People and Places", is the most interesting. It is worth reading for its own sake—and as a matter of fact bears only indirectly upon the final third which under the heading of "Ideas and Decisions" deals primarily with world government—its desirability, attainability and inevitability. Here the essential argument is that the shrinkage of the world has rendered the nation-state obsolete as a spokesman for or protector of man's interests—survival on a high level of existence. In a world reduced to geographical unity, he contends, defense and survival unity and the power of decision in security matters must also be brought under a single sovereignty.

If sovereignty means the power of a nation to retain independence of decision, the author insists that the old sovereignty argument has disappeared. He explains that under modern conditions the aggressor nation makes our decisions for us, witness Pearl Harbor, Korea, our armament program, our tax rate.

Can man, through his presently constituted political agents, put into commission an organization that will function well enough to survive until it gains the strength to endure? Mr. Cousins is hopeful. As an active advocate of world federalism and a veteran of many campaigns in its behalf he has heard all the stock arguments against world government raised by the doubters and "realists": the surrender of sovereignty, loss of control over internal affairs, the Russian obstacle—the futility of trying to gain her assent and the impossibility of success of any world government attempt that does not include her. Attention is given to each of these points. He also deals briefly with practical problems of procedure—the implementation of any proposal for world government, that is, the succession of step-by-step moves from where we now stand—organizationally speaking—to the world federation he envisages.

Has Mr. Cousins attempted to cover too much ground in a single book? His thesis is so attractive and so solidly based in logic—and need—that a more fully reasoned examination is needed, not only of the organizational but also of the political and legal complexities that stand as real and stubbornly lifelike obstacles to the kind of world we want so much. One is left with the feeling that Mr. Cousins has stopped too soon. He gets his foot in the door, shows his merchandise, makes an excellent presentation but because his demonstration is hurried and unconvincing he fails to close his sale.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN

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*Freedom: A New Analysis.* By MAURICE CRANSTON. London, New York, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1953.—vii, 177 pp. 12/6; $3.00.

The latest sympathetic ripple from J. S. Mill's *Liberty* is written in a disarming logic whose initial casualness gives way to Thomistic certainty before the paragraph is out. Cranston writes with that assured clarity, understatement and fairness known as the "Oxford touch". This makes for very convincing reading, especially when combined with an *au courant* semantic analysis. We are reminded that adding an adjective to the substantive does not clear the air of ambiguity. "*Economic* freedom" still means one thing to Senator Byrd and another to Clement Attlee.

Cranston excels at this "what do you mean by . . .?" attack. His analysis is exhilarating in this regard even though he concludes with the not too unfamiliar point that freedom varies with its context. The author probably first arouses antagonists with his somewhat abrupt treatment of the rationalists' conception of freedom.

Cranston refuses to allow the rationalists to claim that they are offering a value judgment and not a definition of freedom. He admits, for instance, that the Christian precept "The service of God is perfect freedom" *is* an acceptable value judgment and not a definition of the word "freedom". But a similar resolution is denied the rationalists. "None of the theorists of *rational* freedom has spoken of 'perfect freedom'; they have spoken of 'freedom', and those who have spoken of '*true* freedom' have surely used the word 'true' as opposed to 'false', and not as opposed to 'inferior'." This is an astonishing interpretation of the English Hegelians, against whom this charge is principally leveled. The author could hardly have made this indictment if he had understood what he earlier derisively refers to as Bosanquet's (that is, a rationalist's) "rarefied self". First of all, the rationalist's approach to the problem of freedom is metaphysical and not psychological. Psychology sees all reality as equally real. For the rationalist, reality is graduated. Reason itself is defined as a process from the less to the more coherent. The self is more or less real in proportion to its degree of realization. Similarly, freedom is a matter of degree. Only by interpreting a fact for himself and assigning it his own value does man demonstrate his capacity for freedom. Man has to master or acquire his freedom just as he has to acquire knowledge or goodness; and there are degrees of freedom as there are degrees of knowledge and virtue.

There is a soft spot in Cranston's heart for *rational freedom* as "self-discipline" in opposition to the "discipline" of *compulsory rational freedom* (p. 29); the one a private ethic, the second a social ethic. This illustrates the burden of the author's debt to Mill. Mill never could trace his line

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between "self-regarding" and "other regarding" acts to his or critics' satisfaction. Rationalists have suggested that an individual does not resent the intrusion of *any* force upon his isolation. The question should be of the nature and tendency of such intrusions, not so much of their origin (that is, from others).

This debt to Mill also colors Cranston's criticism of *étatiste* liberalism. Unable to resolve the "paradox of self-government" (that is, selves are governed by other selves), the author refuses to believe that freedom may be furthered by increasing state power. This is refuted not only by the arguments of rationalists (especially Bosanquet), but by the history of civil liberties in continental Europe.

The *New Analysis* is at its best in a concluding critique on "The Freedom of the Will". The reader is led past the usual *cul-de-sacs* in this argumentative labyrinth by the patient hand and terse logic of the author.

EDWARD R. CAIN

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*The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment.* Edited by COLEMAN WOODBURY. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.—xix, 764 pp. $9.00.

*Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices.* Edited by COLEMAN WOODBURY. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953.—xvi, 525 pp. $7.50.

This pair of volumes is the first attempt at a comprehensive examination of the complex issues involved in urban redevelopment—defined in the broadest terms as "... those policies, measures, and activities that would do away with the major forms of physical blight in cities and bring about changes in urban structure and institutions contributing to a favorable environment for a healthy civic, economic, and social life for all urban dwellers." It represents the principal product of the Urban Redevelopment Study, conducted by Coleman Woodbury and his associates over a period of more than three years, under an administrative committee composed of municipal and planning officials and with the aid of a $100,000 grant of the Spelman Fund.

The two books contain sixteen individual contributions prepared by nineteen authors and cover a wide variety of subjects. In *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, six short essays by city planners are followed by three major research studies on industrial location and urban redevelopment, urban redevelopment and the urbanite, and local govern-

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ment organization in metropolitan areas. To give perspective to the whole enterprise, the concluding part of this volume, written by the editor, analyzes the evolution of urban development and redevelopment since the turn of the century, with emphasis on urban planning, local government finance, organizations for the improvement of local government, and representation and leadership in urban public affairs.

The companion volume, *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices*, presents six technical papers on measuring the quality of housing in planning for urban redevelopment, urban densities and their costs, private covenants in urban redevelopment, rehabilitation and similar programs short of slum clearance, relocation of displaced tenants, and eminent domain in acquiring subdivision and open land for redevelopment.

The Urban Redevelopment Study has brought together, under two covers, a large body of existing materials which were scattered or insufficiently analyzed. This is its chief value. For many years to come the two books will, therefore, be a useful source of reference and consultation both to students of urban life and to technicians interested in specific redevelopment problems. In some of the major papers, such as those on industrial location and on the "urbanite", new research undertaken in conjunction with the project has added to existing knowledge.

At the same time, the volumes reflect all of the uncertainties and diverse opinions on the future of cities and on publicly aided redevelopment as a means of preserving or advancing their rôle in our society, the lack of focus bedeviling the field of urbanism, and the difficulty even of selecting the most relevant questions needing to be answered for sound decision-making. They show the common weaknesses of symposia drawing on a large number of authors. Moreover, the reader has difficulty finding a common denominator for contributions written at three sharply differing levels: the highly subjective essays by city planners who, in most instances, restate in a few pages their known and often conflicting views on what urban communities ought to be; the solid, book-length research studies on major aspects of urban life; and the technical papers which deal with operating problems important to redevelopment. An organizing principle that would furnish a common intellectual framework for a study of this kind is yet to be developed. Maybe there is none. In its absence, a more operational definition of the urban redevelopment problem and a more uniform level and depth of individual contributions might have made for an even more useful product with greater penetration.

Catherine Bauer in her brilliant opening essay, "Redevelopment: A Misfit in the Fifties", raises highly relevant questions but hardly comes to grips with them in nineteen pages: Why is progress in redevelopment so

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slow? What are its positive goals, granting agreement on the desirability of doing away with slums and blighted areas? Are we trying to do the right thing at the wrong time, when demand presses hard on the supply of all real estate facilities and land and building costs are excessively high? Is public aid for urban redevelopment compatible with national security considerations which argue for decentralization? But few of her questions are subjected to thorough analysis in the rest of the volumes.

The economics of urban redevelopment is almost entirely ignored. Public aid under present programs includes land assembly and clearance and the subsidization of the write-down of land costs. Private enterprise is assigned the major rôle in rebuilding. Under these circumstances, questions such as the demand for new real estate facilities on thousands of slum acres at rents high enough to meet building costs, the effects of reduced land costs on rents, and the prospects for changing the locational preferences of land users through redevelopment are of strategic importance. This reviewer—an economist—perhaps yields to his prejudices when he ventures the opinion that these and similar items will control the future of urban redevelopment as immediately and forcefully as some of the issues treated at length in the two volumes.

LEO GREBLER

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## BOOK NOTES

In October 1950 the Institute of Pacific Relations held a conference at Lucknow, India, attended by delegates from sixteen countries. Summaries of the discussions are published in *Asian Nationalism and the West: A Symposium Based on Documents and Reports of the Eleventh Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1953; viii, 449 pp. $5.00), edited by William L. Holland. The book also includes three of the more important documents prepared for the conference. Professor George McT. Kahin writes on Indonesia, Philippe Devillers on Vietnam, and T. H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz on Malaya. Malaya suffers from a plethora of nationalisms—Malay, Chinese and Indian—and its British rulers are trying to supersede them by the creation of a fourth, Malayan nationalism which shall unite all three Asian races. Their aim is the creation of a self-governing Malaya where racial harmony and coöperation will replace the fear and hostility which today split the population three ways. Unless the attempt succeeds, Britain's policy of replacing her control by a parliamentary democracy is certain to fail. The authors give a careful analysis of the situation but tacitly admit that little success has been attained. It is their opinion that "withdrawal of British power would compel the Malays to fight to hold their position; and in such a fight, though the Chinese would probably ultimately win, most of their wealth would be destroyed." Events subsequent to the publication of the book tend to strengthen the authors' conclusions. The problem of nationalism in Vietnam assumes a different and more orthodox form—a revolt against colonial rule which the Communist minority has exploited for its own benefit. M. Devillers believes that a compromise with the Vietminh rebels could have been made in 1946, but that France lost this and later opportunities of ending the war by the slow and grudging concessions which she made to Vietnamese nationalism. This played into the hands of the Communists, who riveted their control over the Vietminh partly by a judicious combination of appeals to nationalism and totalitarian methods. Bao Dai extorted a far larger measure of self-government than the French had bargained for; but the concessions were inadequate to wean the Vietminh nationalists from their support of Ho Chi Minh. M. Devillers' opinion is that "the time has passed when France could have obtained lasting results by the use of force", and that her only recourse is to salvage what she can of her interests by arranging a settlement which is acceptable to



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the people of Vietnam. Professor Kahin gives a detailed and careful analysis of the government and political parties of Indonesia, and the grave problems which have to be solved. Apart from establishing law and order and an effective administration, the rulers have to transform government by the educated minority into a democracy. They have also to satisfy the exaggerated hopes of a higher standard of living which were aroused among the masses during the struggle against the Dutch. Altogether this book gives a sober and informative appraisal of Asian nationalisms.—LENNOX A. MILLS, University of Minnesota.

*The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International Cooperation*, by George Arthur Codding, Jr. (Leiden, Holland, E. J. Brill, 1952; xvi, 505 pp. 25.— guilders), is definitely a book for the specialists—either in international organization or in telecommunications. It is thorough and comprehensive and therefore, as seems almost inevitable, a little dull. The author might have played up the element of conflict introduced by the "cold war" and the dramatic use of radio frequencies for guided missiles—but then there would have been a misplaced focus which would have lost the depth of history through which the I.T.U. has evolved and the daily chores which are so important, if undramatic. The book starts with the founding of the International Telegraph Union in 1865; describing its creation, structure, development and function. A similar study is then made of the International Radiotelegraph Union which came into being forty years later. In 1932, at the Madrid Conference, the two Unions were fused into the International Telecommunication Union. Mr. Codding describes these happenings in full academic detail and the subsequent meetings at Brussels and Lucerne (1933), the First Inter-American Radio Conference, the Conferences at Cairo in 1938 and at Montreux in 1939. World War II forced a rapid development in radiocommunications while the post-war sentiment was for an all-encompassing system of international organization. This led to a fundamental reorganization of the Union proposed by the United States to the Inter-American Radio Conference in 1945 and the Moscow Preparatory Conference in 1946. The results of the subsequent meeting at Atlantic City were the creation of a self-sufficient, independent organization which contained the important International Frequency Registration Board, and which was given a prominent place in the international scene. The main achievement of the Atlantic City Conferences was the establishment of an Administrative Council which has since assumed complete authority over all of the other permanent organs of the Union. The functions of the General Secretariat have not changed, but it has increased in size in order to undertake the new tasks assigned to it at Atlantic City.

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Mr. Codding points out that the staff needs to be "internationalized"—the majority are still Swiss—but that this will take time. Most of the technical work of the I.T.U. is accomplished in the Consultative Committees where there is, usually, a free exchange of ideas without political influences. Unfortunately, financial considerations have hindered the Committees in achieving their full effectiveness by not allowing full secretarial strength. This is a general consideration for the Union as a whole and it cannot fully perform its great tasks without an adequate budget. Mr. Codding has written a valuable study on the evolution of international coöperation which will be consulted for many years by scholars and students. It definitely deserves a place on the shelves of those whose interests run in this direction.—HERBERT MAZA, New York City.

Robert Marjolin has been the presiding genius of much of the cooperative effort for economic recovery in Western Europe since 1947. As Secretary General of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation—the organization of European Marshall Plan countries—he has directed an international secretariat that provided the statistical and analytical basis for much of the discussion of European recovery. More important perhaps, he has been at the center of most of the negotiations among the O.E.E.C. countries where, we may feel sure, he exerted a strong influence for moderation, effective action and the broad view. Marjolin's little book—*Europe and the United States in the World Economy* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1953; xiv, 105 pp. $2.00)—combines his intimate knowledge and balanced judgment with a succinct and lucid exposition of some of the major problems of European recovery. The result is easily the best short account of the subject that is available. The five chapters deal with the results of the Marshall Plan, the impact of post-Korean developments, European integration, the European Payments Union, and the dollar problem as it relates to Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world. Originally lectures given at Duke in the fall of 1951, the book's latest data refer to the summer of that year. Specialists will not find new material here; Marjolin is, after all, an international civil servant with about twenty governments looking over his shoulder, so inevitably he cannot go far beyond the bounds of the O. E. E. C.'s official position. Much of what he says has already appeared in annual and special reports by the O. E. E. C. and the E. P. U., but his selection of subjects for attention and his distribution of emphasis are themselves of interest. And for those who do not want to pursue these matters to their source, Marjolin's review is a readable, informative and authoritative guide.—WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., New York City.

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In *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953; x, 524 pp. $7.50) Donald Creighton, Professor of History at the University of Toronto, portrays the first half of the life of the principal architect and first Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada. A second volume will trace Macdonald's career from 1867 to his death in 1891. The completed work will be the only large-scale biography of Macdonald in nearly sixty years. It will be the first to be based on a critical use of the great collection of Macdonald Papers in the Public Archives at Ottawa as well as on other manuscript and printed sources, including newspapers, in Canada and the United Kingdom. Professor Creighton has had not only the industry necessary to work through all this material, but also a gift for organization and a literary style which have enabled him to reduce it to order and present the results in readable form. His volume is a first-rate book, distinguished in its scholarship, penetrating in its analysis of character and policies, and highly interesting. It does for Macdonald what Beveridge did for the greater figure of Lincoln. Incidental to its analysis of the way in which a small-town lawyer became a provincial politician and then a nation-builder is a picture of Kingston life and society in the early nineteenth century. It is especially good on the process of competition and accommodation between the old Loyalist Anglican group and the new Scottish Presbyterians who came in after Waterloo and to whom, of course, Macdonald, born in Scotland in 1815, belonged. Then, as the stage enlarged after the Act of Union of 1840 and as Macdonald grew in activity and power, there is much general political history—party shifts and stratagems, the fear of invasion from the United States, the problem of the future of British North America. Roughly the last third of the book deals with the coming of Confederation. Professor Creighton has a great knack for making the politics of a past day come alive again. Even when the events with which he deals, such as those preceding New Brunswick's accession to Confederation, are really quite well known, he makes us feel the tension in the situation as it must have been felt by contemporaries. Except in one respect, indeed, Professor Creighton has set a new standard for Canadian political biography. He has not succeeded in escaping a certain censoriousness toward the United States that used to be common in Canadian scholarship before Canada became a mature nation. It is a small blemish, perhaps, but a surprising one to appear in a book that is otherwise so judiciously written.—THOMAS P. PEARDON, Barnard College.

*The Cooperative Road to Abundance: The Alternative to Monopolism and Communism*, by E. R. Bowen (New York, Henry Schuman, Inc., 1953; xiii, 169 pp. $3.00), exemplifies Professor Kenneth Boulding's thesis that

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"good will is in no sense a substitute for scientific competence" (*Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Economics*, 1952, p. 18). Mr. Bowen, for many years an executive of the Agricultural Power Machinery Company, retired from business to devote his full labors to the establishment of the coöperative movement as the basis of our economy. Unfortunately, his zeal and devotion for his task are unaccompanied by ability to analyze complicated economic institutions. The thesis of the book is that cooperation rather than competition is the necessary and sufficient condition for economic abundance. Communism and monopolism, although mentioned in the subtitle, are rarely discussed in the text. The author supports his thesis in two ways: (1) Innumerable quotations in favor of coöperation by leaders in many fields are cited, and (2) competition is vigorously attacked. Some people may find a collection of quotations favoring coöperation interesting reading; if so, Mr. Bowen's book will please. In this respect, the book apes Bartlett. If, however, the reader wishes a comparative economic analysis of coöperation and competition, he has come to the wrong place. In spite of a diligent search of the text, the reviewer was unable to determine even what the author meant by coöperation, but it was clear that the author favored it. The attacks on the evils of competition usually combine inaccurate statements about the American economy with fuzzy thoughts about specific solutions. For example, Mr. Bowen apparently thinks that the American economy can be divided into two classes only: rich and poor (p. 31). The existence of a vast prosperous middle class which is the wonder and envy of the modern world remains unrecognized. According to Mr. Bowen, the introduction of coöperation is needed to end the alleged division between rich and poor. Only then would everyone be "getting a fair share of property, employment and income" (p. 64). He is completely fuzzy as to what constitutes "fairness" in income distribution. Thus an equitable distribution is *not* an identical one but rather one based on "people's needs" (p. 15). But how does one measure people's needs in sufficiently precise terms to be useful in distributing the national income? And even if needs could be measured appropriately, would not the termination of the present method of income distribution (based on contribution to the production of marketable goods and services) have a highly adverse effect on total production? And is not increased total production rather than more equal income distribution the real solution to poverty? The requirements for academic promotion being what they are, there can be no realistic fear of a dearth of publications from qualified economists. Adam Smith correctly stated that the wealth of nations was based on the division of labor. Perhaps Mr. Bowen should have heeded this precept.—Leon Quinto, Pennsylvania State College.

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In his Introduction to *Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953; xiv, 558 pp. $7.50), Clinton Rossiter explains that his purpose is to study "the political ideas that sustained the rise of liberty in Colonial and Revolutionary America" (p. 1). Believing that the eighteenth-century emphasis upon a "philosophy of ethical, ordered liberty" (p. 1) was a product of the colonial experience, he devotes the first five chapters to an analysis of the political, religious, economic and social circumstances which explain this emphasis. The second part deals with men who exemplified and contributed to this tradition: Thomas Hooker, Roger Williams, John Wise, Jonathan Mayhew, Richard Bland and Benjamin Franklin. The last part analyzes in an exceptionally comprehensive way Revolutionary ideas about the rights of man and the objects of government. Great pains have been taken to organize the material logically and to write with enthusiasm and imagination. No one who reads this work will ever again be ignorant about the growth of liberty in America. *Seedtime of History* could not have been written if an imposing number of works in colonial history had not already been published. The author generously acknowledges his debt to those who have written "in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy" as well as to a number of historians who have written more than one book. Nevertheless the author has done some independent thinking and investigation. He refuses to accept Perry Miller's interpretation of Thomas Hooker as well as certain views of Joseph Dorfman. His investigations have taken him along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Charleston. Therefore it is perhaps not his fault that he is unable to stimulate us with any new interpretations, if indeed to do so was ever a part of his intentions. It is much clearer that it was his intention to demonstrate that the philosophy of liberty enunciated between 1765 and 1776 has been a philosophy to which the American people have adhered ever since. Mr. Rossiter is willing to concede that this philosophy may be a "huge mistake" (p. 449) in an age of power elites and other phenomena of our times, but he thinks it would be wrong to anticipate our abandonment of them. If he is right, his book contributes not only to our understanding of the past, but also to the present and the future.—CHILTON WILLIAMSON, Barnard College.

Based on a fresh appraisal of the sources, this careful, well-written monograph—*The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953; x, 310 pp. $6.00) by Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan—clarifies many details with respect to the colonial crisis of 1765–66, although it does little to modify basic views and inter-

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pretations. The account of John Robinson as Collector of Customs in Rhode Island is one of the most illuminating descriptions of the reaction to the Sugar Act, for example, while the discussion of British leadership in the period throws new light on Grenville's strategy with regard to the Stamp Act. Among the best of many fine chapters is one entitled "Nullification: Ports and Courts" where the authors demonstrate, better than any previous students, the ramifications involved in defying the Stamp Act and the dilemma that confronted the colonials. And the ironic twists in the unfortunate careers of such men as Thomas Hutchinson are delineated with greater fullness and understanding than heretofore. Although the authors stress anew that the nature of the crisis was constitutional, they depart from accepted ideas when they argue cogently that the colonials did not make a distinction in 1765 between internal and external taxation, but rather between the power of parliament to legislate for the empire while denying its power to tax, a distinction that appeared inexplicable to most Englishmen. Although the authors tend to minimize the exceptions to this thesis (and to forget that standard writers such as Van Tyne did not emphasize the internal-external tax concept), the bulk of the evidence seems to substantiate their assertion. The most serious criticism of this work stems from the inadequate attention given to the experience of the colonies during the first six decades of the eighteenth century, that important period of maturation. The violent reactions to the Stamp Act and the constitutional questions posed and answered have been commented upon many times, but why the unity of purpose and thought in 1765 in contrast to the comparative disunity earlier? That agreement among the colonials was more general at the time of this act than in later stages of the Revolutionary crisis has often been acknowledged. But why? And why did the colonies from Massachusetts through Georgia object so vigorously while other plantations within the empire acquiesced? These important questions, largely unanswered in this monograph, can only be illuminated by a discriminating examination of the eighteenth-century background. Many scholars will question matters of lesser importance: quoting Governor Bernard to the effect that the country people were as strenuously opposed to the Stamp Act as the urban areas—perhaps an accurate and important observation—but then failing to pursue this point; failing to integrate the question of taxation with the other problems arising out of the imperial policies; subscribing, without analysis, to the too long accepted thesis that the British were really desperate for revenue; assuming John Hughes's evaluation of Pennsylvania politics—what might be labeled the "anti-Presbyterian-Presbyterian" explanation—to be valid; slipping too easily into categories of "conservative" and "radical" factions when explaining an episode

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rather than emphasizing how few colonials actually supported the Stamp Act; treating the Non-Importation Agreements so casually as to distort their significance; and seeing the reaction to the Stamp Act so much through the eyes of New England that other colonies, particularly those south of Pennsylvania, tend to be neglected. Despite these criticisms, this significant monograph is required reading for anyone interested in those eventful years preceding the American Revolution.—CLARENCE L. VER STEEG, Northwestern University.

The passions aroused in the great foreign policy controversy of thirteen years ago have now moved into new channels. They have not subsided, however, and for the long future the wisdom of the choice we made in 1940 will continue to be debated, if only because such argument serves as a catharsis for a generation that no longer enjoys clear foreign policy alternatives. Extremely useful for this protracted post-mortem is Wayne S. Cole's *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941* (Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953; xi, 305 pp. $3.50). A fair-minded history of the articulate committee that opposed itself to the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, this book will be read as a complement to Walter Johnson's *The Battle Against Isolation* which appeared in 1944. Mr. Cole has had access to the papers of the America First Committee and is thus able to clear up a number of questions that contemporaries asked about the group's program and financial backing. On the other hand, the extent to which Anglophobia, anti-New Dealism, and anti-Semitism were elements in America First is discussed but not analyzed in close detail. Undoubtedly the membership composition varied from one part of the country to another but a breakdown of the rolls of typical chapters by class, political affiliation, educational background, etc. could provide an invaluable insight into the domestic dynamics of foreign policy formulation. Cole's presentation embodies merely a straightforward but well-rounded discussion of America First's leadership, organization and rhetoric. He demonstrates on the basis of carefully documented research that the Committee's national leaders tried to keep subversives out—Fascists and Communists alike—and that no contribution over one hundred dollars was accepted without an investigation of its source. But, he states, local chapters were less vigilant. Furthermore, Cole contends, Charles A. Lindbergh's Des Moines speech of 11 September 1941 "complicated the problem of preventing anti-Semites and pro-Fascists from working through the Committee." What emerges from this book and what must remain as an ineradicable judgment on America First is that it had no lucid conception of the possible power relationship of the United States to a victorious

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Nazi Germany. As the author notes: "Many speakers at America First meetings spent more time attacking the interventionists than in positively stating the noninterventionist point of view." This is not to say that sincere pacifists, as such, were not active in its rank; it is to say that its meaning as an organization can be understood only in the light of a much more searching investigation than we have yet had of the ingredients of isolationism—a subject not less important today than on the eve of Pearl Harbor. A key in such a study is the curious and significant fact that, if America First never developed plans to keep us out of war with Japan, isolationists in general have never adjudged embroilment in the Pacific as equally distasteful with similar involvement in the Atlantic.—Henry F. Graff, Columbia University.

Volume XIII of *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, edited by Raymond Dennett and Katherine D. Durant (Princeton, Princeton University Press, for World Peace Foundation, 1953; xxiv, 626 pp. $7.50), which deals with the foreign affairs of the United States in 1951, maintains the high standards set by the earlier volumes in this series. No other non-official collection of documents on contemporary foreign policy is so comprehensive or detailed, and few source books in any field are better edited. Published soon after the period it covers, the volume does not provide the inside story of American diplomacy. It does, however, bring together a large amount of material essential to an understanding of recent diplomatic history. Since most of the documents in this volume have been reprinted either from the publications of the United States government and the United Nations or from the columns of the *New York Times*, they are already available to anyone who wishes to take the trouble to look for them. *Documents on American Foreign Relations* not only saves the student this trouble, but it also furnishes him with material that might otherwise be overlooked and it arranges this material in a meaningful pattern. The editors of the volume have a refreshingly broad view of the range of foreign relations. They have reprinted speeches and debates as well as treaties and diplomatic notes, and they have recognized that economic, social and cultural relations are as much a part of foreign affairs as alliances and international conferences. The editors are also to be commended for their skillful abridgements of many of the documents and for their concise and informative introductions and summaries.—Harold C. Syrett, Columbia University.

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